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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the effects that different political regime types and
institutional arrangements have on the amount of foreign policy change occurring a state.
Scholars in International Relations studying the democratic peace have identified a
relationship between characteristics of democracy and non-democracy and the behavior
of states. Scholars in Comparative Politics have noted that certain institutions more
easily facilitate policy change. This dissertation synthesizes these perspectives and
develops and tests a number of hypotheses relating regime type, institutional
arrangement, and party system to the amount of foreign policy change a state undertakes.
Employing a pooled, cross-sectional time series design, the findings show that
democracies are more stable in their foreign policies than are non-democracies, and that
states with different political institutions and party systems differ with regard to the
amount of foreign policy change they undertake.

vi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1980s, scholars of foreign policy began to examine what was
called "a neglected phenomenon" in foreign policy – the study of foreign policy
change. Real- world events and attempts to improve the development of theory led
scholars to address questions of when, why and how states restructure and reorient
their foreign policies. The study of foreign policy change is an important endeavor.
Significant foreign policy changes can be disruptive to the international system, with
ramifications felt throughout the world. The study of foreign policy change also
provides unique opportunities to examine the dynamics of the foreign policy decisionmaking process and those factors that influence and constrain it.
The bulk of scholarly work in the area of foreign policy change has consisted
largely of theoretical frameworks, single case studies, or studies of particular groups
of countries. Notably lacking are major empirical studies that cast explanatory
variables across time and space, providing results that can be generalized across
multiple cases. The purpose of this dissertation is to test empirically a series of
variables that have previously been largely ignored in the study of foreign policy
change and to do so in a way that produces generalizable results.
Specifically, this dissertation will test the effects that different regime types
and institutional arrangements have on the amount of foreign policy change a state
will undertake. While the concept of regime has received extensive treatment in
recent years throughout the international relations literature, it has yet to be applied in
any meaningful way to a study of foreign policy change. Scholars have explored the
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various factors that contribute to regime change (Gasiorowski, 1995) as well as the
effects that regimes changes have on the international environment (Maoz, 1996). The
concept of regime is central to ongoing debates on the democratic peace. During the
Clinton years, the pursuit, support and sustainment of democracy became enshrined in
U.S. foreign policy with the goal of reducing the threat of hostilities between nations
throughout the world (see Lake, 1993). Despite all these activities, when studying the
factors that might influence foreign policy change, the significant role that regime
settings may play has received little attention. This dissertation will apply regime
setting as an explanatory variable and examine how regime types influence foreign
policy change.
Another set of explanatory variables for this dissertation will be developed by
incorporating ideas found in the comparative politics literature regarding institutions
and the different outcomes they produce. This topic was pursued with renewed
interest as the "third wave" of democratization swept the world in the 1970s and 1980s
(Huntington, 1991). The international relations literature, however, has been slow to
keep pace. Only very recently have scholars begun to look below the level of the two
major regime types to examine the influence that the myriad of institutional
arrangements available might have on conflict behavior and foreign policy. This
dissertation will develop a number of hypotheses about the role institutional
arrangements and party systems have on foreign policy change.
The next chapter of this dissertation provides an overview of the development
of comparative foreign policy and the study of foreign policy change. It will also
specify where this dissertation fits in the foreign policy change literature, as well as
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how it will contribute to the field and foster a better understanding of foreign policy
change.
The third chapter will develop the hypothesis regarding regimes and foreign
policy change. With insights from the literature, the chapter will explain how different
regime types can create both constraints and incentives for foreign policy change, and
will specify how the different regimes might differently impact a decisionmaker’s
ability and willingness to undertake foreign policy change.
The fourth chapter develops the remaining hypotheses in this dissertation with
theoretical explanations regarding the ways in which different institutional
arrangements create incentives and disincentives for foreign policy change.
Specifically, this chapter will address presidential and parliamentary systems, the
different party systems found therein, the makeup of governments, as well as
differences in certain types of non-democratic regimes and the influence that
underdevelopment might have on a state's foreign policy stability.
The fifth chapter will operationalize each of the variables and
methodologically test each of the hypotheses using a pooled, cross-sectional time
series design. The sixth chapter will provide a discussion of the findings and
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

The purpose of this dissertation is to develop and test a series of hypotheses
related to how regimes and institutions – which guide state-society relations, political
arrangements and decisionmaking in states – constrain and influence a policymaker's
ability to undertake foreign policy change by comparing and contrasting democracies,
non-democracies and host of other institutional arrangements and how they impact
foreign policy change. The questions raised in this dissertation fall within a subfield
of international relations known as "comparative foreign policy" or "foreign policy
analysis.” Developed in the 1960s, comparative foreign policy arose as a reaction
against more "traditional" methods of study, and sought to develop theories of foreign
policy at multiple levels of analysis and explanation. Within the subfield, this
dissertation addresses questions of foreign policy change, which emerged as a topic of
inquiry in the 1980s. Scholars addressing foreign policy change are specifically
interested in cases where states change their foreign policies from a previous position
— how it occurs, when it occurs and what factors serve to influence it. This chapter
provides an overview of the development of comparative foreign policy and foreign
policy change as a research question. It also identifies areas where this dissertation
will build upon and improve upon other works, incorporate important explanatory
variables into the debate, and contribute significantly to a better understanding of
foreign policy change.
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The Development of Comparative Foreign Policy: Antecedents
Although the study, evaluation and analysis of foreign policy is as old as the
study of politics itself, a coherent and focused effort to study foreign policy
comparatively is relatively new, developed by a fairly small number of scholars
working in the 1960s. Commonly identified as “the comparative study of foreign
policy,” “comparative foreign policy” or “foreign policy analysis,” the approach
emerged as a challenge to the prevailing methodological practices and theoretical
assumptions of the day. Methodologically, these scholars were challenging a
“traditionalist” approach to the study of international relations and foreign policy,
which was skeptical of efforts to predict or apply probability analysis to human affairs.
Instead, traditionalists applied “judgment, intuition and insight in arriving at their
conclusions” after subjectively examining and interpreting the evidence.
Traditionalists saw no need to quantify their findings and instead focused on single
events or problems that they used to understand “the subtlety of detail” (Dougherty
and Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 29).
Theoretically, scholars of comparative foreign policy came to challenge many
of the assumptions central to the realist paradigm (see Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1973).
Realists argue that the international system is characterized by a “struggle for power,”
where states pursue power as a means to ensure their safety and survival. Since all
states operate in the same anarchical international system, realists argue that all states
will pursue their foreign policies in essentially the same way – with national security
as the paramount goal. Realists assume that decisionmakers, as rational actors,
consciously follow a goal-oriented process by which they evaluate all available
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information about an international event before choosing the best alternative that will
maximize their goals.
Realists characterize states as unitary actors – “billiard balls” that all collide
and interact with each other in exactly the same way. Foreign policy decisions are
made in a “black box,” in that sources of foreign policy decisions are seen as external.
Other factors, such as economics, political systems, size, and individual leadership
characteristics are not regarded as an important influence. Though the tenets of
realism can be traced back more than two thousand years, the theory’s emphasis on
self-reliance, military might, the balance of power, and the pursuit of the national
interest gained a strong following among scholars and practitioners following World
War II. While the comparative study of foreign policy and the realist paradigm are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, comparative foreign policy, almost by definition,
challenged some key assumptions of realism— primarily, that foreign policy decisions
are made by rational actors behaving in the national security interests of the state, that
states are unitary actors, and that the emphasis on power accumulation is a primary
foreign policy goal.
The Development of Comparative Foreign Policy
Surveys of comparative foreign policy generally identify the work of Richard
Snyder and his associates as being the first major effort to theorize about foreign
policy in a scientific matter (see Hermann and Peacock, 1987; Gerner, 1995; Hudson
and Vore, 1995). Contrary to the assumptions of realism, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin
held that sources of foreign policy could be found in individual decisionmakers and
the context in which they operated:
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We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of
analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a
metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing
decisionmaking as a central focus we have provided a
way of organizing the determinants of action around
those officials who act for the political society.
Decisionmakers are viewed as operating in a dual-aspect
setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external
factors become related in the actions of the
decisionmakers (Snyder, et. al., 1954: 53).
Central to their approach was a decisionmaker’s “definition of the situation,”
which results from a number of factors, including the competence of actors in the
decision- making unit, the flow of communication among members, their individual
motivations, personal attributes, values, and perceptions. While the Snyder
framework did not lead to any real substantive scholarly works, it was an important
contribution in that it challenged political scientists to begin looking at the decisionmaking process itself to explain foreign policy. Comparative foreign policy, however,
did not gain momentum as a distinct discipline until more than a decade later.
The individual generally credited with launching the field of comparative
foreign policy is James N. Rosenau. Though he was not the first to advocate a
scientific or comparative approach to the study of foreign policy, his work in the mid
to late 1960s was the first “self-conscious appeal” to develop coherent, comprehensive
generalizations on which to build testable hypotheses. He decried the lack of general
theory in the area of foreign policy. While great strides had been made in
“inventorying determinants of external behavior,” the field had “not even begun to
take shape as a theoretical enterprise” (Rosenau, 1980:119):
To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To
uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to
explain how and why they are operative under certain
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circumstances and not under others. To recognize that
foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external
factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or
indicate the conditions under which one predominates
the other. (ibid.: 118).
Ronsenau charged that work in the field was largely non-theoretical, noncomparable, and non-cumulative, consisting of an abundance of frameworks; studies
into the behavior of a specific country at a specific time; or “partial,” non-comparable,
non-cumulative theories that focused exclusively on single sources of foreign policy
behavior. In response, Rosenau aggressively championed the building of general
theory in foreign policy through the development of “if- then hypotheses” that would
enable scholars to determine under what conditions different sources of foreign policy
influence the process. This, he hoped, would lead to cumulative, comparable research
that would advance the study of foreign policy beyond that of simple diplomatic
histories – and into a true science of foreign policy.
Rosenau laid the groundwork for this theory building through his "pre-theory"
of foreign policy. This framework sought to provide direction for the comparative
study of foreign policy by grouping all possible foreign policy source variables into
one of five manageable variable clusters, and assessing the "relative potencies" of each
of the variable clusters according to the conditions under which each would most
likely contribute to foreign policy behavior.
Through this, and other subsequent pieces (particularly his 1968 “fad, fantasy,
or field” article), Rosenau made the case that launched the comparative study of
foreign policy as a distinct field of inquiry. Rosenau sought to make the study of
foreign policy into a true science and more methodologically rigorous by analyzing
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the phenomenon “in terms of independent, intervening, and dependent variables that
are operational and manipulable” (Rosenau, 1975: 109).
Comparative Foreign Policy Approaches
The scholars who responded to this call for a more scientific study of foreign
policy are frequently referred to as the “first generation” of comparative foreign policy
scholars. They shared a commitment to the study of foreign policy that contained two
central features that helped establish and shape their early research agendas — a
commitment to the study of foreign policy phenomenon “as the object of inquiry,” and
a commitment to the use of comparative methods (Hermann and Peacock, 1987).
For first generation scholars, “foreign policy behavior” was itself the primary
object of inquiry. Early attempts to code and quantify foreign policy behavior, such as
the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project, sought to shift
the focus from foreign policy as a goal-seeking policy – and toward the more limited
but observable concept of foreign policy behavior, defined as “discrete purposeful
action that results from the political level decision of an individual or group of
individuals” (Hermann, 1978:34). Behaviors were characterized as the “observable
artifacts” of a political decision, with a specific location in time and space and with a
defined beginning and end. By focusing on behaviors rather than the decisions
themselves, researchers were free to conceptualize and explore foreign policy in new
ways. Foreign policy truly became a “variable” in that researchers could assemble,
operationalize and organize it in different ways. Foreign policy could assume
different values, as both a dependent and independent variable (Hermann 1978).
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Comparative Foreign Policy Methods and Events Data
The shared commitment to the use of comparative methods entailed three
related aspects: a commitment to multi- nation comparisons (as opposed to simple case
studies); a commitment to a comparative methodology (systematic comparison of
similar variables); and the use of scientific methods (Hermann and Peacock: 1987).
Scholars looked at variables that were assumed to exist to a greater or lesser degree in
every political system and made comparisons about the degree to which relationships
and variables influenced outcomes. These commitments combined with a focus on
foreign policy behavior helped fuel the growth of events data collection and
application in research. Events data refer to discrete foreign policy acts that can be
coded comprehensively. To foreign policy scholars, events became analogous to “the
vote” for behavioralist scholars of American politics, allowing them to “classify the
entire range of national foreign policy actions in order to allow reliable comparisons
between nations” (Hermann, 1975: 145) across time and space. A number of
extensive data sets were developed beginning in the 1970s with significant funding
from the United States government. Many are still widely used today to address
specific foreign policy questions – as is the case in this dissertation.
Early events data collection projects included Rudolph J. Rummel’s (1976)
Dimensionality of Nations (DON), which tabulated domestic and conflict variables
used to examine the relationship between domestic conflict and foreign conflict
behavior. Charles McClelland’s (1971) World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS)
captured hostile or cooperative action directed by one country toward another. The
Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project at Ohio State
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University collected data on different policy positions of states to examine the
relationships between state attributes and types of foreign policy. Singer and Small’s
(1972) Correlates of War (COW) data set was event-specific, consisting of data
complied on the frequency, severity and intensity of international wars back to 1816.
This data set remains in widespread use today by scholars studying issues related to
the democratic peace.
Edward Azar’s Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) (Azar and Sloan,
1975) classifies foreign policy events according to conflict and cooperation on a 15point weighted scale. This data set has been used as a measure to conceptualize
foreign policy change, and it will be employed as one of the dependent variables in
this dissertation. The ease and availability of events data helped fuel the growth of
comparative foreign policy research and theory building. McGowan and Shapiro’s
(1973) survey of the field found that comparative foreign policy publications in 1972
were more than double that of five years earlier and more than 14 times that of ten
years earlier.
Re-Evaluation
These developments fueled a great deal of optimism on the part of many
comparative foreign policy practitioners. Rosenau noted less than 10 years after his
“pretheories” article:
Descriptions have been supplemented by analyses, implicit
assumptions have given way to explicit propositions, unrelated
examples have been replaced by recurring patterns, and
noncomparable case studies have been complemented by
careful replications (Rosenau, 1975: 31).
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In fact, by 1975, Rosenau declared that the field had already reached the status of a
Kuhnian “normal science,” in that there was a methodological and philosophical
consensus among practitioners to such a degree that their research merely “elaborated
and refined” that of one another. Events data and the comparative method formed the
basis for the consensus, and what remained was merely “mopping up operations”
(Rosenau, 1975; 1976; McGowan, 1976).
At the same time, however, a sizable group of scholars were expressing
dissatisfaction with the direction of the field, disappointment with its inability to
achieve its grandiose goals, and doubts about its viability as a separate field altogether.
Sources of this dissatisfaction were rooted in the ways most comparative foreign
policy scholars conceptualized their inquiry – as “neopositivist inductionism,” and as a
Khunian normal science (Hudson and Vore, 1995).
While few scholars held a strict interpretation of neopositivism, one aspect of it
that was reflected in the philosophies of many of them was that of a “building
block”— that empirical findings would build one upon another until enough findings
“could be fitted together into a general or grand theory that would explain the multiple
sources of, variations in, and implications of foreign policy” (Neack, Hey and Haney,
1995:4). While early comparative foreign policy literature did lead to some wellestablished generalizations about foreign policy behavior, none of them, using a model
of cumulation, had been integrated into broader theory. In terms of a “normal
science,” while many aspects of comparative foreign policy were “Khunian” in terms
of methodological commitments, the field lacked the Kuhnian notion of a set of shared
theoretical commitments.
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The period of critical evaluation for comparative foreign policy began in the
mid 1970s and continued into the mid 1980s, beginning at conferences hosted by the
Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy (ICFP) project. The project was
established to assess contributions to the growth of cumulative science, and many at
the conference did express generally optimistic views of the field’s progress and future
(Powell, Andrus, Purkitt and Knight, 1976; Kegley and Skinner, 1976). Others,
however, were more critical, charging that the field never exhibited any “uniform,
sustained, selective cumulation” (Ashley, 1976:155), and that it was being weakened
by its division from international studies, which discouraged the synthesis of national
and systemic variables and cross- level theorizing (Munton, 1976).
Scholars came to realize that “to evolve further, comparative foreign policy
needed to jettison (1) the aim of a unified theory and (2) the methodological
straightjacket imposed by the requirements of aggregate empirical analysis” (Hudson
and Vore, 1995:221); and find ways to address issues that had long been ignored. At a
1985 conference on New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, comparative
foreign policy scholars met to reach a consensus on the new direction the field should
take. What emerged was a renewed commitment to continue comparative analysis,
but without the constraints of being wedded to a single model or quantitative
methodology. Instead, the scholars agreed to establish and pursue a more diverse
approach that incorporates different levels of analysis, perspectives and approaches.
This approach has come to characterize what has been called the second generation of
comparative foreign policy, commonly identified as “foreign policy analysis” (Neack,
Hey and Haney, 1995).
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The second generation of comparative foreign policy is distinguished from the
first not only in terms of a second generation of scholars in the field, but also a second
generation of scholarship. Second generation scholarship builds on the work of the
previous generation, but incorporates more diverse approaches to the topic. These
approaches include: the employment of a wide variety of methodologies with diverse
quantitative and qualitative techniques; drawing on numerous theoretical perspectives
from across the social sciences, especially comparativists and area specialists;
rejecting simple connections and associations, and considering multi-causal
explanations at multiple levels of analysis; rejecting the need for a “paradigmatic
core” and central methodology; and an attempt to link research to substantive concerns
of foreign policy (Neack, Hey and Haney, 1995; Hudson and Vo re, 1995).
The dividing line between first- and second- generation scholarship and
scholars is not solid. In fact, the field itself today is not so narrowly defined. Foreign
policy analysis reflects a wide area of scholarship with a common dedication to
understanding foreign policy through a wide array of approaches and perspectives.
Foreign policy analysis today is seen to be making progress as a “bridging field”
linking international relations theory, comparative politics and the foreign policy
making community (Hudson and Vore, 1995: 228). Country and area experts are now
taking a more active role in refining and testing theories developed by foreign policy
analysts, and can provide valuable insight into the characteristics of leaders,
bureaucratic politics, the role of legislative bodies and the influence of pressure
groups. This dissertation, for example, builds heavily on the contributions of
comparativists studying the role of institutions to develop hypotheses about how
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different regimes, political systems and institutional arrangements place different
constraints on, and create different incentives for, decisionmakers to undertake foreign
policy changes.
Current approaches to foreign policy analysis also provide hope that research
may bridge the gap between academia and practitioners of foreign policy. As
Alexander George notes:
Practitioners find it difficult to make use of academic
approaches such as structural realists theory and game
theory, which assume that all state actors are alike and can
be expected to behave in the same way in given situations,
and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption
that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the
contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with
actor-specific models that grasp the different internal
structures and behavioral patterns of each state and leader
with which they must deal (George, 1993:9).
The Question of Foreign Policy Change
Current trends in foreign policy analysis – with its emphasis on diverse
methodological techniques, broad theoretical perspectives, integrating approaches,
multiple levels of analysis and multi-causal explanations, and desire to be more
“policy relevant” is reflected in today’s approaches to the question of foreign policy
change.
State’s foreign policies are forever changing to some degree, and as long as
scholars have been studying foreign policy outcomes, change has been an element.
The study of change itself as a distinct subject of inquiry, however, is relatively new,
emerging in the 1970s amidst the re-evaluations ongoing in comparative foreign
policy. In fact, Rosenau himself first surfaced the issue, suggesting that one area in
which comparative foreign policy research might prove fruitful is “if the concept of
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change were fashioned into an operational dependent variable” (Rosenau, 1976b:
371).
Rosenau believed that developing a concept of change into an operational
dependent variable would further develop comparative foreign policy as a field and
would spark the “innovative theorizing” that was lacking in the field. Focusing on
those points where old patterns were broken and new ones developed would focus
attention on genuine “puzzles,” and by exploring these questions, scholars would be
forced to become more creative in their theory building. Rosenau also believed that it
would force scholars to build longitudinal variable into their models – something he
believed necessary for good theory building.
Why Study Foreign Policy Change?
There are a number of important reasons to study foreign policy change. First,
foreign policy changes are often not only surprising, but disruptive. Events such as
Sadat’s dismissal of the Soviets and rapprochement with the West and the rising
assertiveness in the foreign policies of a number of Third World countries were in part
what triggered an interest in foreign policy change among scholars. Any foreign
policy change, particularly significant changes, can have a profound effect on the
regional and international system. “Relations between nations are established and
progress based on what is understood to be patterned behavior. When those patterns
are broken, interrupted, or reversed, the effects can be felt throughout the system,
generating greater conflict and uncertainty between states most affected by major
changes in the status quo” (Volgy and Schwartz, 1994: 24). This can be especially
true when foreign policy change conflicts with important interests of a dominant
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power, exacerbating international tensions and often resulting in “coercive, punitive
and violent responses” (Holsti, 1982). Even more mild changes and shifts have can
have profound effects, especially among great powers where, “the question of change
and stability in foreign policy is vital for peace and security” (Go ldmann, 1988: vx).
Second, the study of foreign policy change can contribute to a broader
understanding of foreign policy and international relations by fostering a richer
theoretical focus on foreign policy studies. By focusing study on foreign policy
change itself, scholars offer an important contribution by focusing squarely on what
Hermann (1978) called “that which is to be explained” – the dependent variable of
foreign policy. Unlike many other works in foreign policy analysis that seek to
develop theories based on particular sources of foreign policy, here, foreign policy
itself is the center of analysis (Hagan and Rosati, 1994).
Third, because the study of foreign policy change is "less abstract theoretically
and substantively more meaningful," than other foreign policy approaches, the study
of change can further develop foreign policy analysis by generating empirical studies
at the macro, middle-range and micro levels of specificity (Hagan and Rosati, 1994).
Fourth, the study of foreign policy change offers opportunities to incorporate multiple
perspectives, thereby synthesizing and integrating approaches to a much greater
degree than other studies in foreign policy analysis. A common approach, for
example, is to model the policy- making process as an intervening variable acted upon
by a myriad of other domestic and international phenomenon, blurring the traditional
distinction between internal and external sources of foreign policy (ibid.).
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Fifth, foreign policy change can provide important insights into core issues
between the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis – specifically,
the structural approach of neorealism. This perspective (see Waltz, 1979) emphasizes
how prevailing global structures constrain foreign policy options for decisionmakers,
seeing foreign policy change as more “evolutionary.” Thus, neorealists would argue,
change would only occur when there are changes in the global structure and rational
government actors adapt their foreign policies in response to those new realities. The
study of foreign policy change challenges this notion and may provide a synthesis of
these two previously antagonistic perspectives.
David Skidmore’s (1994) work in this area is one example. He explains a
state’s ability to adjust its foreign policy to changes in the international environment as
a function of international and domestic constraints. He posits that realist theory best
explains policy change in states that have modest power abroad but are institutionally
strong at home; while an institutional approach, looking more at domestic factors, best
explains foreign policy change in states that are strong at abroad, but weak at home.
Foreign Policy Change: A ‘Neglected Phenomenon’
Despite compelling reasons for the study of foreign policy change, it remained,
for many years in the words of K.J. Holsti, “a neglected phenomenon” in the study of
foreign policy:
An aspect of foreign policy that has received little attention
in the theoretical literature…(is) foreign policy change. A
review of current writings reveals that the sources of
foreign policy…have received more attention than actually
policies…and even where policy is reviewed, rather static
pictures emerge; continuity of the major powers’ foreign
policy orientatio n seems to be the norm (Holsti, 1982: ix).
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Similarly, Rosenau observed:
In our search for recurring patterns – for constancies in the
external behavior of nations – we tend to treat breaks in
patterns as exceptions, as nuances which complicate our
tasks. Yet it is precisely the point at which a trend veers off
sharply in a new direction that the interaction of key
variables is most fully exposed. Patterns do not change
except when the value of one or more variables is altered or
when…processes that are normally independent become
intertwined…changed behavior provides an especially
useful occasion for observing the interplay of the factors
that shape foreign policy (1976b: 371-372).

A number of reasons have been given for this neglect. First, foreign policy
analysis is a young field, and “the development of any science naturally proceeds from
analyzing order to analyzing change (Rosati, et. al., 1994: 5).” As Gilpin observed,
“until the statics of a field of inquiry are sufficiently well developed and one has a
good grasp of repetitive processes and recurrent phenomena, it is difficult if not
impossible to proceed to the study of dynamics (Gilpin, 1981:4).” A second reason
was the rise of behavioralism and the search for “middle range theories.” This
resulted in “a proliferation of research into more narrow questions and
microphenomena, analysis not conducive to the broader study of foreign policy
change” (Rosati, et. al., 1994: 6)
A third explanation was western bias. Gilpin observed that the dominance of
American scholarship since World War II led to a field that was “parochial and
ethnocentric,” focusing primarily on the western state system of the postwar era. In
the study of foreign policy, this led to a preoccupation with explaining Cold War
policies of the great powers (Gilpin, 1984). Holsti (1982) charges that this narrow
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focus contributed to the inattention given to foreign policy changes that were
occurring elsewhere in the world.
Another reason identified for the inattention to foreign policy change was the
general “conservative bias” of western academic scholarship. Gilpin observed “social
scientists have a preference for stability or at least a preference for orderly change”
(Gilpin, 1984: 6). Rosati states that because the comparative study foreign policy was
developed at the height of the Cold War, there was a natural emphasis on the role of
government decisionmaking in U.S. foreign policy – at a time when the “high” politics
of national security was dominant, and a true consensus existed among
decisionmakers and the public.
The Development of Foreign Policy Change
The study of foreign policy change remains today a relatively young field. It
was not until the 1980s that change, as a concept and subject of study, began to
receive attention. The publication of several frameworks throughout the decade
helped shape the way scholars began to conceptualize foreign policy change, its
sources, and processes. While these frameworks did not receive widespread
application in the literature, they did provide important insights into how scholars
should think about change.
In Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World.
K.J. Holsti pursues a specific type of foreign policy change – restructuring – “the
dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations” (Holsti,
1982:ix). This differs from “normal foreign policy change, which is usually slow,
incremental and typified by low linkages between [geographic and functional]
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sectors.” (ibid.: 2). Instead, restructuring “usually takes place more quickly, expresses
an intent for fundamental change, is non- incremental and usually involves the
conscious linking of different sectors.” Reorientation, according to his definition,
refers to the intentio n of foreign policy decision makers to restructure their state’s
foreign policy.
Holsti distinguishes reorientation and restructuring on the basis of significant
changes in: (1) the levels of external involvement, (2) policies regarding types and
sources of external penetration, (3) the direction of the external involvement, and (4)
military or diplomatic commitments. Based on these characteristics, he develops four
ideal types of foreign policy: isolation, dependence, self-reliance and nonalignment/diversification.
Using these four types of foreign policy, Holsti establishes 12 possible ideal
types of foreign policy restructuring, as states move from one of the four foreign
policy types to another. Holsti and the authors in his volume use case studie s of an
eclectic group of states, examining a variety of external, domestic, historical, cultural
variables, as well as the policy-making process to try to explain why foreign policy
restructuring occurs. In his conclusion, Holsti states that he is unable to explain why
some states will undergo foreign policy restructuring while other states, facing a
similar set of circumstances, do not. However, he does note that:
certain conditions, particularly dependence, vulnerability,
perceptions of weakness and massive and external
penetration, predispose some governments to restructure
their foreign policies and that sometimes the major residues
of dependence and independence are seen as threats which,
in turn, compel governments to build moats and create
more ‘distance’ between themselves and their mentors
(Holsti, 1989: 199).
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Non-military threats, such as perceived economic and cultural threats, were
found to play a large role in foreign policy restructuring. Fears of economic control
by a more powerful neighbor and fear of a “foreigner” also were found to play a role.
Holsti also concludes that foreign policy reorientation will often occur without
subsequent foreign policy restructuring, as the leaders express a goal of significantly
altering their policies but find the costs and realities associated with it difficult to
overcome.
Holsti’s work is significant because it represents the first major application of a
systematic study of foreign policy change. It also offers important insight into how
the perceptions of leaders in developing states might lead them to undertake foreign
policy change. Elements of this notion will be introduced into the dissertation, to
distinguish differences in the extent to which developed and less developed states
change their foreign policies.
Kjell Goldmann’s (1988) Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: The
Problems and Possibilities of Détente specifically addresses the “tension” in
international politics whereby states face pressures to change policies from the past
(through changing conditions in the environment, learning, and domestic political
changes that produce new leaders with new ideas), yet there remains a strong tendency
to stick to the policies of the past. The “unresolved issue in foreign policy theory,” he
states, is to establish “what factors determine whether, when, and to what extent
pressure for change in a policy will in fact produce change” (Goldmann, 1988: 3).
Goldmann specifically looks at how “stabilizers” intervene with sources of foreign
policy change and the decision- making process. “A source of policy change is an
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event tending to start a process of policy change. A stabilizer is a variable affecting
the likelihood that such an event will set a process of change in motion and/or the
extent to which a process of change will be completed and produce a change in
policy” (ibid.: 4).
Stabilizers determine whether or not inputs from sources of foreign policy
change actually set a process of policy change in motion. Stabilizers reduce the
sensitivity by blocking foreign policy change, reducing the scope of change, or
delaying change. Goldmann lays out an inventory of thirteen international, cognitive,
political and administrative stabilizers that affect the sensitivity of decisionmakers to
their environment, the availability of alternatives and the costs of change.
While Goldmann readily admits there are limitations to testing all of the
variables outlined in his sketch, he offers them as a basis on which others can build
theory. Goldmann’s assump tion that “in the absence of stabilizers, policies are highly
sensitive” (ibid.: 16) to sources of foreign policy change is a theme of this dissertation.
In Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,
Charles Hermann proposes a scheme for “interpreting decisions in which a
government decides to change policy direction” (Hermann, 1990: 3). Specifically, his
interest is in those cases that mark a major reversal or redirection in policy. He
identifies four graduated levels of foreign policy change: adjustment changes (changes
in the level and scope of recipients); program changes (qualitative changes in the
methods and means); problem/goal changes (where the initial problem or goal is
replaced or forfeited, purposes replaced); and international orientation changes (the
redirection of a country’s entire orientation toward world affairs, a simultaneous shift
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in all international roles and activities). The escalation of American involvement in
Vietnam, followed by its extrication, is provided as an example illustrating all four
levels of graduate change. Hermann also outlines four agents of major foreign policy
change – leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring and external
shock.
Leader driven change “results from the determined efforts of an authoritarian
policymaker…who imposes his own vision of the basic redirection necessary in
foreign policy” (ibid.:11). This Hermann says, requires the leader to have the
conviction, power and energy necessary to compel the change. Under bureaucratic
advocacy, a group or organization within government that has access to top officials
becomes the agent of change. Hermann suggests that individuals in the middle levels
of government often have the knowledge to recognize when a policy is not working, as
well as the expertise to overcome resistance. Under domestic restructuring, the agent
of change comes from outside the government structure and is defined as “the
politically relevant segment of the society whose support the regime needs to govern”
(Hermann, 1990: 12). Change can come from shifting elite demographics, shifting
worldviews, or both. External shocks are the result of dramatic international events
that have an immediate impact and cannot be ignored.
The essence of Hermann’s model is the decision- making process as an
intervening variable between these agents of foreign policy change and the four
graduated levels of change. To effect change, agents much act on the decision-making
process, which can either facilitate or obstruct change at any stage of the decisionmaking process. Of the major frameworks outlined here, Hermann’s is the only one to
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receive any real application in the literature. Bengt Sundelius (1994) applies
Hermann's model to the case of Sweden when it broke its longstanding no-alliance,
neutrality doctrine and joined the European Community in 1990. He finds that this
policy move constituted what Hermann called a policy/goal change, which constitutes
a policy restructuring. Sundelius identifies domestic restructuring and external shock
as the two change agents that acted upon the decision- making process leading to the
change.
Other recent new works have sought to build upon these frameworks to
develop new models of foreign policy change. Gustavsson (1998; 1999) incorporates
elements of Hermann's model in his three-stage process of foreign policy change.
Domestic and international sources of change are mediated by decision makers who in
turn act upon the decision- making process to bring about one of the four types of
policy change identified by Hermann. Individual decision makers must perceive
sources of change that trigger alterations in their beliefs for them to impact foreign
policy change. Like Sundelius, he applies his model to the Swedish decision to join
the European Community. He posits that the end of the Cold War and a deep
recession (external shocks) caused Sweden's prime minister, an advocate of EC
membership, to seize the opportunity. Acting as a "policy entrepreneur," the prime
minister framed the debate in terms of an economic, rather than political issue, and
successfully overcame internal resistance within the cabinet to effect the change.
Kleistra and Mayer (2001) incorporate elements of both Goldmann's and
Hermann's models into a model of foreign policy and organizational change. They
identify 11 indicators for change that can act as "carriers" and "barriers" for change,
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based on Hermann's agents of change and Goldmann's stabilizers. They identify
periods of change and stability in Dutch Foreign policy toward their former colony of
Suriname. Comparing and contrasting Dutch responses to two different military coups
in the early 1980s, they account for these changes in terms of whether the indicators
for change (such as a normative regulation, political support, decision making mandate
and response repertory) acted as carriers or barriers. Kleistra and Mayer's study is
significant in its inclusion of indicators for change as true variables, which, depending
upon the value they take, can either induce or inhibit foreign policy change. Although
the authors claim their model was established to explain the Dutch case, the foreign
policy change aspects of it hold out the prospect for application to other cases as well.
Most recently, Charles Hermann, along with Robert Billings (2001), sought to
readdress elements of the Hermann framework and apply it to a model of sequential
decisionmaking – when decision makers engage in a series of decisions about the
same issue or problem across a period of time. The authors introduce control theory
into their model, to assess when decisionmakers will decide to change their foreign
policies in response to information that a previous policy is not working, and when
leaders will instead decide to “stay the course.” According to control theory,
hierarchical “control loops” are used to explain more complex behavior. In terms of
policy, higher- level goals are addressed by success in achieving lower- level sub-goals,
strategies or objectives. The authors illustrate this with the case of North Korea and
the United States’ goal of preventing that country from developing nuclear weapons.
To achieve that goal, several descending sub-goals must also be achieved – an
agreement to open the country to inspections by the International Atomic Energy
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Agency (IAEA); an agreement by North Korea to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), whose signatories agree to IAEA inspections; and an agreement on the
part of China to pressure North Korea to join the NPT. Each sub-goal must be
achieved in order for the primary goal to be achieved. When feedback indicates that
one of these sub-goals is not being met, the policy will be reconsidered in light of
readdressing the sub-goals or in developing an entirely new approach to the problem.
The course of action taken is dependent upon how those involved in the decisionmaking process believe different actions will address the problem and the reasons they
assign for failure of the sub-goal.
Another set of recent scholarship that addresses foreign policy change is the
literature on foreign policy substitution. The notion of foreign policy substitutability,
developed by Most and Starr (1984), suggests that countries may respond differently
to the same conditions by employing different foreign policy tools at their disposal.
Morgan and Palmer (2000) challenge a standard notion of substitutability – that as
resources assigned to a given policy increase, resources assigned to other policies must
decrease. They posit that changing resources devoted to a policy comes as a result of
a change in the efficiency of the policy, or from a change in resources available to the
states. Regan (2000) examines the conditions under which the United States
substituted its intervent ion strategies in the internal conflicts of other countries. He
argues that this is a function of domestic political risks and capabilities. Leaders will
decide to substitute policies (military, diplomatic or "mixed") when the political risk
of maintaining the status quo is high. Clark (2001) examines foreign policy
substitution in the context of political strategies and the diversionary use of force. He
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finds that leaders facing economic and domestic political problems prefer to pursue
private good policies, such as aggressive economic and trade policies, as opposed to
military conflict.
Two smaller-scale studies of foreign policy change are relevant to this
dissertation and are worth addressing. Thomas Volgy and John Schwartz (1990)
examine foreign policy restructuring in three western European states, highlighting the
ways in which democratic leaders overcome the "webs of restraint" to bring about
foreign policy change. The imperative to survive and remain in office is such that
democratic leaders will tend to avoid changes in the status quo that risk failure, and
will instead favor incrementalism and modest departures from the status quo – even if
they desire foreign policy change. Despite this fact, the authors note that democratic
leaders do at times undertake significant foreign policy change and propose a
relationship between risk taking and size of electoral margins.
Volgy and Schwartz suggest that leaders with slim electoral margins are more
likely to undertake foreign policy restructuring than are leaders with moderate or large
electoral margins. Risks associated with restructuring could erode the support that
leaders with larger margins already have. However, if restructuring is successful,
leaders with slim margins may broaden their coalition. They also propose that
fundamental changes in foreign policy are just as likely when elections result in elite
continuity as when they result in an elite turnover. The authors find some support for
these propositions. Elite turnover did not significantly predict changes in foreign
policy in any of the cases they studied. They also found a tendency for restructurings
to occur following a narrow margin of victory – although narrow margins alone did
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not guarantee major changes in policy. The findings also indicated where
restructurings followed narrow electoral margins, leaders enjoyed a solid government
majority in their respective parliaments.
This study offers some important insights into theories that will be tested in
this dissertation. Their findings highlight the importance of constraints and the
political calculus that democratic leaders must evaluate if they are to risk changes in
the status quo that could undermine their status or survival. They also demonstrate
that significant foreign policy change can occur absent changes in political leadership.
By examining cases where leaders enjoyed a parliamentary majority, they also
demonstrate that political and institutional realities in different democratic settings can
create opportunities and incentives for political leaders to take greater risks and
undertake changes from the status quo. This study suffers from a small number of
cases limited to Western Europe; and although it develops no theories about the
constraints and incentives that non-democratic leaders might face in undertaking
foreign policy change, it is significant for this dissertation because it highlights the
fact that the political and institutional setting can shape how leaders perceive risks
associated with foreign policy change and their willingness to undertake it.
Park, Ko, and Kim's (1994) comparison of the foreign policies of South Korea
and Taiwan under periods of non-democracy and democracy provide another study of
foreign policy change relevant to this dissertation. They examine how the regime
transition fundamentally changed each country's ideology, state-society relationship,
political structure and political interest; which in turn fundamentally changed how
each state defined its foreign policy goals as well as changed the foreign policy

29

making process, leading to foreign policy change – specifically a policy of
"Nordpolitik" toward North Korea and China. This analysis presents several themes
that will be developed in this dissertation – particularly the notion that issues related to
legitimacy and ideology can dominate non-democratic governments and
fundamentally shape how they define their foreign policy goals and how they use their
foreign policies in ways that can be "inconsistent" (ibid.: 170). By illustrating how
state autonomy was reduced and regime accountability was increased after the
transition to democratic rule, this study makes a fundamental distinction between
regime types and how the characteristics of each shape foreign policy decisionmaking.
The Dissertation: Contributions to the Study of Foreign Policy Change
If one criticism can be leveled against the study of foreign policy change, it is
that there has been very little in the way of building on the established frameworks to
develop a better understanding of why, when and how foreign policy change occurs.
As one critic recently noted, “the study of foreign policy change...has so far been
dominated by conceptual rather than empirical contributions...The very sophistication
and elaboration of the analytical schemes put forward by authors appeared to militate
against their usage in empirical research. Book- length case studies, let alone
comparative analyses, of foreign policy change using these models are practically nonexistent” (t’Hart, 1998: 441). Almost two decades after Holsti's appeal for its more
systematic study, the field is still described by its scholars as "small but growing,"
with "relatively few empirical studies" (Gustavsson, 1999). Yet, as described above, it
remains for many reasons an important field of inquiry. As a result, the study of
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foreign policy change will likely prove more fruitful by addressing more answerable
but equally relevant questions at a lower level of sophistication.
The crux of my argument in this dissertation is that arrangements central to
different types of regimes and institutional arrangements create constraints and
incentives on decisionmakers to undertake foreign policy change. This is an area that
has received little attention in the foreign policy change literature; and, as will be seen
later, much of the theory supporting contentions of this dissertation are borrowed from
other fields of study within international relations and comparative politics.
Even Goldmann’s rather extensive cataloging of foreign policy stabilizers
failed to grasp directly how the nature of state-society relations and institutional
arrangements between decisionmakers and government bodies might serve as a
constraint on foreign policy change. This can be attributed to the fact that many of
these works are conceptualized in the context of a process underway once a foreign
policy “problem” or issue has been identified and decisions have been made that
action must be taken, rather than at a more macro level that asks how different
structures and institutions might shape the way decisionmakers approach the issue of
foreign policy change generally. Thus Goldmann’s concept of “institutionalization”
addresses not the institutionalization of political structures, but the institutionalization
of the policy; and “support” addresses, not the levels or sources of support for those
making foreign policy decisions, but levels of support for the policy itself. While
some of the works outlined above touch on these elements, the field of foreign policy
change has yet to address sufficiently issues related to how different types of regimes
and institutional arrangements might promote or mitigate foreign policy change.
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This dissertation represents a serious contribution to the field of foreign policy
change in both its theoretical and methodological application. In evaluating foreign
policy change in the context of different regime types, this dissertation applies to the
study an important question being widely addressed in other areas of the literature.
Theories of the democratic peace have spawned a vast array of literature on war
proneness, collaboration, cooperation, alliance duration and conflict resolution as they
relate to regimes. However, regime effects have yet to be applied to a study of foreign
policy change in any widespread empirical study that can generate measurable results.
Additionally, unlike other studies, this dissertation delves "below the regime surface"
to develop and test hypotheses about a myriad of political and institutional
arrangements, and how they relate to foreign policy change.
Another significant aspect of this dissertation is that it accepts a much broader
definition of what constitutes foreign policy change, allowing foreign policy changes
to be captured generally – that is, capturing both major foreign policy restructuring
endeavors as well as other, more incremental, non-realigning types of foreign policy
change. Holsti (1982) originally conceptualized a very specific type of foreign policy
change – "a dramatic, wholesale alteration of the nation's pattern of extra relations
across different sectors." In reality, changes of this degree and scope are relatively
rare, and concentrating on these cases alone as the dependent variable is severely
limiting. Examining change only in its most extreme form also prohibits an
evaluation of both change and continuity – dynamics that are occurring simultaneously
throughout the world. As (Rosenau, 1976b: 372) notes, "Change cannot be discerned
and assessed unless it is analyzed in the context of previously constant or continuous
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behavior. There are no discontinuities without continuities to highlight them." A
broader definition permits this dissertation to model and measure both changes and
continuities in foreign policy, highlighting the ways in which causal factors both
compel and constrain decisionmakers to undertake foreign policy change. A more
general understanding of change as a continuum from stability, to incremental change,
to the more dramatic realignments, allows us to capture ways in which causal
variables may more subtly influence the decision making process. Although these
more mild forms of change may not be as visible or impacting, they are still important
because together they have a cumulative effect on a state's overall international
orientation.
This dissertation will also provide findings that are measurable and can be
generalized, a fundamental shortcoming of most work in this area. Applying a pooled,
cross-sectional time series design provides results that can be validated against each of
the hypotheses. By definition, change is something that is temporally relevant.
Change can only be understood in the context of time, and it is only after a period of
time that change can be determined. This approach is also beneficial because it
promises to capture less visible cases of foreign policy change in states that may
otherwise be ignored or overlooked; it will also capture more subtle foreign policy
changes that may be occurring at different times and in different cases.
In short, this dissertation promises to be a significant contribution to the study
of foreign policy change by synthesizing contributions from elsewhere in the literature
and incorporating important causal factors into the debate, while producing results that
are measurable and generalizable. The next chapters will develop a set of hypotheses
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about regimes, political and institutional factors, and how they may pressure or
constrain a decisionmaker's ability, willingness and desire to undertake foreign policy
change.
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CHAPTER 3
REGIME TYPE AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

Introduction
All foreign policy decisionmakers are to some degree shaped by their
environment. The legal, constitutional and political settings in which they make
decisions largely shape policy outcomes, as leaders must navigate their way through a
web of institutional roadblocks and political opposition that generates constraints and
incentives in the conduct of foreign policymaking. Regimes fundamentally define the
essence of state-society relations, sources of legitimacy for their leaders and
boundaries for their conduct in office. That said, it would seem that foreign
policymaking in different regimes should differ fundamentally. Suggestions from the
literature, however, are mixed. In international relations, a vast literature has
developed around the “democratic peace,” that purports to show that democracies are
less likely to go to war with one another than with other regime types. This literature
has expanded to demonstrate other relationships according to regime type, to include
levels of cooperative behavior, conflict resolution and alliance duration. Many
studying foreign policy decisionmaking, however, have tended to downplay the
differences in regimes, instead stressing the similarities in the ways constraints can
affect all decision- making units, regardless of regime type.
In this dissertation, I examine the effects of regime type on foreign policy
change and propose that different constraints and incentives for foreign policy change
are discernible by regime type. In so doing, I ask a number of important questions.
Are non-democracies more likely to change their foreign policies than democracies?
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What sorts of institutional arrangements are more likely to shape foreign policymaking
in ways that constrain or encourage foreign policy change? Are distinctions at the
regime level most important, or rather, are they the specific institutional arrangements
below the regime level that have the greatest influence? When it comes to the factors
impacting foreign policy change, are the differences within each regime type as
important as the differences between each regime type? These are some of the
questions that will be outlined, addressed and empirically tested in this study.
This chapter will provide a brief outline of the major regime types and how
they are currently treated in the literature. It will then compare and contrast the
regimes on a number of relevant characteristics and explain how those characteristics
may constrain or create incentives for foreign policy change in each regime.
Approaches to Foreign Policy Change
Approaches to the study of foreign policy change can be condensed into one of
three broad areas of explanation. Approaches stressing changes in the global structure
or a state’s international position explain foreign policy change in terms of the
constraints imposed on states by the structure of the international system. This more
traditional view, which is prominent in neorealism, complex interdependence, and
dependency theory, looks to sources outside the state and its decision- making process.
According to this logic, foreign policy change is likely to occur when there are
changes in the international structure that fundamentally alter a state’s position in the
international system. A second area stresses the role of domestic political
realignments, explaining shifts in policy in terms of shifts in power and the relative
position of those vying for power. As new individuals are brought into the process of
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foreign policymaking, they bring with them different sets of beliefs, interests, and
definitions of the national interest. A third area concentrates on the policy-making
process itself. This explanation looks at how dynamics within the government and the
political process shape the implementation of policy initiatives developed by a
country's central leadership. These processes include the roles played by bureaucratic
organizations, political opposition, and government structures, which may reinforce
policy continuity and rigidity, or stimulate foreign policy change.
It is this latter approach that the dissertation will take to explain foreign policy
change, specifically addressing how different regimes types (democracies and nondemocracies) and a number of other political and institutional arrangements within
each regime type shape the context of decision- making process itself.
Regimes
Do the differences between political regime types impact the foreign policy
decision- making process in such a way as to influence a decisionmaker’s ability,
willingness, or desire to undertake foreign policy change? There are compelling
reasons to believe this is the case, not only because regime effects have been found to
exist in other areas of internatio nal relations literature, but also because the study of
regimes goes to the very crux of the relationship between state and society, the
government and the governed, with implications for the leadership’s interests,
ideology, autonomy, sources of legitimacy and opposition, and accountability – all
which directly impact the state’s ability undertake foreign policy change.
Before turning to an examination of regime effects on foreign policy, it is first
important to define the regime concept as applied in this dissertation as well as outline
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definitions of the two major regime types treated in the literature. Regimes have been
defined as the set of rules, practices, and norms that shape how governments are
constituted and regulated (Hauss, 1994; Dominguez, 1987). Regime characteristics
include: the openness of the state's political institutions; the competitiveness of its
selection process for new leaders; the amount of citizen involvement in the political
process that is permitted or tolerated; the extent of legal and institutionalized
constraints imposed upon those in positions of power; and existence of, and protection
of, individual rights. Regimes throughout the world are generally characterized, to a
greater or lesser degree, as being either democratic (open and competitive) or
autocratic (non-democratic – closed and restricted).
Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes
The word democracy comes from the Greek words demos, meaning “people”
and kratos, meaning “rule.” Thus, democracy can be understood most simply as, “rule
by the people.” Numerous definitions of democracy have been offered over the years,
stressing the roles played by the public, procedural rules, protection of individual
rights, representation and accountability of elected leaders. 1 Robert Dahl (1998)
identifies six necessary items for a democratic society to exist. These include: elected
officials; free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of
information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship. The definition of
democracy for purposes of this dissertation tracks closely with Dahl’s concept that
democratic systems are understood to exist in countries where: leaders are chosen
through a open, competitive electoral process; institutionalized procedures are in place
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regarding the transfer of power; leaders face legal and institutionalized constraints on
their powers; citizens may freely organize for the purpose of political participation and
expression; and basic protections of individual rights are secured.
Definitions of non-democracies are not nearly as well developed. 2 Nondemocracies can most easily be conceived of in terms opposite of democracy – that is,
where there are no open, competitive elections; there are no institutionalized
procedures to transfer power; there is an absence of legal or institutionalized
constraints on leaders; there are limits on an individual’s ability to participate
politically; and individual rights are not secured.
Regime Effects in the Literature
While comprehensive empirical analyses of regime effects on foreign policy
change are not to be found, the same cannot be said when applied to other areas of the
international relations literature. A vast body of literature has developed around the
"democratic peace" or "war-proneness" of democratic regimes, and a variety of
findings have emerged. These include: that democracies initiate war as frequently as
non-democracies (Small and Singer, 1976; Chan, 1984); that democracies are less
likely to engage in hostilities with other democracies than they are with nondemocracies (Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Russett, 1993); that democracies show greater
restraint in their foreign policies than do non-democracies, and will seek to settle
disputes by other means short of war (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Mousseau, 1998);
that conflicts between non-democracies are more likely to escalate into war than are
1

See Aristotle, 1995; Roper, 1989; Powell, 1982; Vanhannen, 1997; Aron, 1969; Schattschneider,
1960; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Danziger, 1998; Pennock, 1979; Bobbio, 1987.
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conflicts between democracies (Maoz and Russett, 1993); that democracies are more
amenable to collaborate in military disputes than are non-democracies (Mousseau,
1997); and that immature democracies are prone to militarized disputes (Mansfield and
Snyder, 1995; 2002).
Others have found that democracies tend to ally with other democracies
(Siverson and Emmons, 1991); non-democracies tend to ally with other autocracies
(Werner and Lemke, 1997); and that alliances between democracies are less averse to
failure than are alliances between democracies and non-democracies (Gaubatz, 1996;
Reed, 1997). Studies measuring the overall leve l of cooperation and conflict between
democratic and non-democratic dyads have shown that jointly democratic dyads
engage in comparatively higher levels of cooperation than will jointly autocratic
dyads; that jointly autocratic dyads will engage in higher levels of cooperation than
“mixed” dyads of autocratic and democratic regimes (Leeds, 1999); and that
democracies demonstrate cooperative behavior regardless of the institutional
characteristics of the dyadic partner (Leeds and Davis, 1999).
Despite this vast array of work (of which this is only a fraction), regime
effects have yet to be widely applied to a study of foreign policy change. On the
surface this is somewhat surprising. It would appear that the same characteristics of
regimes that influence alliances and militarized disputes would also apply at a lower
level of abstraction and capture the day-to-day activities of foreign policy
decisionmaking – defined as "how leaders, groups, and coalitions of actors can affect
the way foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are selected, the choices
2

In one of the literature’s most comp rehensive treatments of non-democracies, however, Juan Linz
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that are made, and what gets implemented" (M. Hermann, 2001:1) – and how it
influences foreign policy change. This inattention can be explained in part by those
areas emphasized by major approaches to the study of international relations and
foreign policy. 3
First, as outlined earlier, those who ascribe to realist and neorealist
explanations of international relations tend to discount the role played by domestic
political regimes in foreign policy change (see Waltz, 1979). The neorealist theory of
international relations is based on the proposition that in an anarchic “self- help”
system, all units perform essentially the same function. Since all state’s goals are the
same (survival), they face the same incentives to change or maintain their foreign
policies. From this perspective, foreign policy change is something that occurs as
states seek to increase their security by making adjustments in response to changes in
the distribution of capabilities within the international system. Domestic
considerations, including a country’s regime type, are considered largely irrelevant.
A second school focusing on the dynamics of the foreign policy decisionmaking process highlights the constraints inherent in democracies and nondemocracies, downplaying differences between them and stressing the way constraints
function in both democracies and non-democracies. These themes predominate the
(1975) identifies two primary types of non-democratic regimes: totalitarian and authoritarian.
3
Traditional approaches have suggested that regime effects do exist, but in the opposite direction
predicted in this dissertation – that democracies are more prone to change. This logic suggests that in
democratic systems, public opinion and citizen involvement influence the policy process to such an
extent that it is difficult for democratic leaders to commit to a course of action, making foreign policy
relatively unstable and inconsistent. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (431 B.C.)
noted that, following an oligarchical coup d’etat, members of a new government in Athens felt that a
Spartan king might be more open to make peace “now that he had them to deal with instead of the
inconstant commons” (Thucydides, 431 B.C.: Ch 25). Similarly, Tocqueville observed in American
foreign policy-making a “propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence,
and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion” (Tocqueville, 1835).
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current literature on decision units, which argues that decision- making dynamics can
be quite similar across, and quite varied within, both regime types. For example, both
Saddam Hussein and Lyndon Johnson have been characterized as predominant
leaders, in that they had the ability to stifle opposition and dissent and make decisions
alone if necessary. Foreign policy decisionmaking in both the British cabinet and in
the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party have been described as
being carried out by a single group. A coalition of autonomous actors has described
foreign policymaking in Iran as well as many democratic states, where relevant actors
are separate individuals, groups or representatives of institutions which can act in
concert with one another, but cannot force compliance on the others (see Hagan, 1987,
1994b, 2001; M. M. Hermann at. al., 2001; Hermann, 2001b; M. Hermann, Hermann
and Hagan, 1987; M. Hermann and Hermann, 1989). Tsebelis (2002) takes a similar
view of democracy and non-democracy and its capacity for policy change, charging
that regime effects are cast at too high a level of abstraction for any meaningful
differences to be found in terms of policy change.
While accepting the notion that significant constraints do exist in both major
regime types, it is the contention of this dissertation that there are fundamental
differences in the level and nature of those constraints, which impact the decisionmaking process in fundamentally different ways. As will be argued below, this
suggests different prospects for foreign policy change and stability in democracies and
non-democracies.
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Structural Constraints in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and
Prospects for Foreign Policy Change
I argue that the structures of democratic institutions make them more
conducive to foreign policy stability and that the structures of non-democratic systems
make them more conducive to foreign policy change. These structural characteristics
include legal and constitutional restrictions related to the conduct of government,
government bodies and players involved in the decision- making process, and the
institutionalized procedures for foreign policy decisionmaking. 4
Almost by definition, it can be said that democratic leaders face heavier
structural constraints than do their autocratic counterparts. The very nature of
democracies provides an organized and institutionalized mechanism for diffusing
decision- making authority, mobilizing opposition and holding decision makers
accountable. Whether those mechanisms take the form of votes in the legislature,
votes of confidence, negotiations with government coalition partners, constitutional
checks on executive authority, party politics or elections – each has the power to
authoritatively constrain foreign policy decisionmaking.
In democracies, there are formal constitutional limits on the power and
authority of the executive’s conduct of foreign policy. For example, in the United
States, only Congress may make declarations of war. Treaties require approval of the
Senate, as do the appointment of ambassadors. Other democratic governments face
similar restrictions and while these formal powers may be limited, they are significant

4

Scholars of comparative foreign policy have long explored the notion that different structures
constrain foreign policy. See Rosenau (1966), Farrell, (1966). Salmore and Salmore (1978),
Wilkenfeld et. al. (1980), and Hagan (1987, 1993).
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in that they are legally constituted and binding. In contrast, non-democracies are
characterized by the absence of any enforced, legally binding restrictions on the
leader’s ability to make foreign policy.
In addition to formal restrictions on what a democratic leader may do in the
realm of foreign policy, he or she must also contend with formal, legally instituted
bodies within government that can block, stall or kill executive initiatives, or at the
very least, bargain in such a way that the executive must settle for a compromise
significantly different from his preferred course of action. While democracies, as will
be outlined la ter, vary significantly from one type to the next, all are to some degree
characterized by decentralized power and shared decisionmaking. This power may be
shared with legislative bodies, cabinet ministers, coalition partners or bureaucratic
institutions.
Policy initiatives may require the support of a majority or supermajority in a
legislature, a majority of government coalition partners, or the concurrence of
government ministers. Even if there is concurrence among elected leaders for a course
of action, bureaucratic institutions may limit the options available to decision makers
for consideration or negatively impact the implementations of foreign policy
decisions. Allison (1969) demonstrates how the standard operating procedures of
bureaucracies, and the intense competition among actors within them, make
bureaucratic institutions resistant to change.
Fragmentation has been used as a concept to define a leader’s ability to
dominate his or her immediate political environment (Hagan, 1987). At one extreme
are highly fragmented regimes, where no dominant party or group is able to assert
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leadership. Instead a coalition of autonomous actors governs who can easily block
policy initiatives by threatening to withdrawal from the ruling group, causing it to
collapse. At the other extreme are cases of highly cohesive leadership, where a single
individual is able to dominate the decision- making process, other political groups,
bureaucracy and government institutions. While the framework was originally
intended for application to both democratic and non-democratic regimes, I posit that
the concept, particularly if stripped of its "situational" political context, is useful for
understanding the differences between them.
Since no democratic leader can completely dominate his environment, all
democracies are to some degree fragmented. While serious divisions may exist in
non-democratic entities (as was the case in China during the Cultural Revolution and
in Iran during the early years of the Ayatollah Khomeini), a critical difference is that
these divisions are "situational" in that they have no legal or constitutional standing –
rather they are of a more political nature. A non-democratic leader in a moderately
fragmented ruling group may be able to consolidate his power by eliminating or
repressing opposition. Democratic leaders do not have this option, as fragmentation,
in the form of pluralism, is itself enshrined in the constitution or inherent in the
democratic norms of that society. A democratic president cannot eliminate an
opposition legislature without ceasing to be a democratic president. Further, while
clearly there are degrees of fragmentation and cohesiveness, democracies will fall
more on the fragmented side of a continuum than would non-democracies; and under
no circumstances would a democratic leader ever be able to exercise full authority
over the formulation, implementation and execution of foreign policy. Divisions of
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power, checks and balances, and requirements for majority votes dictate that
democracies will always be fragmented to some degree.
This concept is important to the study of foreign policy change because policy
change requires the commitment of resources as well as the support of (or at least
concurrence or indifference of) relevant actors with the authority to oppose such
actions. As a consequence, I expect policymaking in democratic regimes to be
characterized to a much greater degree than non-democratic regimes by bargaining and
compromise. Democratic leaders build support for the policy's adoption and
implementation through negotiation. New initiatives may be blocked or voted down
altogether. If passed, they may no longer reflect the preferences of leadership, but
instead the process of accommodation with government partners. Non-democracies
with fewer constraints would be expected to have more of a free hand in the
formulation, implementations and execution of foreign policy. Consequently, foreign
policy change in democracies should be more incremental, less confrontational and
less dramatic than in more cohesive non-democracies, where power is more
concentrated, and the stabilizing and moderating influences of fragmentation exist to a
much lesser degree.
The idea that democratic regimes face greater constraints in the conduct of
foreign policy is not new. In 1531 Italian political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli
observed in Discourses on Livy:
taking everything into account…there will be found greater
stability in the Republics than in Princes: For even if the
Republics had the same spirit and the same wants as
Princes, their movements being slower will always make
them take longer to form resolutions than Princes, and
because of this they will be less prompt in breaking their
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faith…Alliances are broken for usefulness. In this,
Republics are more careful in the observance of accords
than Princes. And it is possible to cite examples where a
minimum of usefulness has caused a Prince to break his
faith, and where a great usefulness has not caused faith to
be broken by a Republic…people make fewer errors than
Princes, and because of this, they can be trusted more than
Princes (Machiavelli, 1675: Ch. 59).
Countless quantitative studies on the democratic peace, alliance behavior, and use of
force have similarly identified executive constraints as a significant explanatory
variable in state’s international behavior (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992;
Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Leeds and Davis, 1999; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Maoz
and Russett, 1993; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Weitsman and Shambaugh, 2002).
Political Constraints in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects
for Foreign Policy Change
Constraints and incentives for foreign policy change deriving from political
considerations presume that political leaders wish to remain in power and maintain or
increase their level of support. To remain in power and remain effective, leaders must
rely on the support of those groups to whom they are accountable, that is – those
groups that can remove the executive from power. Democratic executives may be
removed from power in a number of ways — through elections, the withdrawal of
support from a majority in parliament, desertion of a coalition partner, a lost vote of
confidence, or impeachment. This means that democratic leaders must maintain a
sufficient level of support for themselves or their party among the electorate and/or a
majority within the ruling government or the parliament.
A leader’s foreign policies, their success and failure, can figure prominently in
the judgments of an electorate, party or parliament. Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to
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seek reelection in 1968 following a worsening situation in Vietnam is one example.
Nincic (1992) studied incumbent approval ratings and found that a president's
handling of foreign policy was an important factor in his overall rating, with a shift in
foreign policy approval of two percent inducing a change in the overall approval rating
of one percent (for a further examination of how voters use foreign policy to evaluate
presidents, see Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989; Smith, 1998).
What does this mean for the conduct of foreign policy – in particular, the
prospects for foreign policy change? There is some debate in the literature regarding
how a democrat’s tenure vulnerability and the electoral process might translate into
foreign policy behavior and how that vulnerability creates incentives for democratic
leaders to pursue certain policies.
Some argue that democratic leaders may use foreign policy to mobilize public
support through military action abroad. Although there is some quantitative evidence
for a "rally around the flag effect" showing an initial upsurge in support for the
president, those effects have been found to be weak and relatively short- lived (James
and Oneal, 1991). Public support for the president following the use of force is more
likely when the United States is involved in a serious crisis (Lian and Oneal, 1993);
and the longer the military action continues without a clear victory, the sooner that
support dissipates. This makes military action abroad for political purposes a
somewhat risky proposition. Central to concepts developed in this dissertation, this
suggests that democratic leaders are not likely to undertake a significant change in
their state’s foreign policy toward another country through the use of foreign policy
for strictly political purposes.
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To the contrary, other evidence suggests that democratic leaders, aware of this,
will undertake military action when it is "politically safest" to do so – usually early in
their terms of office (Auerswald, 1999). In fact, the popularity and support of a
democratic leader may well be a predetermining factor in a decision to use force
abroad (Ostrom and Job, 1986). American leaders have frequently cited the necessity
of public support for military engagement abroad, particularly when Americans are
being killed (Mueller, 2000).
Political concerns may also foment foreign policy change in democracies
through the politicization of foreign policy during elections. New administrations are
bound to coincide with some degree of foreign policy change, as new individuals enter
the decision- making process bringing with them different beliefs, goals, perceptions
and worldviews. Some, however, have argued that these differences are beyond what
could be explained by normal differences between administrations, and that American
presidential candidates have staked out hard- line positions on national security issues
in an attempt to draw distinctions between themselves and the other candidate, and to
avoid the label of being “soft” on hot button issues. Once in office, these new leaders
are then bound by campaign promises to follow through on their stated positions. John
F. Kennedy’s declaration of a “missile gap” between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the closely contested 1960 presidential election is one oft-cited example
of this dynamic (Nincic, 1992). This view would suggest that democratic elections
produce greater instability in foreign policy, as new administrations, bound by
promises of the campaign, move foreign policy in a different direction from that of
their predecessor.
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I argue, however, that there are some critical weaknesses to this argument. To
the extent that candidates may be tempted to draw distinctions between themselves
and other candidates, they will nonetheless avoid staking positions that are too costly
or too out of step from the mainstream, at the risk of being criticized by their
opponents. Additionally, even though candidates may stake out strong positions in a
campaign, once in office, international realities often dictate a different course of
action. During the 1992 elections Bill Clinton promised that if elected, he would lift
the United Nations- imposed arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. Once in office,
however, as the war escalated further, he continued the Bush policy of no direct
involvement. Outside of some criticism from his political opponents, Clinton faced no
undo pressure to stick to the promises made during the campaign. This can be
attributed to the fact that key support groups did not deem the issue of sufficient
significance, and the fact that American presidents have four years to overcome any
fallout that might generate from broken promises. 5
I posit here that instead of creating incentives for foreign policy change, the
political process of democratic regimes creates strong incentives for foreign policy
stability. A political leader wishing to remain in office, be re-elected, ensure success
for his party and maintain his political capital will want to, above all else, avoid
embarking on activities that could potentially undermine his success and perceived
effectiveness on the job. This should make democratic leaders more risk-averse to
foreign policy behaviors that could result in failure.
5

To the extent that this dynamic might exist in democratic polities, it is much more likely to occur in
presidential systems. Unlike parliamentary systems, where the executive is accountable to parliament
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Weitsman and Shambaugh (2002) address the issue of risk-taking and regime
type. They define risk-averse policies as those having a high probability of success,
yet low potential yields – that is, they are “safe bets,” where the positive benefits of
pursuing it may be minimal, but the probability of the policy failing is low. Riskaccepting policies, on the other hand, have a low probability of success; but promise
much more favorable results if the policy in fact succeeds. Measuring risk preferences
in terms of states’ alliance commitments, they find that democratic states – with their
concomitant electoral accountability, constraints on the chief executive, and
institutionalization and regulation of political participation – are more risk-averse than
non-democracies.
Foreign policy change is an inherently risky behavior for a number of reasons
– especially for democratic politicians. New foreign policy initiatives may involve a
significant investment of national resources and national pride. Policy changes often
require a commitment of economic and human resources, which for many countries is
very limited (Volgy and Schwartz, 1991, 1994). Military resources are also limited,
and policies of military intervention have an obvious human cost as well. Any
decision to enter into a trade agreement or establish diplomatic relations with another
state or intervene militarily in a conflict involves trade offs. Resources that are
committed to pursuing a particular policy may preclude or diminish the ability of
decisionmakers to commit those resources to other important areas. Therefore, when
significant or controversial policy initiatives fail, leaders can expect to be judged
harshly by the accountability groups on which they must depend for political survival.
and faces the mediating influence of party, parliament and government, presidents are directly elected
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Any departure from the status quo involves "unknowns" which can lead to
unintended consequences and policy failure. States or important sectors within states
may not derive all the expected benefits promised from a policy, maintenance of the
new policy may become too costly, or it may require a greater commitment of
resources than anticipated. Military defeat or quagmire is also costly not only in terms
of material and human loss, but also national pride. For a risk-averse politician,
except in cases of severe crisis or national emergency, the safest policy should be to
simply continue the current policy, where relevant groups are already aware of its
costs, benefits and consequences –"better the devil you know.” Additionally, even if a
new policy initiative promises success, a leader must ensure that he or she does not
alienate significant portions of “accountability groups” who may be adversely affected
by the new policy. To secure support for passage of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, for example, U.S. President Bill Clinton had to overcome opposition from
his own party's leadership as well as the traditional Democratic Party constituency of
organized labor, who feared that the agreement would send manufacturing jobs south
to Mexico (Wink, et. al., 1996).
I suggest that democratic leaders, sensitive to their environment and wishing to
remain in power, face strong incentives to avoid the risks and controversies associated
with pursuing significant changes in foreign policy. Leaders will not wish to alienate
groups upon which they rely for political support by undertaking changes that could
intentionally or unintentionally adversely affect their interests or well being. They
also will not wish to face the political consequences associated with policy failure that

and must stake out positions they believe will mobilize the greatest number of voters.
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might come from a significant change in the status quo. Policy failures adversely
affect the evaluation of leaders and provide political fodder for the opposition. As a
result, I would expect democracies to demonstrate relatively stable foreign policies
marked by more incremental change.
The Nature of Opposition in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and
Prospects for Foreign Policy Change
A key feature that distinguishes democracies from non-democracies is the
existence of open and fair elections. Regardless of the institutional arrangements
within different democracies, all hold elections of some sort, providing a regularized
means of removing leaders from office and a ready avenue for opposition to challenge
the current the leadership. Democratic elections serve to reinforce tendencies of
foreign policy stability in two ways. First, by providing citizens an opportunity to
remove a leader from office, reward him or her with additional time in office, or select
an entirely different leader, elections make democratic leaders accountable. Second,
they provide citizens an opportunity to inform political leaders of their preferences on
a wide array of issues, including foreign policy, by rewarding those candidates whose
preferences most closely match their own. Since voters are free to express their views,
leaders do not have to guess what policies are most appealing or acceptable to the
electorate, and in fact, can claim a mandate from them. The existence of elections is a
powerful source of stability because it means that democratic leaders are in a constant
state of vulnerability – they are held accountable for their actions on a regularized
basis through an institutionalized, recognized and binding process. At the least,
elections may stabilize policies by delaying unpopular changes in foreign policy –
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reflected in John F. Kennedy’s attributed statement to advisers that he would be
unwilling to remove troops from Vietnam until after the 1964 elections (Nincic, 1992).
Unlike democracies, non-democracies do not have such regularized
mechanisms for removing a leader from office, and opposition in non-democratic
regimes does not have an established avenue for challenging leadership or its having
interests considered. This is not to suggest that opposition does not play a role in nondemocratic regimes or that opposition interests do not have the capacity to influence
policy. Studies of foreign policy decisionmaking in the Soviet Union following the
death of Stalin have stressed the significant constraints leaders faced, where no
individual, even the secretary general of the Communist Party, could dominate the
process. Soviet leaders, like leaders in democracies, had to secure a voting majority
for all major decisions, and some have even suggested that they in fact had fewer
prerogatives in decisionmaking than their American counterparts (Valenta, 1978,
1979). Differences within the Politburo, ruling juntas, or royal families all serve to
limit the options available to autocratic rulers. Additionally, leadership turnover can
occur in many non-democratic settings. Internal opposition forced Khrushchev from
power in 1964, and military governments in Latin America established regularized
turnover of its political leadership.
What I suggest is that leaders in non-democratic regimes will be relatively less
sensitive to the political environment than will democratic leaders, and that opposition,
while serving as a constraint on a leader’s freedom to act, can also influence foreign
policy in a very different way – that creates incentives for foreign policy change.
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The lack of institutionalized mechanisms (such as votes in the legislature or
national elections) for channeling demands and making preferences known to
leadership has several consequences important for foreign policy change. First, as
outlined earlier, since opposition concurrence is not required for government decisions
to take force, non-democratic leaders do not have to accommodate other views, and
they can simply ignore demands or repress the opposition. Since opposition from
outside the government is regarded as illegitimate, its aims are viewed with particular
hostility by the central leadership. In democracies, virtually every decision has
political consequences. Leaders must be concerned not only about their policies being
implemented but also the political consequences of those decisions and whether they
will adversely affect a leader’s future in office. In non-democracies, government
proposals typically do not face formal votes, and leaders do not have to consider how
their decisions will impact their future in the next election.
Second, without such mechanisms, or a free press or freedom of speech, nondemocratic leaders are often unable to gauge what opposition demands might be, the
level of support among the people for the central leadership, or their ideas for the
direction of the country. Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi’s genuine surprise as he
witnessed widespread demonstrations in opposition to his rule shortly before his
downfall and the Soviet Union’s inability to control or accommodate demands once
citizens were able to express them under glasnost reflect this tendency. Thus, unaware
of consequences of their decisions to a much greater degree than democratic leaders,
non-democratic leaders should feel less encumbered in the decisions that they make
and are less likely to recognize a need to accommodate those demands.
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Third, without mechanisms to channel opposition or accommodate its
demands, opposition may take a much more extreme anti-system flavor. Without an
“escape valve” to have demands and frustrations heard, opposition may move from the
mere political – where moderates within the opposition press demands on moderates
in the government – to the systemic, as opposition leaders feel they have no other
option than to challenge the legitimacy of the regime itself. When opposition reaches
this stage, threats to the regime are perceived by its leaders not only as threats to their
tenure, but quite possibly their group’s integrity, their personal status, freedom or life.
At this stage, rather than ignoring demands of relevant actors, non-democratic leaders
may be tempted to co-opt them by politicizing foreign policy for purposes of regime
maintenance. This may be done by appealing to patriotic and nationalist symbols and
themes to generate support for the regime and justify its “right to rule.” This may take
the form of challenges to former colonial power or hegemon or staking out positions
and making statements in international bodies. This process, however, can take on a
life of its own and lead to the use of foreign policy in its most extreme form – military
action. Opponents may “outbid” one another by advancing bold proposals to defend
the national interest; nationalist leaders may find themselves trapped by the
“blowback” of nationalist rhetoric and forced to take actions abroad; or nationalist
coalitions may form around issues through a process of “logrolling” (Mansfield and
Snyder, 2002).
In what has become known as the "diversionary theory of war," or
"scapegoating" (see Rosecrance 1963; Levy, 1989), leaders try to divert attention from
problems at home, isolate opponents, and consolidate political support by taking
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military action abroad. One of the most often cited recent examples is Argentina’s
1982 invasion and seizure of the Falklands Islands.
The military junta in Argentina, under the leadership of General Leopoldo
Fortunato Galtieri, was facing internal and external political opposition, worsening
economic problems and growing pressure from international and domestic human
rights organization over the government's repressive policies and questions over the
status of the "disappeared." Internally, there were growing divisions between
hardliners and softliners within the military over its mission, the future of military rule
and its impact on the institutional interests of the military. Externally, demonstrations
against the government were growing. Even among those within the regime who did
not favor continued military rule, there was a growing sense that the situation was one
they could no longer control. Argentina’s military rulers believed recovery of the
Falklands (Malvinas) Islands, a “national symbol” shared by almost every segment of
society, would boost support for the military by demonstrating that it could act on
behalf of Argentine sovereignty. The occupation did initially bolster support for the
regime. Appealing to the Argentine image of "lost greatness," the "territorial integrity
symbolized family, the group and national integrity” (Femenia, 1992: 12). Through
proclamations coming from Argentina's central leadership alluding to "missing
relatives,” "healing old wounds" and "reconciliation," they sought to fashion the
military action in terms that would unify the country and help its citizens forget some
of the very problems that the military junta created (Levy and Vakili, 1990; Femenia,
1992). Ultimately British victory in June 1982 sealed the fate of Argentina's military
government. The government did not believe that the British would respond militarily
57

to retake the islands. Nonetheless, this risky strategy demonstrates the extent to which
non-democratic leaders will go to maintain their hold on power (or at least regain
control of the process of transition to civilian rule).
A democratic leader in a similar situation would not have faced the same
incentives to take high-risk military action for strictly political purposes. Recent
evidence suggests that democratic leaders facing domestic problems at home prefer
instead to pursue policies aimed at reallocating private, rather than public, goods to a
“core constituency,”– seeking to address the specific nature of their domestic
problems (Clark, 2000). Since the benefits of military disputes approximate a public
good policy for democracies (such as a widespread increase in patriotism, for
example) (Bueno de Mesquita, et. al. 1999), democratic leaders should avoid foreign
policy adventurism and look for other more mild policy tools to boost their popularity
or resolve domestic problems (Clark, 2000). Miller’s (1999) examination of
scapegoating in democratic and non-democratic regimes found no relationship
between changing economic growth rates, levels of protest and rebellion at home, and
dispute escalation. Autocratic leaders, however, were found to be more prone to
diversionary behavior, with economic growth rates negatively correlated with dispute
escalation.
The political consequences of possible policy failure are in a sense greater for
democrats because they still have stake in a political future, even if they lose
electorally. Non-democratic leaders, however, would be willing to accept higher risk
“all-or-nothing” strategies for political purposes because the stakes are higher for
them. It is rare that a “defeated” autocrat is able to reenter the political arena at a later
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date. Thus there is a distinct temporal difference between “loss” in a democracy and
“loss” in a non-democracy. Applying tenets of Przeworksi’s explanation of why
political forces comply with the rules set forth in democratic institutions provides
some insight into the motivations of democratic and non-democratic leaders and their
conduct of foreign policy. He notes that elections produce winners and losers, yet:
Democratic institutions render an intertemporal character to
political conflicts. They offer a long time horizon to
political actors; they allow them to think about the future
rather than being concerned exclusively with present
outcomes... (they) offer to the relevant political forces a
prospect of eventually advancing their interests that is
sufficient to incite them to comply with immediately
unfavorable outcomes. Political forces comply with
present defeat because they believe that the institutional
framework that organizes the democratic competition will
permit them to the advance their interests in the future"
(Przeworski, 1991: 19).
For democrats, defeat or removal from office is not a final statement, but a
temporary outcome. Candidates, parties, and ideas can endure long after elections are
over; and losers do not forfeit their right to run again, shape their party's agenda, or
otherwise shape the policy agenda. Since there is a persistent role for politics, parties,
and elections, the timeframe of political actors in a democratic society is unlimited
(see Linz, 1999). Therefore, political actors wishing to remain relevant face strong
incentives to avoid pursuing policies that are considered extreme, controversial, or
could easily be discredited or result in policy failure. Non-democratic leaders,
however, must focus to a much greater degree on present outcomes, regime
maintenance, controlling opponents and assuring acquiescence, support or compliance
from those upon whom they rely for support. I suggest that differences in the nature
of opposition as well as the temporal aspects of democracies and non-democracies will
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cause each regime to treat the uncertainties of foreign policy change differently – with
democracies being far more cautious.
Audience Costs in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects for
Foreign Policy Change
Not only are there fewer incentives for democratic leaders to undertake foreign
policy change, in particular situations, there are strong incentives not to change
foreign policy. "Audience costs" constrain leaders from changing foreign policy since
they may face domestic political penalties for backing down from previously stated
policies or breaking foreign policy commitments important to the domestic audience.
Particularly in cases of crisis, domestic audiences will punish or criticize leaders more
for escalating confrontation and then backing down, than for choosing not to escalate
the in the first place (Fearon 1994). Crises, in a very public way, "engage the national
honor," and expose leaders to criticism from opposition groups for subjecting their
country to "diplomatic humiliation." Fearon notes that opposition groups “frequently
condition their activities on the international successes and failures of the leaders in
power" (ibid.: 581).
Therefore, states that bear the greatest audience costs should be the ones least
likely to back down in a crisis. While leaders in both democratic and non-democratic
regimes face audience costs, these constraints are especially important in democracies,
where domestic audiences (such as rival ministers, opposition politicians, legislative
committees, and the mass public) are more organized and institutionalized and have a
greater opportunity to make leaders pay a penalty for changing course:
In democracies, foreign policy is made by an agent on
behalf of the principals (voters) who have the power to
sanction the agent electorally or through the workings of
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public opinion. By contrast, in authoritarian states the
principals often conduct foreign policy themselves (ibid.:
581).
The significant role that audience costs play in democratic foreign policy
stability may not be limited to the extreme cases of confrontation and conflict. Fearon
hypothesizes that other foreign policy actions create audience costs as well, and
suggests that democratic states "should be less inclined to bluff or try ‘limited probes’
in foreign policy" (ibid.: 578). Additionally, in democracies, foreign policy
commitments often represent a sizable political investment to build the required
domestic coalition needed to support the action.
An administration that justifies the use of costly sanctions
by going to great lengths to persuade reluctant legislators
and economic actors that vital interests are at stake will
face high domestic costs if it then backs down from
threatening counter-sanctions. Having committed itself to a
particular policy, such reneging would call into question its
initial arguments and damage its reputation (Martin, 1993:
414).

Alastair Smith (1998) suggests that since autocratic rulers and lame-duck
presidents cannot be punished at the ballot box, they face no real audience costs, and
may pursue policy on the basis of international conditions alone. While I concur with
Smith’s sentiments on non-democratic leaders, I argue that, while lame-duck
presidents may not face the prospect of electoral defeat, it does not mean they do not
face audience costs or that audience costs are not important to them. Favorable
political capital is something important to all democratic leaders – whether or not they
are facing election. The successful conduct of foreign policy has the power of
increasing a democratic leader’s prestige and popularity, which he can then use to
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influence other areas of the policy agenda, assist in the electoral fortunes of other
members of his party, and ensure his place in history.
Audience costs are seen as an important way that states may signal their
intentions and commitments. For example, George Bush’s 1990 declaration that the
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait "will not stand" was seen as credible because it put
American honor and prestige at stake. George W. Bush's statement that “either you
are with us, or you are with the terrorists" similarly lent credibility to the U.S.
commitment to a war on terrorism. On the other hand, it is more difficult to gauge the
credibility of, or take seriously, Saddam Hussein's frequent threats and
pronouncements, since he faces no significant audience cost for not following through
on those threats. Suggestions from this literature indicate that democracies would be
less likely to undertake foreign policy change than would non-democracies.
‘Two-Level Games’ and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change
Related to issues of political constraints on the conduct of foreign policy, the
literature on two- level games suggests that major foreign policy changes in the form of
international agreements are more difficult for democracies to undertake. This is
related to the “transparency” of its decision- making process (Cowhey, 1993) and the
way foreign policy commitments are made. Schelling (1966) posits that states may
communicate their intentions and commitment to other actors by maneuvering into a
position where they would face a cost were they to back down or not follow through
on a committed course of action. Domestic political costs are one such mechanism,
and linkages between foreign policy in the domestic audience make it much more
difficult to divert from a committed course of action in states where leaders would
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face a political cost for doing so. Robert Putnam (1988) suggests that the requirement
for democratic leaders to garner domestic political support places additional
constraints on their ability to make new international agreements. He models
international negotiations as a “two-level game:”
At the national level domestic groups pursue their interests
by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies,
and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions
among those groups. At the international level, national
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse
consequences of foreign developments (ibid.: 434).
The ability to reach agreements is largely a function of the distribution of
power, preferences, possible coalitions among domestic constituents, and the nature of
domestic political institutions. Institutional requirements for ratification are an
effective constraint on leaders’ abilities to reach agreements. In states where there are
few or no domestic institutional barriers to reaching an agreement, leaders have
greater autonomy and face fewer constraints in committing to a specific course of
action. States with greater domestic constraints, however, may place leaders into
immovable negotiating positions, provoking stalemate or breakdown (Schelling,
1960). Putnam posits such states "should make fewer international agreements and
drive harder bargains in those that they do make" (Putnam, 1988: 443). While the
logic of two- level games is not limited to democracy, it is suggestive that it will play a
much larger role in democracies than in non-democracies, where there is an absence of
organized, legally recognized and institutionalized constituent opposition. Putnam
stresses the primacy of domestic political considerations since there are “fixed costs”
associated with domestic coalition building:
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Any political entrepreneur has a fixed investment in a
particular pattern of policy positions in a particular
supporting coalition. If a proposed international deal
threatens that investment, or ratification would require him
to construct a different coalition, the chief negotiator will
be reluctant to endorse it, even if (judged abstractly) it
could be ratified (ibid.: 458).
Anderson (1981) suggests that leaders have a built- in bias toward consistency
and "reliability" in foreign policymaking – a bias that is further reinforced in
democratic systems. He notes that the uncertainty associated with international
politics places a premium on consistency in foreign policy. This is because
governments use the behavior of other governments to develop expectations about the
future, and sustaining expectations about future behavior requires pursuing courses of
action consistent with expectations.
As Kissinger (1969) argued concerning U.S. policy in Vietnam:
Stability depends upon confidence in American promises.
Unilateral withdrawal or a settlement that unintentionally
amounts to the same thing, could therefore lead to the
erosion of restraints and to even more dangerous
international situation (ibid.: 219).
Domestically, there is a bias toward consistency as well, and undermining what
is seen as a desirable precedent requires justification to the domestic audience.
However:
If a government is willing to bear the political costs of
implausible justification, or in the case of autocratic
systems, is relatively isolated from the associated domestic
costs, the constraint will be minimal. The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, for example, occurred under what many in
the West considered a flimsy justification (Anderson, 1981:
743).
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Thus leaders, especially democratic leaders, and their foreign policy decisions have a
way of committing and binding future leaders and the latitude they have in foreign
policy decisions.
The logic of two- level games, illustrating the interaction of the international
and domestic negotiations necessary for foreign policy change, suggests that
democracies should be less likely to undertake significant changes in foreign policy
than non-democracies. The difficulty policymakers have in meeting both domestic
and international imperatives are a significant constraint on forging new international
agreements. Non-democracies, however, with fewer domestic constraints, should
more easily negotiate international agreements, since autocratic leaders may place
much greater weight on the international ramifications, as opposed to the domestic
ramifications, of their of decisions.
The Nature of Legitimacy in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and
Prospects for Foreign Po licy Change
Another fundamental difference between democracies and non-democracies
with prospects for foreign policy change concerns the sources of legitimacy upon
which the regimes and their central leadership is based. Legitimacy has been defined
as "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed"
(Hurd, 1999: 381). It has a subjective quality, based on an individual's perception
"that the actions of the entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate" (Suchman, 1995:
574). For an individual citizen, legitimacy is an internalized belief conferred upon a
ruling body or regime in its "right to rule." For national leaders this is an important
source of control and stability, and it ensures compliance on the part of the people.
Legitimacy is less costly and politically less risky than the other mechanism for
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maintaining compliance – coercion. Robert Dahl observed that higher levels of
legitimacy require lower levels of the use of force, while conversely, as legitimacy
decreases, higher levels of coercion and force are necessary to maintain control and
compliance.
For democracies, legitimacy is much easier to come by because it comes in
two forms – ruler legitimacy and regime legitimacy. Democratic ruler legitimacy is
based on the leader’s ability to perform duties and meet the expectations of those
supporting him or her. The legitimacy of a democratic regime is based on rules and
procedures – the ability of voters to select their leaders through open and fair
elections, comp ete for elective office, express political opinions freely, and so on. A
democratic leader may lose ruler legitimacy while maintaining regime legitimacy. In
fact, when a leader is voted out of office and a peaceful transition of power occurs, the
legitimacy of the regime is itself reaffirmed (Huntington 1991). A democratic leader’s
loss of ruler legitimacy does not mean an end to any role he might play in the future.
Since the legitimacy of the regime in which he is operating continues, he and his party
may work within the system to regain power at a later date.
Democratic regime legitimacy (rules and procedures) serves as a constraint on
the conduct of foreign policy. Opposing views may be expressed, elections may
remove leaders, and executive powers are limited. Opponents to the government or its
policies may organize and voice their opinion without fear of retribution. Since
political power in democracies is limited and rests abstractly with the office, rather
than being unlimited and resting with specific individuals, a domestic legal
environment binds leaders and what they may do. Scholars have suggested that these
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norms associated with democratic legitimacy shape the conduct of foreign beyond the
domestic legal constraints imposed upon them. Gaubatz (1996) suggests that the role
of law, "juridical nature of liberal democracy," and “reputation of a state for
reliability” have a significant rhetorical appeal in democracies. Stanley Hoffmann
(1989) observed the restraining effects of liberalism, "the essence of Western political
regimes and Western international law." He states that the “civilizing and refining of
power through international law and legal institutions" act as " blinders…to a more
effective approach” and that "diplomatic correctness…limits what a non-totalitarian
power can achieve" (ibid.: 47-49).
In non-democratic regimes there is no distinction between ruler legitimacy and
regime legitimacy. Thus non-democratic leaders must build and maintain their own
legitimacy if they wish to remain in power. The "legitimization problem" to some
extent will be a perpetual challenge for non-democratic leaders as they seek to justify
their rule through other sources (Huntington, 1991). For some non-democratic
regimes, particularly those that seize control from democracies, leaders will often base
their legitimacy on "their capacity to guarantee order, restore faith in the economy, or
eliminate a ‘subversive’ threat" (Share and Mainwaring, 1986: 188). Once these
governments solve the "problems" that brought them to power, however, those sources
of legitimacy will dissipate; and groups in society that initially supported them may
begin to question their continued purpose (see O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1989). Faced
with this decline, non-democratic leaders are eventually driven to look to other areas,
such as the government's "substantive accomplishments" and "performance" as the
principal sources for legitimacy. When a country suffers economic hardship or does
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not have sufficient wealth or resources to provide material improvements to the
people, the foreign policy realm becomes an attractive avenue to accomplish this.
Robert Snyder’s (1999) recent study of the breakdown in U.S. relations with
the revolutionary states of Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua reveals that domestic political
imperatives in these countries, and not U.S. attitudes toward the revolutionary states
are what caused the breakdown. In each case, the United States became the target of
foreign policies aimed primarily at justifying the revolution, isolating opponents in the
bourgeoisie and consolidating their power. In each case, the countries fundamentally
reoriented their foreign policies into an anti-U.S. posture, despite initial receptiveness
on the part of the United States to the new regimes and their leadership. A similar
dynamic was identified in Ethiopia’s realignment with the Soviet Union and Sadat’s
realignment with the United States (David, 1991). Legitimization was also a central
feature of Argentina’s occupation of the Falklands Islands, outlined above.
Dawisha (1990) identifies the drive for legitimacy at home as a central tenet of
the foreign policies of many Arab states, where power is often concentrated in the
hands of a single individual or very small group. As urbanization and education have
increased in these states, traditional values and attitudes have been questioned and can
no longer be relied upon to underpin regime stability. As a result, Arab leaders have
demonstrated a willingness to pursue very risky and adventurist foreign policies aimed
at consolidating support at home. For example, Syria’s confrontation with Israel
following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 reestablished Assad’s credibility as
leader of “the only country that dared to confront Israel militarily,” following ethnic
violence that seriously undermined his position as leader (ibid.).
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Legitimacy was also a driving force in the foreign policy of Egypt under
Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Through his refusal to join the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact, active
participation in the nonaligned movement, arms deals with the Soviets, formal
recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and confrontation over nationalization
of the Suez Canal, Nasser enhanced his anti-Western credentials in a way that not only
brought him immense support at home, but also throughout the Arab world
(Dekmejian 1971). His success in using foreign policy as a legitimizing tool became
a model emulated by many other leaders of non-democratic states.
Foreign policy legitimization is not limited to the small developing states.
Whiting (1983) notes that a tone of "assertive nationalism" pervaded a wide range of
foreign policy pronouncements following the Communist Party's Twelfth Party
Congress in 1982. Consistent with the notion of declining legitimacy over time, he
attributed the shift in China’s more aggressive tone to the new leadership’s need for
“ideological unity and legitimacy after the dilution and reduction of MarxismLeninism-Mao Zedong thought as the primary appeal to loyalty and national
cohesion” (ibid.: 328).
I suggest that the fundamental differences in sources of legitimacy in
democracies and non-democracies will impact their propensity to undertake foreign
policy change in fundamentally different ways. The rules and procedures associated
with democratic legitimacy will foster greater foreign policy stability, while the search
to continuously build and maintain legitimacy in non-democracies will drive them to
use foreign policy in ways that foster more foreign policy change.
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The Nature of the Public in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and
Prospects for Foreign Policy Change
Another central feature that differentiates democracies from non-democracies
is the nature of opposition that comes from outside the central leadership. External
opposition can and does exist in many non-democracies. Whether in the guise of the
church, trade unions or other organizations, individual citizens have found ways to
express their opinion and disapproval of policies and the conduct of the regime itself.
A key consideration that differentiates regime types, however, is the fact that nondemocracies have the capacity to suppress public opinion, popular movements and
limit or eliminate popular participation (or conversely, mobilize them toward their
own ends). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) illustrate this by contrasting the
Greek response to the Cyprus crises of 1967 and 1974. In 1967, a Greek Army
general associated with enosis (the union of Greece and Cyprus) was involved in an
attack on Turks in Cyprus and the Turkish government responded by preparing for
war; however, a negotiated settlement with the help of the United States averted the
crisis. Greece’s military junta, which had come to power just months earlier, could
not overcome strong opposition to war from the public and "the high domestic
constraint more typical of a democracy operated in this case against the Greek
colonels in the early days of their leadership." Seven years later, however, when the
Greek military government was "more skilled at suppressing the views of political
opponents," the government effectively ignored popular opinion, even more opposed
to enosis by force than was the case in 1967, and lead a risky military coup in Cyprus,
installing a puppet leader sympathetic to the Greek government (ibid.: 162).
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If democratic decisionmakers have less autonomy from the public and
relations between demands and decisions are relatively strong (Purcell, 1973), will that
mean more or less foreign policy change? Does public opinion matter? Is it
consistent? How responsive are decisionmakers to public opinion on foreign policy
issues? For Kant and most liberals, public opinion was believed to be inherently
peaceful and would discourage democratic leaders from going to war. Since public
support would have to be mobilized to support a war, preferences for peace among the
public would serve as a major restraint on policymakers. Others have noted, however,
that a hawkish public can also pressure political elites into adopting hard- line policies
that lead to war, as in the case of the United States in the Spanish-American War
(Levy, 1988).
A major concern among traditional realists following World War II was a
"disruption from below" – where popular pressures would force democratic
governments to respond in ways that "drive foreign policy off the path of cool reason
and calculated reflection” (Nincic, 1992: 5). Hans Morgenthau feared that democratic
states subject to the whims of public opinion would be ineffective in dealing with the
realities of political realism (Morgenthau, 1973). The “Almond-Lippmann consensus”
(O. Holsti 1992) that developed concerning the public and foreign policy was based on
two concerns – that the public was ill- informed and knew very little about the
intricacies of complex foreign policy issues facing the nation and that public opinion
was extremely fickle and volatile (see Almond, 1950, 1956). Rather than a force for
foreign policy stability, this logic suggested that an inconsistent public would force an
inconsistent foreign policy.
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Research generally does support the contention that the public is ill- informed
on most foreign policy issues. Just ten years after the end of the Vietnam War, less
than two-thirds of the public knew that the United States supported South Vietnam in
the conflict (Clymer, 1985); and a famous Harris poll taken at the height of U.S.
efforts to support the Contras in Nicaragua showed that 56 percent believed the
Contras were enemies of the United States. In terms of volatility, early research
focusing on public opinion seemed to confirm concerns that public preferences are
“moody” and “malleable” and that opinions were not linked to a larger ideological
structure or understanding that would provide those beliefs context, structure or
coherence (Converse, 1964).
More recent research indicates that although public opinion may be volatile,
the beliefs underlying them are, in fact, structured and coherent. In other words,
foreign policy beliefs are not horizontally constrained (where beliefs within one issue
area are systematically related to opinions and beliefs in other issue areas). Instead,
they are organized by vertical constraints, where specific opinions on foreign policy
issues are rooted in a deeper set of ideological beliefs. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987)
developed a hierarchical model rooted schema theory to explain the relationship
between general and specific foreign policy attitudes (vertical constraints). According
to schema theory, people are "cognitive misers," and have a limited ability to deal with
complex information. Therefore, they take "short cuts" to simplify the process by
relying on a more general understanding to interpret, gather, and process new and
more specific informa tion. More abstract ideas and beliefs constrain the more specific
ones – from core values to postures to foreign policy issues (public opinion).
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Wittkopf’s (1990, 1994, 1996) examinations of Americans attitudes about foreign
policy after Vietnam show that individuals’ beliefs about foreign policy remain
relatively stable and consistent over time, in spite of changing attitudes on specific
foreign policy issues. This has been shown to exist not only in the United States, but
in other countries as well. A recent study found that public beliefs concerning foreign
policy issues in Sweden are also very structured, in ways not unlike that of the United
States (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999). Other studies have found evidence that public
opinion itself is relatively stable when analyzed in the context of changing world
events (Page and Shapiro, 1988). This was also found in a non-American setting,
where public opinion and attitudes stabilize over time at the aggregate level following
significant changes in the international environment (Isernia et. al., 2002).
If opinions and beliefs are more stable than many originally conceived, the
question remains to what extent does public opinion influence the foreign policy
decision- making process; and whether beliefs can be aggregated in any meaningful
way that could influence the decision making process (see Riker, 1982). Some argue
that public opinion plays a role because decisionmakers perceive that it is important
(Hoffmann, 1989). Monroe’s (1998) study of public opinion and U.S. policy
decisions found that of all issue areas, foreign policy preferences were the most
consistent with government policy; and that the growing gap between public
preferences and policy present in most policy areas was not evident in the case of
foreign policy. Nincic (1992) suggests that Presidents Carter and Reagan adjusted
their policies with the Soviet Union to a more moderate approach in response to public
opinion that rejected policies seen as too accommodating or too confrontational.
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Others suggest that public opinion plays a role in the formulation and execution of
foreign policy, in that democratic leaders must mobilize support for their policies by
shaping their appeals in terms of wider themes that appeal to core beliefs about foreign
policy (see Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Wittkopf, 1996); and that public opinion
establishes for decisionmakers a “range of policies” that can be popularly sustained
(Russett, 1990). Elite interviews with foreign policy decisionmakers have also
indicated a very direct role for public opinion in that public reaction to policies are
considered at the earlier stages of formulation; and when public opinion conflicts with
policy, decisionmakers will seek to educate the public and build support for the policy
rather than change the policy (Powlick, 1991).
On balance, current research on the role of the democratic public in foreign
policymaking suggests that to the extent that public opinion does influence foreign
policy, it is a source for policy stability rather than change. While the public may be ill
informed on major foreign policy issues, the foreign policy beliefs that help inform
those opinions are ordered, structured and coherent. Thus, changes in foreign policies
in democratic societies are not likely to be in response to changes in public opinion. If
anything, according to current literature, they are an attempt to bring policies more in
line with public opinion, avoid the extremes and remain more consistent with the
beliefs of citizens and policies of the past.
The Nature of Organized Interests in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes
and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change
One way individual opinions and preferences may be expressed and used to
influence policy in democracies is through organized group demands. An analyst of
decisionmaking in an authoritarian regime contrasts the process in both regimes:
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Limited pluralism may be expected to produce an erratic
relation between the authoritarian leader’s decisions and
expressed group demands. Many decisions will involve
issues that were never raised, while issues that are raised
frequently maybe ignored because groups lack sufficient
resources and capabilities to support their demands.
Interest groups in authoritarian regimes may also be
expected to play a predominantly reactive (rather than
initiating) role in the decision- making process, expressing
support for the leader’s decisions or seeking to modify
them in their behalf. In a democratic regime characterized
by relatively unlimited pluralism, the relation between
group demands and the leader’s decisions may be expected
to be strong; groups will play a predominantly initiating
role in the decision- making process and should be able to
support their demands with substantial pressure. The low
subject mobilization of authoritarian regimes will reduce
the number of demands made upon the authoritarian leader,
provide him with substantial decision- making autonomy,
and reinforce the erratic relation between group demands
and the authoritarian leader’s decisions. In a democratic
regime characterized by moderate "participant"
mobilization, the number of demands emanating from the
policy will be greater. The autonomy of the
decisionmakers will be more limited, and the relatively
strong relation between the demands and decisions will be
reinforced (Purcell, 1973: 37-38).

While group demands may be repressed or controlled in non-democracies,
they play a prevalent role in many democracies. Interest groups are able to pool
resources and political clout to articulate policies to the elected members, educate and
inform them on the benefits and consequences of political decisions, mobilize votes –
as well as educate their membership, the American public and the media, on issues of
interest to them. The United States has been called an "interest group society" (Berry,
1984) due to the pervasiveness of interest groups and lobbyists and the role they play
in attempting to influence the legislative agenda. Special interest groups may play an
especially large role in countries such as the United States, where there is weak party
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discipline and individual legislators are more open to other influences and ideas.
Democracies, especially democracies such as the United States, present these interest
groups with multiple channels of influence, where they compete and coalesce with
other groups for influence over policies. Groups vary in size and scope, representing
special interests, a particular ideology or issue (such as peace or nuclear disarmament),
military defense or trade policy. Others are ethnic in nature and geared toward U.S.
policies with specific nations or regions. Historically, one of the most influential of
these ethnic interest groups in the United States has been the pro-Israel American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). With close ties to Israeli governments as
well as allies in Congress, this organization has been an integral part of U.S.
policymaking toward Israel for many years (see Hadar, 1996). The Cuban American
National Foundation is another ethnic group that exercised significant influence in the
1980s (Haney and Vanderbrush, 1999).
Addressing the issue of foreign policy change, critics of special interest
groups charge that their influence forces decisionmakers into responding to pressures
from what is a relatively narrow segment of society. If this is indeed the case, one
might expect a relative lack of continuity in foreign policy in democratic states, as
policies successively respond to an ever-increasing number of narrow interests groups.
Others, however, suggest that except under rare circumstances, interest groups do not
have a great influence on foreign policy. AIPAC’s influence is often seen as an
“exception to the rule” that interest groups do not exercise great influence on foreign
policy, with its unified organization, money, lobbying skills, cohesive constituency
and issue salience to lawmakers being key to its success (Haney and Vanderbrush,
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1999). As interest groups are formed around issues and those groups begin to exercise
influence, opposition is prompted to organize and push policy in the opposite
direction, creating cross-pressures on decisionmakers. Additionally, groups often will
seek inaction and maintenance of the status quo. "Such efforts are generally more
successful than efforts to bring about policy change. For this reason interest groups
are generally regarded as agents for policy stability” (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1991:
273).
Another way organized interests further stabilize foreign policy is that subnational actors adjust their behavior to receive the greatest benefits from the current
policy. Interests organize and take an active role in the political process to ensure that
those policies and benefits continue. Rogowski’s (1989) study of trade expansion and
decline shows how domestic political cleavages are formed around those industries
reaping the greatest benefits from international trade conditions and how those
interests use their economic clout to further strengthen their political position. Charles
Lipson (1982) illustrates how a free trade agreement fosters the development of, and
increases the political power of, those firms benefiting from free trade. These interests
become an important part of the “domestic supporting coalition,” making foreign
policy changes that impact their interests less desirable for democratic decisionmakers
to undertake if they wish to maintain the political support of these groups. Further,
these interests need not be especially large or widespread to have an important impact
on the policy-making process. Putnam (1988) observes that political participation
rates vary significantly across groups and issues; when costs and benefits of a policy
or agreement are relatively concentrated, those constituents whose interests are most
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affected will exert special pressures on the policy- making process to act on their
behalf. Thus foreign policy commitments themselves can perform an important
feedback mechanism – developing and strengthening the political power of those
interests that benefit the most from a policy, who in turn pressure leaders dependent
upon their political support to maintain the status quo. The role of interest groups,
therefore, is another reason to expect greater foreign policy stability in democracies
than non-democracies.
Summary
As I have outlined in this chapter, there are compelling reasons to believe that
differences between democracies and non-democracies will have a significant impact
on their foreign policies. The institutional and structural constraints on democratic
leaders are greater than those on non-democratic ones. Democratic leaders must
contend with an instituted and legally binding decision- making framework that can
authoritatively limit the availability of foreign policy options. The nature of political
competition in democracies makes them more averse to risky foreign policy strategies
and more likely to pursue policies that accommodate the interests of relevant political
actors than is the case in non-democratic systems. Instead, non-democratic states may
exhibit strong incentives to use foreign policy toward strictly political ends. The
nature of democratic legitimacy further constrains the steps decisionmakers may take
and affects the timeframe in which they view their political future. The legitimacy of
non-democracies, however, is tied very closely to the performance of government and
shapes a focus of immediacy on domestic support for the regime and its leadership. In
democracies, the public has a much stronger impact on the decision-making process.
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Organized interests and the democratic public can effectively punish leaders for
significantly departing from policies favorable to the people. Non-democratic leaders
are much more isolated from societal pressures and can repress popular movements,
control media and more easily shape public opinion.
I argue that these fundamental differences should make it more difficult for
democracies to undertake foreign policy change and place fewer incentives in the
hands of democratic leaders to undertake foreign policy change. Non-democracies, on
the other hand, have fewer impediments to undertake foreign policy change, and more
incentives to do so. Thus, the first hypothesis of this dissertation:
H1: Democratic states demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their
foreign policies than do non-democratic states.
In developing this hypothesis, concepts of democracy and non-democracy
were necessarily generalized. In the following chapter I will take a look at factors
"beneath the regime surface," examining ways the variety of institutional and
structural arrangements within each regime type influence foreign policy stability and
continuity, and I will develop specific hypotheses regarding these factors. While these
factors have been largely ignored in empirical studies of regime effects on
international relations and foreign policy, compelling reasons exist to believe that just
as democracies and non-democracies place different constraints and incentives on
decisionmakers, so too do the myriad of differences within them.
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CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

Below the Regime Surface
In the previous chapter I outlined some of the differences between major
regimes types, argued that those differences create incentives and constraints for
foreign policy change, and developed the hypothesis that democracies will exhibit
more stable foreign policies than will non-democracies. For a fuller understanding of
how domestic constraints influence foreign policy stability, it is necessary to look
below the regime surface. Within the democracy/non-democracy dichotomy there is
great variation in terms of institutional arrangements, political dynamics and the types
of actors involved, each creating opportunities and constraints for foreign policy
change. Drawing upon literature developed largely in the area of comparative politics,
this chapter will produce specific hypotheses related to how these differences impact a
state's foreign policy stability.
The notion that institutional arrangements in different types of democracies
produce different outcomes is not new. It was the central debate among framers of the
United States Constitution, who wished to design a system that would constrain the
powers of government by dividing its functions and creating a system of checks and
balances. The recent focus on institutions and their outcomes has been spurred largely
by the "third wave" of democratization that swept the globe throughout the 1980s and
into the early 1990s. These new democracies faced fundamental choices about how
their new regimes would be organized, how individuals would be elected and power
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dispersed.1 Neo-institutionalists argue that these choices have profound consequences
in terms of the representation, efficiency and responsiveness of governments, and,
perhaps most importantly, prospects for democratic consolidation and regime stability.
While the study of institutions has been central to debates within comparative
politics for more than a decade, they have until very recently received little attention in
the international relations and foreign policy literature. Auerswald (1999) examines
the domestic institutional context in which executives make a decision to use force.
He posits that executives become less adventuresome in foreign policy as they become
accountable to more domestic groups. Examining the U.S., British and French
responses to the Suez Crisis and the war in Bosnia, he finds that presidents are more
likely to use force than single-party parliamentary governments, which are also more
likely to use force than coalition governments. Prins and Sprecher (1999) examined
the differences in Western parliamentary democracies. They find that coalition
governments are more prone to reciprocate disputes and speculate that single-party
governments are more sensitive to the electoral risks associated with escalation. This
dissertation will expand upon the notion that important differences exists between
regimes aside from the standard democracy/non-democracy dichotomy and apply
those differences specifically to the study of foreign policy change.
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems
Presidential and parliamentary systems constitute, in a broad sense, the two
major ways of organizing democratic government. The systems differ fundamentally
1

One of the most fundamental choices facing these new democracies was whether their system would
be presidential or parliamentary. Of the new democracies that have emerged since the 1980s, all of
Latin America and Asia have opted for pure presidentialism; and of the 25 countries that constitute
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union only three have chosen pure parliamentarism – Hungary,
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in terms of executive selection, separation of survival and separation of powers.
Executives in presidential systems are popularly elected; whereas parliamentary
executives are selected based on the allocation of legislative seats, usually the leader
of the party winning the greatest share of seats. Regarding separation of survival, in
presidential systems, the terms of the executive and the legislature are both fixed and
the survival of one is not dependent on the other. In parliamentary systems, the terms
of the executive and the legislature are concurrent, and the executive is accountable to,
and depends upon the confidence of, the lower chamber of the legislature. In
presidential systems there is a formal separation of powers. Executive power rests
outside the le gislature with the president and his cabinet. In parliamentary systems
these functions are fused, and the parliament is the forum for both lawmaking and
executive power (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Samuels and Eaton, 2002).
A state’s ability to change its policies is a function of a number of factors. One
of these is the number of “veto players” in the system, defined as the person, political
party, or faction that can act alone to exercise a “veto” on a policy or issue (or must
agree for the policy to change) (see Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). As the effective number of
vetoes increases, so do the transaction costs (through negotiations with different
actors, etc.) that must be overcome to change a policy. Greater costs make policy
change more difficult to undertake, and lower costs, in terms of fewer veto players,
make policy change less difficult to undertake (Cox and McCubbins, 2001). A greater
number of veto players, therefore, create a self-enforcing mechanism for policy

Czech Republic and Slovakia. Almost all other opted for some for a hybrid
presidential/parliamentarism.
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stability, “guarding against the possibility of ever-changing, unpredictable policies”
(Haggard, et. al., 2001: 321).
I suggest that several other attributes of presidential systems make them more
stable in their foreign policy. One such attribute is separation of powers. Executive
and legislative powers are divested into two separate institutional bodies – the
presidency and the legislature. The framers of the U.S. Constitution (upon which
virtually all presidential systems today are modeled), sought to construct a system that
would avo id a "tyranny of the majority” by making compromise the norm and rapid,
drastic policy changes more difficult to achieve. Decisionmaking and the lawmaking
process are formally and legally shared between an individual and an often disparate
body of individual legislators who have the capability to effectively constrain the
executive’s policy agenda.
Members of the legislature are equipped with mechanisms to effectively block,
delay and "water down" a president's proposals. In this fragmented decision- making
process, presidents are compelled to seek compromise if they wish to avoid deadlock.
Linz (1994), a critic of presidentialism, observes:
the political process therefore becomes broken into
discontinuous, rigidly determined periods without the
possibility of continuous readjustment as political, social,
in economic events might require... (unlike) the much
greater flexibility of that process in parliamentary systems
(ibid.: 8-9).
The constraining effects of separation of powers are further exacerbated in cases
where legislative bodies are bicameral. Effective bicameralism exists in a much
greater degree in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems (Samuels and
Eaton, 2002).
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Separation of powers does not exist in parliamentary systems, where instead
there is an “association of powers.” Legislative and executive functions are fused.
The prime minister and his or her cabinet are almost always selected directly from
parliament itself, and while in power, members of the government may retain their
seats in parliament. If a party wins a majority of the seats in parliament, there is true
“party government,” and government may pass its programs virtually intact, without
much of the requisite bargaining and compromise found in presidential systems. This
lack of a separation of powers is a significant difference that makes parliamentary
systems generally less constrained than presidential democracies. While political and
policy differences may exist within parliamentary government, prime ministers do not
have to face opposition in an entirely separate body. The separation of powers creates
an additional institutional veto player for presidential systems that makes new policies
more difficult to undertake and old policies more difficult to break. Therefore,
presidential systems should demonstrate more stable foreign policies than
parliamentary democracies.
Another factor that should make presidential systems more prone to foreign
policy stability concerns the constraints raised by separation of purpose, which refers
to "the degree to which the executive and legislators have similar preferences and
political incentives in response to, and are accountable to the same groups, pressures,
and demands” (Samuels and Eaton, 2002: 7). Executives and legislators with a high
separation of purpose are less likely to come to an agreement on policies and solutions
since they must respond to different actors with different interests and preferences.
Separation of purpose is not only more likely to occur in presidential systems, but its

84

impact is greater. This is largely a function of presidentialism’s system of separate
elections and the separate origin of executives and legislators. Presidents and
legislators stand for election in separate contests, often at different times. Each has a
different origin in that presidents are not selected from legislatures. This means that
each has a different constituency and different incentives to respond to different
actors, pressures, and demands.
A president wishing to appeal to a majority of voters will more likely represent
the political center, while principles of representation in the legislature produce
individuals with more parochial preferences, interests and allegiances. Therefore,
presidents and legislators, pursuing policies consistent with their own preferences, or
acting rationally on behalf of their constituents’ interests, will likely be at odds on
many issues. Separation of purpose is not tied to party identity and can easily occur
even when a majority in the legislature is of the same party as the president. The fact
that executives are directly elected in separate elections, however, allows voters to
"split their votes," giving executive control to one party and legislative control to
another. When this happens, separation of purpose is even more likely.
Separation of purpose tends to be much lower in parliamentary systems. Since
there are no direct or separate elections for the prime minister, elections for members
of parliament take on a more national scope, with voters casting votes for parliament
based upon which party’s leader they would like to form a government (Linz, 1994).
“Legislators in parliamentary systems ban together in parties that seek to present a
relatively coherent face to the electorate in the form of a party label that is identified
with a basket of policy positions. They are encouraged to do so because the only way

85

that legislators or their voters can influence the makeup of the executive branch is
through their choice of party in legislative races” (Shugart and Haggard, 2001: 83).
Thus parliamentary elections tend to be more party-focused and legislative elections in
presidential systems more candidate-focused. Elected members of parliament will
tend to have a more nationally focused mandate from their constituents, who will
reward them for adherence to the party line. The prime minister and a majority of
those in parliament will have more similar preferences; and will have similar
incentives to be responsive and accountable to the same groups, pressures and
demands. A lower separation of purpose suggests that parliamentary executives will
face fewer legislative constraints in policymaking than will presidents.
Separation of survival is a key factor that differentiates presidentialism from
parliamentarism, with ramifications for the conduct of foreign policy. In presidential
systems the fate of the executive is not tied in to the legislature. In parliamentary
systems the government is responsible to the parliament and will remain in office only
as long as it retains the support of a majority in parliament. If it loses that support,
either parties in parliament must form a new government or hold new elections.
This has a profound affect on the allegiance of members of the majority or
government coalition party to the head of government. Self- interested
parliamentarians would not want to risk their party losing power and face new
elections by withdrawing support for the government over particular policies or
legislation. Therefore cabinet ministers and rank-and-file legislators have “little
incentive or ability to stray from the preference of their own party…(which are)
powerfully shaped by national issues (Shugart and Haggard, 2001: 84). This “mutual
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dependence” maximizes incentives for maintaining single-party or coalition majorities
while minimizing the opportunities for legislative impasse (Stepan and Skach, 1994).
One way of assuring allegiance on important legislation is by tying it to a vote
of confidence, whereby its defeat would cause the government to resign and new
elections be held. Linz observes:
in parliamentary systems governments can demand from
parties (either their own if they have a majority or those in
the coalition) support in votes of confidence, threatening
them otherwise with resignation in the case of lack of
support and ultimately with dissolution of the legislature.
The role of each party and even of each deputy would be
clear to the voters, who are unlikely to sanction destructive
actions by parties. The party that failed to support its prime
minister would have to pay a price (Linz, 1994: 64).
Arend Lijphart (1994) contrasts this with presidential systems:
[in parliamentary systems], on every important vote,
legislators must cast their votes not only on the merits of
the particular issue but also on keeping the cabinet in
office: the fact that most legislators do not want to upset the
cabinet too frequently gives the cabinet very strong
leverage over the process of legislation. In presidential
systems, the legislature can deal with bills on their merits
without the fear of causing a cabinet crisis—and hence
without being “blackmailed” by the executive into
accepting its proposals (ibid.: 96).
Separation of survival contributes to the weak party systems that are generally found
in presidential systems. Presidents cannot (and need not) rely on a majority of support
from the legislature, even if his or her party holds a majority of the seats, since
legislators in presidential systems have incentives to focus on the local and special
interests that support them. To enact their programs, presidents must therefore
continually build and maintain coalitions within the legislature, and bargain and
compromise on their agendas. Since parliamentary legislators have strong personal
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incentives to support the national policies of their party to a much greater degree than
do legislators in presidential systems, parliamentary executives should face fewer
constraints in their ability to enact policies, including foreign policy change.
The separate origin and survival of the executive and legislature in presidential
systems also makes them more open to the influence of interest groups, since
organized interests will always have at least two points of entry to exert their influence
(Vogel, 1993). Additionally, weak party systems ensure that individual legislators
will not lose their jobs or face being disciplined by their party for allowing these
groups to influence their policy decisions. “The greater number of access point
suggests that demand side pressures may have relatively greater success at influencing
the policy process in presidential systems, thereby increasing the cost of moving
policy from the status quo " (Samuels and Eaton, 2002: 36). On the other hand, "unity
of survival in parliamentary systems limits how responsive legislators can be to
lobbies” (ibid.). The constraining effects of interest group participation on foreign
policy change would appear to be greater in presidential systems than in parliamentary
systems.
The literature on the ways institutional characteristics may contribute to
democratic breakdown also offers insight into the foreign policy stability of
presidential and parliamentary systems. One of the most influential pieces in the past
decade is Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela’s The Failure of Presidential Democracy
(1994). In addition to the fact that presidents and members of the legislature are
elected to separate, fixed terms, Linz finds another drawback of presidentialism – its
"dual democratic legitimacy.” Dual democratic legitimacy arises from the fact that
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both the popularly elected president and the elected legislature can rightfully claim
democratic legitimacy. Presidents will claim a strong mandate that they represent all
of the people (even though often that may not be the case); and legislators, often
representing different political, and parochial interests, also lay claim to that
legitimacy. The result is often a veto or stalemate on legislation, which presidential
systems have no way of resolving. Dual legitimacy thus provides one other prospect
for constraints in presidential systems.
Of interest to the study, it must be noted that there are aspects of
presidentialism that suggest presidents will have significant freedom to act in foreign
policy. Chief executives in almost every presidential system have some
constitutionally granted lawmaking authority. While there is great variation across
presidential systems, these powers include the ability to make diplomatic and
administrative appointments, act as commander- in-chief of the armed forces, and veto
legislation. In some countries these powers can be quite significant. Shugart and
Haggard (2001) observe, however, that the strongest presidential powers exist in
countries that are prone to high separation of purpose. They hypothesize that
presidents in these societies are granted extraordinary powers in order to compensate
for the "indecision, deadlock, and particularism" that would otherwise prevail. They
caution that strong presidential powers cannot offset the constraining effects that a
high separation of purpose has on policy decisiveness; and that presidential powers are
used as a source of policy change only under limited circumstances, when there is
explicit delegation to the president on the part of the legislature, or in crisis settings
when legislatures are willing to grant greater leeway. Other “reactive” powers, such
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as the veto, can only reinforce policy stability. Others positing that presidents are less
restrained in foreign policymaking than parliamentary governments stress the fact that
premiers and their cabinets are dependent upon the legislature for support, which
serves as a significant constraint on their freedom to act (Maoz and Russett, 1993).
Auerswald’s conclusion that parliaments are more subject to the meddling effects of
the legislature supports this contention. However, for the reasons outlined above I
suggest, that on balance, presidents will be more constrained in their foreign policy
conduct than will parliamentary executives.
An early study comparing foreign policymaking in presidential and
parliamentary systems is Kenneth Waltz’s Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics
(1967). Waltz compares the foreign policy decision- making processes in the United
States and Great Britain and concludes that the American presidential system is more
effective; however, his observations suggest mixed ramifications for foreign policy
stability. On the one hand he states that a source for long-term stability and
commitment for presidential systems is the fact that Congress, an independent
legislature with varied interests, must approve many executive actions. On the other
hand, he concludes that prime ministers are actually more constrained in their decision
making than are presidents. He argues that party discipline in parliamentary systems
is actually a source of weakness, since executives must depend on the support of
members of their party to remain in power. This leads to a situation where party
cohesion takes precedence, and prime ministers bargain, make concessions and avoid
controversial issues, lest they risk losing their needed majority support. The result is
“massive continuity, painfully slow adjustment, response to crisis only whe n they have
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almost hopelessly deepened" (Waltz, 1967: 3-4). This conclusion, however, ignores
the fact that individual members of parliament are likewise dependent upon supporting
their party to stay in power and that it is in their best political self- interest to do so.
Particularly in the British system, prime ministers have a means to ensure party
discipline, and Charles Hermann (1968) notes that the British House of Commons has
not voted a majority out of office since 1895.
Stephen D. Krasner has cha racterized the United States as a "weak state" in his
analysis of foreign policymaking in the American presidential system, where the
central characteristics are the fragmentation and dispersion of power and authority.
He observes the important effects of separation of purpose and notes that cleavages
between Congress and the president have often been greater than those between
political parties. The fragmentation of power within Congress itself, through its
committee system, creates further "decision making nodes" where policies can be
blocked. He characterizes policy change in these states in terms of a "punctuated
equilibrium,” where significant changes only come in response to crisis situations
(Krasner, 1976; 1984). "Once policies had been adopted, they are pursued until a new
crisis demonstrates that they are no longer feasible" (Krasner, 1976: 341; see also
Hoffman, 1989).
Cowhey (1993) concludes that the U.S. presidential system, when compared to
that of Japan's parliament, makes it easier for America to maintain its policy
commitments. He explains America’s success in developing multilateral institutions,
such as GATT and NATO, in terms of the U.S. separation of powers, which enables
each branch a veto over policy; and the nature of its electoral system, which
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encourages parochial interests in Congress. In Japan's parliamentary system of
democracy, political power is concentrated, which makes it easier to undertake major
policy initiatives. In the absence of "built- in checks on reversals of policy promises...
it is easier both to initiate and to reverse major foreign policy promises" (ibid.: 315).
To summarize, presidential democratic systems differ fundamentally from
parliamentary democracies. The separation of powers, separation of purpose, and
separation of survival inherent in presidential systems contribute to a weaker party
system, different constituencies and allegiances for policymakers, and a greater
openness to multiple influences on policy decisions. Collectively these aspects create
more veto players and generally more constraints on the policy- making process in
presidential systems. Or, as stated in the second hypothesis:
H2: States with presidential democracies demonstrate a greater degree of
stability in their foreign policies than do states with parliamentary
democracies.
Contextual Approaches
The presidential-parliamentary dichotomy, however, is by no means the only
institutional distinction in the democratic settings. Within presidential and
parliamentary systems are a myriad of other arrangements that can impact the stability
of a state's foreign policy. Scholars in the past decade have begun to challenge longheld assumptions about the superiority of parliamentary systems (see Epstein, 1967).
Some lines of argument have trumpeted the merits of presidentialism over
parliamentarism, including a higher degree of accountability to voters, the
identifiability of winners in elections, and the mutual checks on powers of the
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executive and the legislature (Sugart and Carey, 1992). Others have argued that the
presidential-parliamentary distinction is cast at too high a level of abstraction and that
the differences within each system are so great that the dichotomy has no real
explanatory value (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001; Shugart and Haggard, 2001; Cox
and McCubbins 2001; Haggard, McCubbins and Shugart, 2001; Cheibub and
Limongi, 2002; for an alternate view that key distinctions do exist between the
systems see Samuels and Eaton 2002).
A proponent of this latter view, which has been called the "contextual view," is
George Tsebelis. His concept of veto players provides a framework for analyzing
constraints on policymaking that can be applied across and throughout presidential and
parliamentary settings. As outlined briefly earlier, the veto player concept stems from
the idea of checks and balances present under the U.S. Constitution, and is defined as
"an individual or collective actor whose agreement by majority rule for collective
actors is required for a change in policy” (Tsebelis, 1995: 301). Institutional veto
players refer to institutional bodies such as the presidency or legislature. Partisan veto
players take the form of members of the government coalition or a legislature. Policy
stability in any system is a function of three characteristics of its veto players – their
number, their congruence (the differences in the political positions of the veto players)
and their cohesion (the similarity of policy positions of those that comprise each veto
players). The potential for policy change decreases as the number of veto players
increases and the congruence and cohesion of veto players decreases. This concept
will be addressed further throughout the chapter as hypotheses are developed about
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how different types of presidential and parliamentary systems are more or less prone
to foreign policy change.
Presidentialism and Divided Government
One aspect unique to presidential systems that may influence foreign policy
stability is the possibility of divided government. Divided government occurs when a
different party from that of the president controls the legislative branch. These
situations occur in presidential systems as a consequence of separate elections for the
executive and legislators and the separation of survival present in such systems.
When the fortunes of legislative candidates are not tied to that of the executive, and
elections are held separately, the tone and tenor of those races become very different.
Legislators seeking election in (often) smaller and geographically separate districts
appeal to a narrower set of more parochial interests. Presidential candidates, on the
other hand, must appeal to the broader electorate and represent interests of a more
national focus. Since voters may focus on issues of interest to their districts when
voting at the legislative level, and issues of national interest when voting at the
presidential level, it is often the case that separate parties control each of these bodies.
Divided government has important consequences for the conduct of foreign
policy and foreign policy change in a number of ways. First, divided government
increases the number of veto players already present in the system, making the
agreement necessary for policy change more difficult to achieve. While the number of
institutional veto players is specified in a state’s constitution, the number of partisan
veto players can vary from election to the election. According to Tsebelis (1995,
2002), divided government will add an additional veto player to the policy-making
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process because parties generally have different policy positions. As Shugart and
Haggard observe, "Under divided government, a wider range of interests must
necessarily be accommodated for policy to be enacted. As a result, the potential for
stalemate increases” (2001: 82).
Second, the separation of powers and purpose, already forces for policy
stability, are reinforced with partisan concerns that dominate divided government.
Incentives already facing legislators to respond to local interests in their district as
opposed to the president's program and any "mandate" he might have nationally, are
coupled with the fact that divided government provides parties with electoral
incentives that discourage support for presidential initiatives:
When party control of Congress and the presidency is
divided, partisan considerations dominate these institutions’
relations. Opposition politicians will sometimes find
electoral advantage in frustrating the other side, even when
doing so prevents them from satisfying their own policy
goals... The conflict and impasse a divided government
frequently inspires are not born of frustration from failing
in a sincere search for mutually acceptable policies; rather
they are more calculated and designed to yield advantage in
the next election (Kernell, 1991: 96-97).
Studies have shown that partisan loyalties are an important feature in congressional
support for a president's foreign policy (Wittkopf and McCormick 1998, 1999).
Additionally, majority control of a legislative body may, as in the case of
United States, afford the opposing party considerable tools to influence the policy
agenda, such as through control of committees. Strong partisanship combined with
legislative mechanisms to control a policy agenda provides powerful impediments to
foreign policy change.
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It should be noted that this contention runs somewhat contrary to the
traditional notion that American presidents have a relatively free hand in the conduct
of foreign policy. In cases of deadlock, presidents may break the impasse by veto,
appealing directly to the American people; “going public” with foreign policy
commitments; or making wider use of executive agreements (Cox and Kernell, 1991,
1991B). Wildavsky (1966) developed his “two presidencies thesis" based on the
notion that presidents have greater success in dealing with Congress on foreign and
defense matters than on domestic policies, and that Congress is less likely to intervene
on foreign policy issues. Statistical analysis, however, has called this claim into
question (Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Nincic, 1992).
In cases of divided government in the United States, Congress has shown a
willingness to block the foreign policy initiatives of presidents. Sundquist (1982)
observed that the Democrat Congress confronting Gerald Ford refused to acknowledge
agreements Nixon made with South Vietnam and rejected aid packages to the country,
blocked a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, sided with Greece in the dispute
over Cyprus, and blocked his attempts to intervene in Angola. Clark’s (2001) study of
foreign policy substitution found that American presidents are more likely to substitute
trade action for military action in cases of divided government, which has a restraining
effect on more aggressive policies. Regan’s (2000) study of policy substitution
explains decisions to intervene in internal conflicts in terms of a political calculus and
finds that presidents are less likely to undertake policy changes when there is divided
government and the y may face stronger political opposition to the new policy.
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Most recently, the constraining effects that divided government can have on a
president’s ability to conduct foreign policy were reflected in the words of Senator
Tom Daschle. Less than 12 ho urs after his party lost control of the Senate in the 2002
elections, giving President Bush a Republican majority in both houses of Congress, he
observed that with the Republican majority:
I think it means that the president has an opportunity here
to enact and proceed with the plan (on Iraq) as he has
articulated it…It is too early to tell what will happen on
Iraq, but you will probably see a far more hawkish position
and confrontational tone to their approach. 2
Without the constraints imposed by divided government, the majority leader conceded
that the president would have a much easier time undertaking foreign policy change in
the form of a more aggressive stance toward Iraq.
I posit that for a number of reasons, divided government in presidential
systems will make foreign policy change less likely than would occur in cases of
unified government. Divided government reinforces the constraints already present
through the institutional separation of powers and the separation of purpose. Divided
government creates an additional veto player with interests, goals and agendas
frequently different from that of the president, as well as partisan incentives to resist
the policy agenda of the president. For significant foreign policy change to occur in a
divided presidential system, not only must a president often formulate a policy that
will be accepted by an entirely separate and independent branch of government; he
must do so with a body that is largely ideologically opposed to him that has political
incentives to derail the effort. This will be tested in the third hypothesis of this
dissertation:
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H3: Presidential democracies with divided government demonstrate a
greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do presidential
democracies with unified government.
Presidentialism and Multipartism
Another variation among presidential systems that I propose will impact
foreign policy stability is the existence of a multi-party system. Multipartism should
make changes in foreign policy more difficult than in two-party systems. In these
instances presidents must not only contend with an institutional separation of powers,
they will likely find it more difficult to build coalitions in the legislature without any
sort of working majority. Additionally, the greater the number of parties, the more
likely they are ideologically diverse, further making the agreement necessary for
policy change to occur more difficult.
Whether any system (presidential or parliamentary) functions as a two-party or
multi-party system is largely a function of electoral formulas. Single member district
plurality formulas tend to produce two-party systems, while proportional
representation tends to lead to the formation of multiple viable parties (Duverger,
1986). The two-party/multi-party distinction is important in that it informs the degree
to which members of the legislature are likely to agree on a common set of goals or
objectives, and the extent to which they may be able to work together to achieve them
(cohesion). It also informs the degree to which the legislature will effectively work
with the president (congruence) (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002).
In a single member district plurality "first past the post" electoral system, a
candidate has an incentive to appeal to the widest group of voters as possible, since
2

Quotes appeared in the Nov. 6, 2002 Argus Leader and Reuters news service reports
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staking out extreme positions or appealing to very narrow interests will be punished at
the ballot box. Interests, ideology, and policy positions will tend to converge around
two major competing parties, which are less ideological, more cohesive with one
another and more representative of the political middle. Examples of the United
States and United Kingdom illustrate that two-party systems will typically produce a
center- left party (Democratic, Labour) and a center-right party (Republican,
Conservative). Other electoral systems, such as proportional representation or those
that allow multiple members to be elected from the same district, permit a more
eclectic mix of ideas and interests. It is possible for multiple parties to win enough
votes that they are awarded seats in the legislature. Multi-party systems permit a
much wider range of interests to be represented and the ideological space between the
parties is much greater.
Another important consequence is that two-party systems tend to be onedimensional party systems. Since two parties cannot absorb multiple issue
dimensions, the main parties usually differ only in regard to socio-economic issues.
The number of issue dimensions in multi-party systems varies with the number of
parties. In addition to socioeconomic issues, other dimensions may include religious,
cultural and ethnic, urban and rural, pro-system and anti-system, materialist and postmaterialist, and foreign policy (Lijphart, 1999). The correlatio n between numbers of
parties and number of issue dimensions is closely related. When there is an increase
in the number of issue dimensions, there will likewise be an increase in the number of
parties (Taagepera and Grofman, 1985; Lijphart, 1999).
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These constraints on policymaking should be especially prominent in
presidential settings. The combination of presidentialism and multipartism, and the
deadlock and immobilization associated with it, has been attributed to the breakdown
of democratic government in Latin America (Mainwaring, 1993). Multi-party systems
make it rare for the president’s party to have a majority in the legislature, and
presidents must continuously build new legislative coalitions to pass important
policies. In multi-party systems a president is more likely to have fewer
representatives of his own party in the legislature, making this coalition building even
more difficult. Greater ideological space between the parties also makes this coalition
building more difficult. The separation of survival and purpose makes agreements that
are made with party leaders in the legislature less binding, since they face fewer
incentives to support the executive or follow a party line.
Duverger (1964) also expressed concerns over the stability of multi-party
presidential democracies, albeit with different implications for foreign policy stability.
Unlike two-party systems where “parties are big enough to dwarf the president,” his
concern was that in “weak and ineffectual” multi-party systems presidents would come
to dominate the policy process. However impotent multi-party legislatures may be in
presidential systems, this contention must be tempered with those outlined above.
When legislative support is required for major policy actions, and legislatures have the
power to block presidential initiatives, I posit that even a fractionalized body without a
majority or organized opposition can still effectively stalemate presidential initiatives.
In summary, multi-party systems exacerbate constraints on foreign policy
decisionmaking already present in democratic presidential systems under separation of
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powers. The greater number of parties representing a much wider ideological
spectrum, inherent in multi-party systems, makes forming stable majorities and
coalition building more difficult. Not only must chief executives in such systems
contend with constraints emanating from a lack of congruence between bodies, but
also problems of cohesion within the legislature itself. I suggest this will make
impasse and stalemate more likely and foreign policy change less likely:
H4: Multi-party presidential democracies demonstrate a greater degree of
stability in their foreign policies than do two-party presidential
democracies.
Parliamentary Democracy: Single-Party Governments and Coalition
Governments
As with presidential democracies, there is great variation among parliamentary
systems, with implications for a state's capacity to undertake foreign policy change.
Considered here are cases of single-party government, where a single party, usually
winning an outright majority of seats, is able to form a government on its own, and
coalition governments, where usually no party wins an outright majority and a
government must be formed from more than one party.
In Arend Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) classic analysis of modern democratic
systems, he outlines two models of democracy. Although his analysis is not limited to
parliamentary systems, I find it useful here in identifying some of the key differences
between single-party and coalition governments and how they impact the decisionmaking process. The Westminster Model describes majoritarianism (of which singleparty party governments are one element), where power is concentrated in the hands
of a bare majority. The Consensus Model (of which coalition governments are one
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element), on the other hand, seeks to maximize majorities, and "its rules and
institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement on policies
that the government should pursue" (Lijphart, 1999: 2). Single-party and coalition
systems differ fundamentally in the concentration of executive power, executivelegislative relationships and party systems. I this makes foreign policy change more
likely in single-party government systems.
In single-party governments executive power is concentrated in one-party and
bare majority cabinets. Typically the party winning the majority of seats forms the
government and the cabinet. The minority is completely excluded from power and
relegated to strictly an opposition role. In coalition systems, power is shared with
several parties, with a greater representation and variety of interests participating in
the decision- making process. In single-party government systems the cabinet
(executive) tends to dominate parliament since that party holds a majority of seats. As
Lijphart describes the situation in the United Kingdom:
In theory, because the House of Commons can vote a
cabinet out of office, it "controls" the cabinet. In reality,
the relationship is reversed. Because the cabinet is
composed of the leaders of a cohesive majority in the
House of Commons, it is normally backed by the majority
in the House of Commons, and it can confidently count on
staying in office and getting its legislative proposals
approved. The cabinet is clearly dominant vis-à-vis the
parliament (Lijphart, 1999: 11-12).
Under systems of coalition government there is greater parity in the executivelegislative balance of power. Because no single party within the government enjoys a
majority and can completely rely on the support and confidence of parliament, the
broad, often uncohesive coalitions that form cabinets require a more "give-and-take"
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relationship with the parties and legislators in parliament. Additionally, single-party
governments tend to exist in two-party systems, while coalition governments are
common in multi-party systems.
Each of these factors is very much interrelated. Two-party systems permit the
formation of majorities; majorities permit the formation of single-party government;
which in turn permits the emergence of a cohesive government able to dominate
parliament and rely on the confidence of the majority in parliament. Likewise, multiparty systems reduce the likelihood of the formation of outright single-party
majorities; creating the necessity of coalition government; which in turn produces a
government that is less cohesive and must more carefully cultivate and maintain the
confidence of a majority in parliament. Additionally, as outlined above, the greater
number of parties associated with coalition governments means that there will likely
be greater ideological diversity in these systems, as well as more policy dimensions.
The essence of executive dominance in single-party governments means that
they will face far fewer constraints in foreign policy decisionmaking than will
coalition governments. Single-party parliamentary majority governments represent
the most cohesive and the least fractionalized of all democracies. Internal cohesion is
high because members of the same party hold all cabinet portfolios. The cabinets can
dominate parliament unfettered by concerns that the government will fall due to a loss
of confidence. The decision- making process in coalition governments is far more
constrained. Since the government's existence typically depends upon the support of
all coalition parties, prime ministers have strong incentives to distribute cabinet
portfolios proportionally to the weight of each party (Samuels and Eaton, 2002).
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Since different parties hold cabinet portfolios, internal cohesion within the cabinet is
much lower. In some cases key ministerial posts such as prime minister, defense
minister, and foreign minister may be held by members of different parties. Even
small parties that are members of a coalition may wield significant influence. In
Germany, the Free Democrat Party and (more recently) the Green Party, though
seldom winning more than 10 percent of the vote nationally, have consistently been a
part of German coalition governments. Their reward for facilitating the formation of a
government has been a top cabinet post, usually foreign minister. Controlling this post
has permitted the German government’s junior partner to effectively block foreign
policy initiatives favored by the senior partner. These include prevention of German
participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative and postponement of the
modernization of short-range nuclear forces in 1989 (see Kaarbo, 1996).
As a result, coalition government ministers must take a much more
accommodating stance in policymaking, accounting for and accepting a much broader
range of interests. Governments cannot rely on the confidence of just one party, and
the withdrawal of a coalition member, even a rather junior member, may cause the
government to collapse and new elections to be held. Disputes over foreign policy
issues can lead to coalition crises putting at stake the very question of who governs
(ibid.). Relations between the executive and the rest of parliament are also less stable
than in single-party government situations. Therefore, leaders of coalition
governments will be more averse to risky policy pursuits than single-party government
executives, since members of the legislature will be especially sens itive to the success
and failure of the executive (see Auerswald, 1999).
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In terms of veto players, all else being equal, a single-party government has
only one – the majority party that forms the government. In coalition governments,
however, that number is as high as the number of parties in the coalition, since
desertion of a coalition partner threatens the collapse of government (Tsebelis, 1995).
The greater number of veto players places more barriers in the way of the decisionmaking process, making change more difficult. Tsebelis observes that in the United
Kingdom, common complaints concern frequent policy reversals, while in coalition
governments such as Italy, with many parties (and many veto players) complaints tend
to revolve around policy immobilism (ibid., 1995).
An illustration of coalition constraints in the conduct of foreign policy can be
found in the Dutch government’s decisions regarding NATO's planned deployment of
nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the early 1980s. Coalition governments at
the time managed only very small collective majorities in parliament, with the
defection of just one or two parliamentarians threatening to bring down the entire
government. The result was deadlock and a “minimalist” foreign policy that
precluded a single, coherent course of action and delayed a final decision through
three different governments (see Hagan et. al., 2001; Van Staden, 1985).
C.S. Ahn (1997) contrasts foreign policymaking in Japan under the period of
LDP dominance, with the advent of coalition politics in the 1990s. After decades of
single-party government, Japan’s foreign policy- making apparatus was confronted
with conflict and dissention for the first time. Under LDP rule, the prime minister was
largely able to circumvent formal and legal limitations on executive power due to the
fact that he was not only chief executive but also party leader. Under coalition
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government, conflicts emerged for the first time between the prime minister and
ministry of defense; and the Diet itself began to abandon its role as a “rubber stamp”
on LDP policy initiatives.
For reasons outlined above, I posit that coalition parliamentary governments
are less likely to undertake foreign policy change than are single-party governments.
In single-party governments, power is concentrated into a single cohesive ruling body
that can effectively dominate the parliament. Since ministers can confidently rely on
the support of a majority of parliament, they are far less constrained in their
decisionmaking tha n are multi-party coalition governments, where there is a greater
diversity of interests present within government and the parliament, greater parity in
executive-parliamentary relations, and less cohesion within the government itself.
Consequently, foreign policy decisionmaking in coalition governments should be
more incremental, reflecting the accommodation and bargaining necessary in holding
together a more diverse and less ideologically cohesive ruling body. Thus, the fifth
hypothesis of this dissertation:
H5: Parliamentary democracies with coalition governments demonstrate a
greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do parliamentary
democracies with single-party governments.
Coalition Governments and the Number of Parties in Parliament
Another important consideration for coalition governments is support within
parliament. In majority single-party governments, the cabinet may take majority
support in parliament largely for granted, since its defeat would mean new elections
and possible minority status for majority parliamentarians. This "in or out" dynamic

106

ensures loyalty and cohesion. The situation is very different in coalition governments.
Since there is relative parity in executive- legislative powers in these cases (Lijphart,
1999), support for the government from within the parliament is much more important.
This becomes more difficult with a greater number of parties. With a greater number
of parties, the greater the likelihood that they will represent a wider ideological
spectrum and bring to the table a greater number of issue dimensions.
Contending with a greater number of parties, governments must ensure that their
policies are acceptable to a much wider range of interests than in systems where there
are fewer parties represented.
A greater number of parties also mean that the size of the predominant party in
the coalition will be smaller. The existence of a "predominant" or "senior" party in a
coalition has been identified as an important factor in overcoming the decision- making
constraints associated with coalitions (Hagan, 1993). Hanrieder and Auton (1980)
compare foreign policymaking in Germany under 1966-1969 Grand Coalition between
the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats to later periods when one of the larger
parties shared power with the smaller Free Democrats. They found that agreement
was much easier to attain when a large party dominated. 1
As a result, I would expect that in coalition governments where there are a
greater number of parties represented in parliament, states will undertake fewer bold
foreign policy initiatives that could risk failure, or offend or adversely affect members
of the legislature upon whom the government relies for support. Through a policy
process characterized more by accommodation and bargaining, policy outcomes will

3

This view contradicts that of Tsebelis, who stresses the number rather than size of coalition parties as
an important constraint on policy change.
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be more “watered down,” incremental and status quo. As reflected in the sixth
hypothesis of this dissertation:
H6: In parliamentary democracies with coalition governments, the
greater the effective number of parties seated in the parliament, the more
stable a state’s foreign policy.
Non-Democracies and Military Governments
The first hypothesis of this dissertation posits that fewer constraints on nondemocratic leaders, combined with unique incentives to utilize the state’s foreign
policy for political purposes and regime maintenance, would make non-democracies
undertake more changes in foreign policy than democracies. One possible exception
may be those cases where the military takes an active role in the political leadership of
a non-democratic regime. The reasons for this are related to the circumstances under
which military governments come to power, the preferences and ideology of military
leadership, and the formulas they use for maintaining power and governing.
Military governments typically come to power following a perceived crisis.
While some military governments remain in power for long periods of time, typically
their stated purpose is temporary – to restore order and national unity. The interest of
military regimes then, is not to remake society, but solve “the problem” that brought
them to power and restore political stability. Thus military rulers do not see their role
as remaking society, but a restoration of order and maintenance of their institutional
integrity. Often military governments come to power in response to a “knock on the
barracks door,” and leaders of military juntas frequently show no interest in remaining
in power indefinitely. In fact, differences within the military leadership over its
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continued role in politics are often an important step in the process of transition to
democratic rule (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1989; Huntington, 1991).
Military governance has been characterized as "decisionmaking without
politics.” Rather than seeking to mobilize sectors for popular support, military
governments, particularly bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, instead seek to
depoliticize the process and relegate policy decision to those of technical, rather than
political, concerns (Collier, 1979; O’Donnell, 1980). Rejecting any pretense of
responding to the will of the people or organized groups, military governments have
been characterized as having transferred the technical and rational process of military
decisionmaking to national go vernance:
Politics as a regulated conflict, competition and
compromise is transformed into the apolitical politics of
consensus, acquiescence and government by fiat
(Nordlinger, 1970: 1137).
Formulas for legitimization open to many civilian non-democratic leaders who
might encourage a politicized foreign policy prove difficult for the military, where the
“military mind” and its associated managerial qualities, traditional values, and
command-obey structure are not easily transplanted into politics (Danopoulos, 1983).
Max Weber (1947) identified three principles for attaining and maintaining
legitimacy: charismatic rule, where a leader appeals to the masses based the force of
his personality; an appeal to traditional beliefs and practices; and legal-ratio nal
legitimacy, based on an adherence to democratic ideals and principles. The latter is
not an option for non-democratic leaders. Charismatic rule does not fit with the
military principles of order and hierarchy or its bureaucratic structure (Nordlinger,
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1977). An appeal to traditional beliefs and practices in fact may be more likely to
promote foreign policy stability.
While military governments may have preferences that would indicate a stable
foreign policy, they are also the ones directly controlling one of foreign policy’s key
instruments – the use of force. Without military support or acquiescence, any foreign
policy change would be difficult to achieve. Additionally, whenever the military is
part of the government, a potential source of government opposition (the military
itself) is in effect co-opted.
The stability of the foreign policies of military governments is illustrated in
Park, Ko and Kim’s study of the foreign policies of Taiwan and Korea during both
their democratic and non-democratic periods. They characterize the politics of these
countries between the late 1960s and late 1980s as bureaucratic-authoritarian.
Utilizing the military as a power base, these governments exhibited a "depoliticization
of social issues in exchange for technical rationality" and the use of "security, stability,
and economic growth" as a legitimizing ideology. The commitment to national
security as an ideology constrained the flexibility of these governments, whose foreign
policies were “highly inflexible and dogmatic.” It was not until after democratization,
and its concomitant change in value systems and political ideologies, that a policy of
Nordpolitik – rapprochement with North Korea and the People’s Republic of China –
became a viable policy option (Park, Ko and Kim, 1994).
Military governments are a unique form of non-democracy whose
characteristics suggest fundamental differences in the conduct of foreign policy when
compared to other forms of non-democratic government. The circumstances that
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bring them to power, their goals, preferences, and ideologies suggest that nondemocratic military governments will foster greater foreign policy stability than will
non- military non-democratic governments (see also Perlmutter, 1977; Collier, 1979;
O’Donnell, 1980):
H7: Non-democratic governments in which the military is a member will
engage in a more stable foreign policy than will non-democratic
governments where the military is not a member.
Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries
Another set of factors that will be considered is not regime or institution
related, but nonetheless should significantly impact a state’s foreign policy stability.
The first of these concern a state’s level of development.
Leaders of less developed countries are confronted with a daunting task. They
must simultaneously address acute political and economic problems, while having few
resources with which to do so. In many of these states there is a notable lack of
political institutionalization, and organized competition for control of the reins of
government and the policy agenda is frequently viewed as a threat to the regime itself
(see Good, 1962; Dawisha, 1990). In a system where leaders perceive themselves to
be vulnerable, foreign policy becomes an important legitimizing tool:
Political debates often raise fundamental questions over the
legitimacy of basic political arrangements and even the
existence of the national political order itself (as a
result)…the leadership’s domestic political needs are a
powerful factor behind foreign policy…(the) management
of volatile and polarized opposition does not usually take
the form of bargaining and compromise… (Rather), foreign
policy issues are to be manipulated to legitimize the current
regime’s hold on power (Hagan, 1993: 56-57).
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With few economic resources available, foreign policy becomes an attractive
and less costly way of legitimization, and can be used to isolate domestic opponents,
divert attention from certain difficult and intractable issues, and establish nationa list
credentials (Weinstein, 1972, 1976). In his seminal study of small state foreign policy
behavior, East (1973) showed that states with limited economic and military resources
are not confined to low levels of participation in world affairs, low levels of conflict
behavior, or a reticence to use force. Instead, they have been shown to take part in
high-risk behavior, to exhibit high levels of overall participation in world affairs, and
to become involved in conflict. Likewise, K.J. Holsti suggests that smaller, less
developed states may be more prone to restructure their foreign policies as they seek
to “assert autonomy, to control transnational processes, to destroy the residue of
colonialism, and to escape from the embrace of a hegemon” (Holsti, 1982:ix- x).
Steven David describes a situation where leaders in developing countries, facing both
internal and domestic threats, must “omnibalance” demands and threats coming from
both arenas, and they “will sometimes protect themselves at the expense of the
interests of the state” (David, 1991: 236).
In what he calls the “dilemma of dependence,” Franklin Weinstein (1972,
1976) outlines how foreign policy is “used” when a developing state is torn between
pursuing two mutually exclusive foreign policies – one of “independence” and one of
“development.” States seek to avoid the domination and influence associated with
dependence on a major power, yet at the same time, due to conditions of poverty and
economic development, there exists a recognized need to attract foreign aid and
investment. Using elite interviews with key foreign policy decisionmakers in

112

Indonesia, Weinstein finds that while Indonesia’s foreign policy changed after
Sukarno seized power from Suharto, elite attitudes and beliefs regarding
“independence” and “development” did not. However, as Sukarno eliminated
domestic opposition, it became politically safer to pursue the policy of development,
even though it may have been less politically popular (Weinstein, 1972,1976). The
Indonesia case illustrates how, depending upon the perceived vulnerabilities of the
government or regime, foreign policy decisionmakers may be “pushed” into pursuing
a particular policy, or at other times have the political latitude to “pull” the country
with them toward pursuing another more prudent, but perhaps less popular, policy.
Developed countries with more established institutions do not face these
constraints to the extent that less developed states do. In addition, developed states are
likely more “satisfied” with their pattern of foreign relations, and the costs of changing
them would be much higher (K.J. Holsti, 1982). The constraints and incentives for
foreign policy change that especially affect less developed states is the basis of the
eighth hypothesis:
H8: The more developed states will engage in a more stable foreign policy
than will the less developed states.
Leadership Change and Foreign Policy Change
Another factor that will be considered (and controlled for), concerns periods
when there is a change in the leadership of a state. Empirical studies have shown that
changes in leadership (even relatively minor changes) usually coincide with a change
in foreign policy (see Moon, 1985; Hagan, 1989). Leadership changes bring to the
decision- making process new actors with a different set of beliefs, ideas, preferences
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and goals. The most striking cases are those of a true revolution, such as in Iran.
Although this country throughout its history has been ruled by a non-democratic
regime, the revolution of 1979 that overthrew Muhammad Reza Shah and eventually
installed the Ayatollah Kohmeini produced drastic changes in Iran’s foreign policy,
even though its regime type did not change. While it is necessary to control for these
effects, there still may be a relationship between leadership change, regime type and
foreign policy.
I posit that there are theoretical reasons to believe that when there is a change
in leadership under a non-democratic regime, there will be more dramatic changes in
foreign policy tha n is the case when democratic states change leaders. In democracies
there are open channels through which opposition can compete and vie for political
power. Because leaders must rely on public support to get elected and remain in
office, alternative vie ws on major issues must at least be considered, and policy output
is usually the result of bargain and compromise. When a new leader comes into
office, he too faces these same institutional constraints. Policy will be a more watered
down version of what the leader wants, rather than a true reflection of his preferences;
and because there is an outlet for opposition, actors have an opportunity to influence
the agenda. This is not the case in authoritarian regimes, where the ideological space
between the “in” and “out” groups is far greater. With no “release valve” to channel
opposition, the political situation becomes polarized. Rather than being centered on
narrow issues of policy, opposition is frequently “anti-system.” Repression further
polarizes the opposition.
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This notion was explored by East, Salmore and Charles Hermann (1978), who
stated that leader-autonomous decision- making groups will more frequently select
foreign behaviors involving change from the government’s previous position than will
delegative groups and assemblies, who tend to select policies involving less change.
Gaubatz (1996) makes a similar assertion in his study of democracy and alliance
commitments, suggesting that, since democratic leadership changes are regularized as
well as being a regular, the policy differences between them will be far less substantial
than in non-democratic states, which lack an effective means for leadership transition.
Democracies accommodate opposition while non-democracies tend to ignore,
resist or repress it. The mitigating influence of democratic institutions and the
opportunities they present for opposition to make their views known and heard should
mean that when opposition does come to power, their foreign policies will not differ as
significantly from that of their predecessors when compared to leadership changes in
non-democratic regimes. Therefore, the ninth hypothesis of this dissertation:
H9: Changes of leadership in democratic states will produce less dramatic
changes in foreign policy than will leadership changes in non-democratic
states.
This chapter outlined some of the key differences within the major regime
types and developed hypotheses about how those differences impact foreign policy
change. Differences in institutional arrangements, party systems and players in
government all create different constraints and incentives for change. The following
chapter will empirically test each of these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter will model and test each of the hypotheses developed in the
foregoing chapters. I will first identify the data used and operationalize each of the
dependent, independent and control variables. I will then explain the models used and
employ a pooled, cross-sectional time series analysis to test the hypotheses.
Data: The Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in this dissertation is foreign policy change, which is
operationalized thr ee different ways. One uses events data and measures foreign
policy change in terms of changes in conflictual and cooperative foreign policy
behavior. Two other schemes employ measures of foreign policy in terms of votes
cast in the United Nations General Assembly. One of these schemes measures foreign
policy change in terms of changes in the patterns of voting similarity between states
on all United Nations roll call votes. The other measure captures change in terms of
changes in voting coincidence with the United States on salient votes deemed
important to the United States.
Events Data
The Conflict and Peace Databank, or COPDAB is a longitudinal events data
set that records international events and interactions for countries in terms of their
level of cooperation and conflict. Data used in this dissertation cover the years 1953
to 1978, the last year for which these data were collected. COPDAB specifies
international interactions as "occurrences between nation-states that are distinct
enough from the constant flow of ‘transactions,’ (e.g., trade, mail flow) to stand out
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against this background as ‘reportable,’ or ‘newsworthy’” (Azar, 1993: 6). Data are
coded from reports in 99 different newspapers, magazines, annual reports,
chronologies and his torical accounts from throughout the world. Regional experts
assisted in the coding procedures. Relevant information includes: date; actor who
initiated the event; target to whom the event was directed; the activity initiated; the
type of issue involved (political, military, economic, etc.); and a scale value based on
the degree of cooperation or conflict involved in the event. International events are
coded on a 15-point weighted scale, with a score of 1 being the most cooperative
action and a score of 15 being the most conflictual.
The data set assigns each point on the scale a weighted intensity value. Scale
point number 8 is designated the "neutral point.” and assigned an intensity value of 1.
Scale point number 15, the highest level of conflict, is deemed to be 102 times more
conflictual. Scale point number 1, the most cooperative action, is judged 92 times
more cooperative than scale point number 8. This scale is outlined in Table 5.1. A
more detailed explanation is found in Appendix A (Azar, 1993).
For this dissertation, COPDAB data will be employed as used in Leeds and
Davis’ (1999) study of domestic political structures and alliance behavior. An average
annual cooperation/conflict score (what Leeds and Davis call “net interactions”) sent
by each state in the data set toward all other countries in its Politically Relevant
International Environment (PRIE) will establish an annual measure of each state's
foreign policy in terms of cooperation and conflict.
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Table 5.1 COPDAB International Event Scale with Weighted Values
International Event Type
________ Weighted Value
1. Voluntary unification into one nation
92
2. Major strategic alliance (regional or international)
47
3. Military, economic or strategic support
31
4. Non-military, economic, technological or industrial agreement
27 Conflict
5. Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non-strategic)
14
6. Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime
10
7. Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions – mild verbal support
6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8. Neutral or non-significant acts
1 Neutral Point
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9. Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction
6
10. Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction
16
11. Diplomatic-economic hostile actions
29
12. Political-military hostile actions
44 Cooperation
13. Small scale military acts
50
14. Limited war acts
65
15. Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs
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Leeds and Davis sum the annual weighted values on the cooperation and
conflict scales for each state; they then divide that figure by the total number of events
for that year, which provides an annual level of cooperation and an annual level of
conflict score for each state toward another for each year. They calculate an annual
net score by subtracting the average level of conflict score from the average level of
cooperation score. “This variable thus captures the flow of interaction between states,
with positive values indicating a generally cooperative relationship and negative
values indicating a more conflictual relationship...Net interactions captures more than
either conflict or cooperation…(and) is our closest measure of the general tenor of a
state contact toward a dyadic partner” (Leeds and Davis, 1999:12).
The concept of a Politically Relevant International Environment was first
developed by Maoz and Russett (1993). Building on a procedure developed by Weede
(1983), the concept of a PRIE is to focus analysis on those areas where international
interactions between states are most likely to occur. Most international dyads are
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considered irrelevant since the states comprising them are too far apart and too weak
militarily or too weak economically for any meaningful interactions to occur.
Measuring Cyprus’ interactions toward Costa Rica, for example, would tell us very
little about Cyprus’ foreign policy- making process. A state's PRIE, on the other hand,
“represents the set of political units whose structure, behavior, and policies have a
direct impact on the focal state's political and strategic calculus” (Maoz, 1996:138).
Each state's PRIE is defined in terms of contiguity and geopolitical status.
Maoz defines contiguity in terms of land connection and/or short water distance
between two states (less than 150 miles). In terms of geopolitical status, the United
States, United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China are considered "major
powers" and included in every state’s Politically Relevant International Environment
(ibid.). 1 For example, Malaysia’s PRIE, in addition to the major powers, includes
Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. Haiti’s PRIE, in addition to the major powers,
includes Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.
Using the COPDAB scores, Leed and Davis calculate average annual
cooperation/conflict score for each state toward all states its PRIE. This provides an
annual measure of a state's foreign policy, in terms of cooperation and conflict, toward
each politically relevant state. From this I calculate the dependent variable for foreign
policy change by lagging the average scores for all states in the PRIE from the
previous year, and using the absolute value of the difference. Changes in these
COPDAB scores are illustrated dramatically in the case of Cambodia following the
1970 coup, which brought in a pro-Western government that became more heavily

1

Since 1991, PRIEs include Russia and Germany as well (Maoz, 1996).
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involved in the Vietnam War. With annual foreign policy change scores ranging from
1 to 4 for five consecutive years, this country score jumped to more than 16.
The value of using COPDAB data in this study is that it measures the
dependent variable through a broad range of state interactions – from diplomatic
exchanges, visits, and agreements to official statements and full- scale war. One
disadvantage is that data are not available beyond 1978. In this dissertation, COPDAB
data are used for the 25-year period from 1953 to 1978. An ongoing project, the
Global Events Data System at the University of Maryland, which was to have updated
the COPDAB data to real-time, was canceled in late 2001 due to funding-related
issues. 2
United Nations Voting
Another set of measures of the dependent variable uses votes cast in the United
Nations General Assembly. For decades votes cast in the U.N. General Assembly
have been conceptualized in the literature as a measure of foreign policy (Alker,
1964). Studies involving U.N. voting have typically taken the form of tests of the
bargaining model, which tracks U.S. aid and trade with compliance with the U.S. in
United Nations voting (Wittkopf, 1973; Richardson, 1976; Richardson and Kegley,
1980; Moon, 1983); or a measure foreign policy change by comparing a country’s
U.N. voting agreement using a major power, such as the United States or the Soviet
Union, as a baseline (Vengroff, 1976; Moon, 1985; Hagan, 1989).
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This drawback unfortunately plagues most events data sets. Studies of the democratic peace, for
example, typically end in 1992, the last year for which Correlates of War data is available.
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The use of U.N. votes presents a number of advantages. Moon (1985)
observes that it "is perfect for the needs of cross sectional and longitudinal studies," in
that it is reliable, it is comparable across cases, and it is available for a substantial
period of time. Of all possible measures, it is the single foreign policy behavior in
which virtually all countries in the world equally participate and can be measured on
an equal basis. Moon also notes that votes in the United Nations General Assembly
are regarded as an important expression of foreign policy in much of the world and
that for many countries it provides one of the few opportunities to express their
foreign policy on a wide range of issues. “Where alternative measures exist, they are
highly correlated with U.N. voting but do not capture position taking on global issues"
(ibid.: 299fn). Further credence in U.N. voting as a measure of a state's foreign policy
can be found in the fact that the United States has deemed it important enough to be a
major consideration in its dispensation of foreign aid (see below).
Despite this, questions have been raised regarding the utility of using U.N.
votes as an accurate measure of foreign policy. First, U.N. voting is seen as a
relatively cost- free enterprise. Votes do not require a significant commitment of
resources and typically do not carry with them the visibility of other foreign policy
undertakings. These votes therefore do not carry the same significance as other
foreign policy actions. Additionally, there has been a trend in recent years toward
consensus voting in the United Nations, which leaves less variance for analysis and
could skew results.
Despite these criticisms, I believe U.N. votes are a useful tool for measuring
foreign policy change in this dissertation. This measure permits an analysis of those
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more subtle expressions of foreign policy that do not require major resource
allocations. In capturing these aspects of foreign policy behavior, I may find that the
constraints hypothesized to impact foreign policy change and stability have a different
influence on different aspects of foreign policy. This may include what can be seen as
“declarative” foreign policy – the wishes, intentions and preferences of a state's
foreign policy orientation. As Holsti (1982) observed, states may declare changes in
foreign policy or their intentions to undertake changes without fundamentally altering
their relations with other states. Another benefit of this measure also allows analysis
across time and space for more recent years, since the collection of the events data
typically lags the present by several years. The use of United Nations General
Assembly votes as an indicator of a state's foreign policy position has received
renewed interest in recent years. Signorino and Ritter (1999) suggested that U.N.
voting might represent a more accurate reflection of a state's foreign policy positions
than do its alliance commitments. Gartzke and Jo’s (2002) subsequent development of
the United Nations General Assembly Affinity of Nations Index is receiving
widespread attention throughout the field, and has been used in a number of empirical
studies to capture the similarity of a state’s foreign policy positions (Oneal and
Russett, 1999; Gartzke, 2000; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).
United Nations General Assembly Affinity Scores
This study employs scores of U.N. voting measured two different ways –
one using S scores for voting affinity on all roll call votes cast in the United Nations
General Assembly and another measuring a percent-agreement with the United States
on General Assembly votes deemed "important" to the United States by the U.S. State
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Department. Data on S scores for all roll call votes cast in the U.N. General Assembly
from 1950 to 1994 come from Gartzke and Jo's (2002) Affinity of Nations Index,
which measures the similarity in voting among pairs of states. Signorino and Ritter
(1999) developed the S score as a measure of foreign policy similarity for those types
of foreign policy cases where a disagreement can be registered from an agreement.
This spatial measure of foreign policy similarity is based on the conception that "the
closer two states are in the policy space – i.e., the closer their revealed policy positions
– the more ‘similar’ their revealed policy positions. The further apart two states are in
the policy space, the more dissimilar their revealed policy positions” (ibid.: 126).
The S indicator is calculated as: S=1-2*(d)/dmax, where d is the sum of the
metric distances between dyad members (in this case in terms of votes) in a given year
and dmax is the largest possible metric distance of those votes (Gartzke and Jo, 2002).
The S indicator provides scores in a range from -1 to +1. A score of +1 indicates that
the two states policy positions are identical. A score of -1 indicates that the two states
are as far apart as possible in the policy space, and a 0 indicates that the distance
between the two states is half the maximum that it could be (Signorino and Ritter,
1999). An examination of Iran’s affinity scores with the United States over the years
provides a good illustration of these differences. Throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s,
Iran’s affinity scores were with rare exceptions always positive — indicating that the
policy distances between the two states were less than half the maximum that they
could be. This trend continued up through 1978, when Iran’s U.N. affinity score with
the United States was .2377. The following year, after the Ayatollah Khomeini came
to power, the affinity score changed to -.2451, indicating the two countries were more
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than half the maximum distance in policy positions. The difference in scores in this
one-year period was .4828.
The Affinity of Nations data were compiled from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR dataset #5512) and official
United Nations sources (Gartzke and Jo, 2002). This ICPSR data contained a number
of coding errors that the authors noted and corrected. Using the raw data, S scores are
calculated based on United Nations votes on three dimensions – "yes" for approval
and “no” for disapproval, as well as an intermediate dimension covering those cases
where a state "abstained," was "non-participating (present but not voting)" or "absent
(country cast no vote and there is no evidence of non-participation).” Since no votes
were recorded in 1964, the authors interpolated data for these missing values by using
the interpolate procedure in the STATA statistics data analysis program.
The Affinity of Nations Index contains annual dyadic S scores for all states in
the United Nations. To capture the similarity of U.N. voting positions among states
likely to interact in the international system, I calculate an average annual S score for
each state with all other states in its Politically Relevant International Environment.
The politically relevant dyads are obtained using Bennett and Stam’s (2000) Expected
Utility Generation (EUGene) program. EUGene is a software program that can be
used to create dyadic data based on a number of different criteria. PRIE dyads where
selected using the same criteria specified above, with Russia and Germany included in
all PRIEs from 1991 onward, as outlined by Maoz (1996). These S scores provide an
average yearly measure of foreign policy in terms of affinity for each state with all
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other states in its PRIE. For use as a dependent variable, foreign policy change was
calculated from the absolute value of the difference in the lagged annual score from
the previous year.
Important Votes in the United Nations General Assembly
A third measure of the dependent variable also uses U.N. General Assembly
roll call votes but refines the process by focusing strictly on those votes deemed
"important" by the United States. Using the U.S. as a baseline for these votes, a
percent-agreement score was calculated for each state in the study.
Beginning in 1982, pursuant to Public Law 101-167, the United States State
Department began tracking votes cast in the United Nations General Assembly on “all
such votes on issues which directly affected important United States interests and on
which the United States lobbied extensively" (United States Department of State,
1990: 93). This move was prompted by concerns in the Reagan administration and
among members of Congress regarding the erosion of support for American initiatives
in the United Nations. States were beginning to assert themselves to a much greater
degree than in the past and were casting votes contrary to the United States —
including states that were recipients of large amounts of U.S. foreign assistance.
Lawmakers later sought to link foreign aid to recipients’ voting compliance with U.S.
positions on these important votes (Kegley and Hook, 1991).2
Under Public Laws 101-167 and 101-246, annual reports record the votes of all
U.N. members on several resolutions deemed important to the United States. These
2

Subsequent studies analyzing successful links between foreign aid and compliance on important votes
have yielded mixed results. Kegley and Hook (1991) found no statistical evidence of any relationship,
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votes, which typically number from 12 to 15 annually, cover such issues as human
rights, the U.S. embargo of Cuba, the Middle East peace process, and weapons of
mass destruction. These data are recorded in annual editions of Voting Practices in
the United Nations. Based upon the availability of these publications, I collected data
on these important votes back to 1985. The data in this dissertation are recorded up
through 1997, the last year for which data on the independent and control variables are
available. Votes are recorded as identical or opposite to the United States position, or
as an abstention or absence. Annual coincidence rates are recorded by calculating a
percent agreement with the U.S. position for those votes coded as identical or
opposite. This method has been shown to produce results nearly identical to other
measures that treat abstentions and absences as opposite votes (Wang, 1999). As with
procedures for measures of the dependent variables above, an absolute value of the
difference score is calculated to measure foreign policy change.
The cases best illustrating changes in this variable are those of the former
Soviet Bloc countries that, prior to 1990, consistently voted with the United States less
than 50 percent of the time on these important votes. After the fall of the Berlin Wall,
however, these states have fairly consistently voted with the United States greater than
fifty percent of the time.
The use of important votes offers a number of advantages. By focusing on
those votes deemed critical to a major power, this scheme offers a more refined
measure of foreign policy by eliminating positions taken on “unimportant” or non-

while Wang (1999) found that foreign aid programs successfully induced foreign policy compliance on
important U.N. resolutions.
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controversial issues. These more high-profile United Nations issues would be
expected to have greater attention from domestic actors. Including a measure of
important votes also allays the bias inherent in including all roll call votes, since recent
years have demonstrated a significant trend toward consensus votes in the General
Assembly. During the past decade, of the 300 to 400 resolutions adopted each year,
typically 75 to 77 percent are adopted by consensus – a significant increase from the
60 to 65 percent rate 20 years earlier. Additionally, since I am employing the U.S. as
a baseline, using important votes makes it easier to control for the fact that there has
been declining support for the U.S. position over the years. Wang (1999) notes that
the average coincidence rate among 65 developing countries for all U.N. resolutions
from 1984 to 1993 was 19 percent, while the coincidence rate for important votes
during the same period was 55 percent. Because these data run through the year 1997,
it also permits an analysis of both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. A
disadvantage of this measure is that it does not provide as large a timeframe for
analysis as do other measures of the dependent variable.
Independent Variable: Democracy/Non-Democracy
The independent variable for democracy/non democracy is operationalized as
each state’s annual Polity score, based on a 21-point scale from most non-democratic
to most democratic, as recorded in the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000).
Since the 1970's, the Polity data sets have been widely used in cross- national,
longitudinal studies involving authority characteristics of modern politics – most
frequently to assess the degree of democracy and autocracy in the political systems of

127

modern states (K. Gleditsch, 2002). The data set includes all independent states in the
global system with a total population greater than 500,000.
The concept of democracy, as operationalized in the Polity data, contains three
interdependent elements: the presence of institutions and procedures for citizens to
express preferences regarding alternative policies and leaders, the existence of
institutionalized constraints on executive power, and a guarantee of civil liberties to all
citizens. "Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of
checks and balances, freedom of the press, and the like, are treated as a means to, or
manifestations of, these institutional structures" (Jaggers and Gurr 1995: 471.).
The indicators used to create the scale are constructed based on va lues
assigned to five different components of democracy and autocracy, providing a rich
measurement that captures multiple characteristics of regime type. These indicators
include:3
1. Competitiveness of Participation: the extent to which alternative preferences for
policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.
2. Regulation of Participation: the extent to which there are binding rules on when,
whether, and how political preferences are expressed.
3. Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: the extent to which there is a process of
advancement that provides political players an equal opportunity to obtain the position
of chief executive; for example, whether executives are elected or selected.

3

A more detailed explanation of the component variables, along with assigned values may be found in
Appendix B.
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4. Openness of Executive Recruitment: the extent that the position of chief executive
is theoretically open to members of the politically active population; for example,
whether the executive is hereditary or open to selection by other means.
5. Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): the extent of institutionalized constraints
on the decision- making powers of the chief executive.
Scores on these components are used to construct separate 10-point autocracy
and democracy scales, ranging from 0 to 10. The 21-point scale is calculated in Polity
by subtracting each state’s total autocracy score from its total democracy score,
providing a single summary measure ranging from –10 (most non-democratic) to +10
(most democratic). For purposes of illustration and ease of interpretation, I converted
this scale to a 1 to 21 scale of whole numbers and report the relative frequencies in
Appendix D. The three figures correspond to the years covered by each of the three
dependent variables. The reader will observe the paucity of cases in the middle range
on the scale. The 11 points in the middle of the scale account for only about 20
percent of the cases in each time period, and several points correspond to less that one
percent of all cases. The bimodal nature of the scale makes its use as single scale
variable impractical. For analysis in this dissertation, the scale is collapsed to define
non-democracies, democracies, and those states in between with mixed authority
characteristics.
Within the political science literature, there are different notions as to what
Polity score should mark the threshold of democracy and non-democracy. Scores for
democracy have been assigned at a range from +3 and higher (N. Gleditsch and Hegre,
1997), +6 and higher (McLaughlin et. al., 1998; Mousseau 1998; Leeds and Davis
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1999), and +7 and higher (Enterline 1998; Reiter and Stam 1998; Mansfield and
Snyder, 2002). Non-democracies have been associated with Polity scores of -6 and
lower (Leeds 1999) and -7 and lower (Enterline, 1998; Reiter and Stam, 1998;
Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).
For this dissertation I code states with Polity scores of +6 and higher (+17 and
higher on the adjusted scale) as democracies and states with Polity scores of –6 and
lower (5 and lower on the adjusted scale) as non-democracies. This places each
regime type at the midway points between high democracy/high non-democracy and
completely mixed systems. States falling between the two regime thresholds are
coded as and are “mixed systems.” Using this criterion, I created several variables for
the independent variable. First, three separate dummy variables for each of the three
regime types outlined above are coded 0 or 1, accordingly. Second, a three-point
regime scale identifies non-democracies as 1, mixed systems as 2, and democracies as
3. A third measure is a two-point scale, with non-democracies coded 1, democracies
coded 2, and mixed systems on the middle of the scale as missing data.
Independent Variable: Presidential/Parliamentary Democracy
The independent variable for presidential democracy-parliamentary democracy
is operationalized using data from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive
(CNTS). CNTS contains comprehensive longitudinal political, economic and social
variables and indicators for every state in the international system. The CNTS
project was developed and is maintained by Arthur S. Banks, former senior editor of
the Political Handbook of the World. I create dummy variables for presidential and
parliamentary democracy from the CNTS variable Effective Executive (Type). This
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variable identifies "the individual who exercises primary influence in the shaping of
most major decisions affecting the nation's internal and external affairs," as a
monarch, president, premier, military or other (Banks, 1999). I code those states
identified as parliamentary (premier) or presidential with a 0 or 1 accordingly.
Independent Variable: Divided Government
Data for presidential systems with divided government come from Witold
Henisz' (2000) Political Constraint Index Dataset, developed at the University of
Pennsylvania. This data set contains an annual variable identifying cases where the
party controlling the lower house of the legislature is aligned with that of the
executive. To operationalize divided government in the dissertatio n, I convert this
variable to indicate cases where the lower house and executive are not aligned
(divided government). The divided government variable is assigned a value of 1
when the executive and legislature are not aligned and a 0 when they are aligned.
Independent Variable: Multi-Party Systems
The independent variable for multi-party systems is operationalized using a
calculation that identifies the effective number of parties in a system. This method
avoids the bias found in a simple count of the total number of parties, especially in
those systems where several small and politically insignificant parties coexist with
two or three other larger, more substantial parties (as is the case in the United
Kingdom). Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) measure of effective number of parties is
an indicator that counts the number of parties in a system after weighting them by
size.
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This measure is constructed as: Np = 1/∑?Pi2 , where Np is the number of
parties and pi is the proportion of seats held by the i-th party. This data comes from
the CNTS data set, which includes annual measures of Rae’s (1968) party
fractionalization index:
m
F = 1 - ∑ (ti)2
i=l

,where ti = the proportion of members

associated with the ith party in the lower house of the legislature. Using a formula P=
1 / (1 - F) identified by Lawrence and Hayes (2002), I converted these figures to a
measure for effective number of parties. While there is little substantive difference
between the two measures, I chose to use the effective number of parties indicator in
this dissertation since the figure is designed to approximate actual numbers of parties
and is more widely accepted in the literature.
Independent Variable: Coalition Government
The independent variable for coalition government is developed from a CNTS
variable that divides the size of the legislature by the number of seats held by the
largest legislative party. Using this scale, I establish a dummy variable (1 or 0) for
coalition government. Parliamentary systems are coded as coalition if they score
above a 2.0 on the scale, indicating that the largest party does not hold a majority of
seats. Only under extraordinary circumstances would a party winning an outright
majority form a coalition government.
Independent Variable: Military Government
The independent variable for military government is developed from the CNTS
variable Type of Regime. This variable codes states as civilian, military-civilian,
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military, and “other.” From this, I construct separate dummy variables corresponding
to the extent of military involvement in government.
Military-Civilian Rule (coded 1 or 0): Describes cases where an outward
civilian government is effectively controlled by a military elite. Civilians hold only
those posts (up to and including that of head of state) for which the military deems
their services necessary for the successful conduct of government operations. The
majority of Latin American military governments fall under this category, as did
Greece from 1967 to 1974.
Direct Military Rule (coded 1 or 0): Direct rule by the military, usually (but not
necessarily) following a military coup. The governing structure may vary from
utilization of the military chain of command under conditions of martial law to the
institution of an ad hoc administrative hierarchy with at least an upper echelon staffed
by military personnel. About one- fourth of the cases of military rule in the
dissertation's dataset fall into this category. Argentina's experiences under military
rule in the 1970s and early 1980s are one example.
Independent Variable: Less Developed Countries
Conceptualizing an independent variable for less-developed countries is not an
easy task. In fact, frequently scholarly articles will examine cases related to the "Third
World" without ever defining or operationalizing what constitutes this group of
nations. The term “Third World” is used to describe the less developed nations of
Asia, Africa and Latin America. These states tend to be characterized as poor and
economically dependent on the export of primary products to the developed world.
They are also frequently associated with having higher rates of illiteracy, population
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growth and political instability. Typically included among Third World states are all
those of Asia, with the exception of Israel and Japan, all of Africa (with the possible
exception of South Africa), and all of the Americas with the exception of Canada and
the United States.
Most standards for characterizing a country as Third World are subjective in
nature. There are no widely accepted standards or criteria in the literature for
classification. One possible method is to utilize the World Bank's country
classification indicators. However, these data are not available longitudinally. This
dissertation characterizes states as "less developed" based upon their membership in
the Group of 77. The Group of 77 (G-77) was established in 1964 by 77 developing
countries that were signatories of the "Joint Declaration of the 77 Countries" issued at
the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). The G-77, which now numbers 133 countries,
characterizes itself as "the largest third-world coalition in the United Nations." Its
stated goals are to articulate and promote collective economic interests, enhance joint
negotiating capabilities on major international issues in the United Nations system,
and promote economic and technical cooperation among developing countries. G-77
membership tracks quite closely with what conventional wisdom dictates as "the Third
World," with the possible exceptions of Mexico, South Korea and four of the five
former Soviet Central Asian republics, who are non- members. Member states that
may not traditionally be thought of as "developing" or "Third World" include Cyprus
and the Eastern European states of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania.
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For this variable, member states are coded as 1 for all years in the study; non-member
states are coded as a 0 for all years.
While admittedly not a perfect measure, this is at least non-subjective and
reflects the states' self- identification with development issues. Membership in the G77, as with most conventional concepts of what constitutes the Third World, include
an eclectic mix of nations – from extremely poor and underdeveloped states such as
Haiti, Sierra Leone, Comoros and Bangladesh – to oil- rich nations such as Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait – to newly industrializing countries such as Malaysia and
Singapore.
Independent Variable: Leadership Change
I adapt the independent variable for leadership change from the CNTS variable
Changes in Effective Executive. This variable identifies the number of times in a year
that effective control of executive power changes hands. Changes are coded if the
new executive is independent of his or her predecessor. For this dissertation, if a
change in the effective executive occurs in a given year, I assign that variable a value
of 1. If no changes in the effective executive occur, I coded that variable as 0. This
variable is used as both a control variable in tests of each of the hypotheses and as an
independent variable in an interaction model comparing the effects on leadership
change in foreign policy change in democracies and non-democracies.
Description of Data
A further description of the dependent and independent variables is illustrated
in Appendices C, D and E. Appendix C contains descriptions of the mean, minimum
and maximum values for each dependent and independent variable according to the
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years included in each dependent variable. Appendix D contains histograms for the
non-dichotomous dependent and independent variables. Appendix E contains
correlation tables for each of the independent variables. Since the time periods
covered by each of the dependent variables differs significantly (1954-1978 for the
COPDAB data, 1951-1992 for the U.N. Affinity Data, and 1986-1997 for the
Important U.N. Votes), there are variations in the independent variable depending
upon the dependent variable being used to test the hypothesis.
Control Variables
This dissertation includes several variables to control for other factors that
might influence foreign policy change or stability. These variables include a state's
capabilities, national attributes, political factors, international alliances, aid allocations
as well as other considerations that arise when adapting the hypotheses to a
methodological model.
Control Variable: National Capabilities
One important consideration is a state's capacity to undertake foreign policy
change. States throughout the world differ significantly in national resources that can
be utilized to effect foreign policy changes. National resource levels also reflect a
state’s position in the international system. This dissertation employs the Composite
National Capabilities Index (CINC), developed by Singer, et. al. (1972) as part of the
Correlates of War project, as a control variable for capabilities. In a given year, this
index represents a state's share (percentage) of global capabilities in six areas: iron
and steel production, urban population, total population, total military expenditures,
total military personnel and total amount of energy production. Each state's
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proportion of total system capabilities in each area is calculated, and an average is
taken across all areas for that state where data is not missing. Data are available for all
years in this study up through 1992. Inclusion of this control variable limits the
analysis up to the year 1992.
Control Variable: Coups d’ Etat
Another factor that must be controlled are cases when changes in leadership
come through violence or extra-constitutional means. Moon (1985) demonstrates that
revolutionary changes in government produce significant changes in foreign policy.
Hagan (1989) continues this logic and fo und that more extreme changes in leadership
produce more dramatic changes in foreign policy, while more mild changes yield less
significant changes.
The variable already included in this dissertation for leadership change
accounts for the effect those new individuals entering the decision-making apparatus
have on foreign policy change. However, it is necessary to differentiate "typical"
leadership changes from those that are more extreme and would likely result in more
abrupt policy changes. A control variable for coups is adapted from the CNTS
variable Number of Coups d' Etat. This variable captures the number of successful
extra-constitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its effective
control of the nation's power structure that occur in a given year. If a successful coup
occurred, I assign that state's coup variable a value of 1; if no coups occurred, the
variable is coded 0.
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Control Variable: Wealth
As discussed in the foregoing chapters, scholars suggest that wealthier states
are less likely to undertake significant foreign policy change, since they are more
likely "satisfied" with their prevailing situation and undertaking significant changes
would be relatively more costly. A control variable for wealth is operationalized
based on a state’s per capita Gross Domestic Product relative to the United States
(U.S. = 100) for each year. Higher levels indicate higher levels of wealth. Data for
this variable come from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (PWT 6.1) data set (Heston,
Summer and Aten, 2002). One problem with the PWT data sets is that they do not
contain these data for most communist states. To include these cases in the
dissertation, I followed the prescription used by Leeds and Davis (1999). In order to
combine their data with that of the more updated data set, I code all states with a GDP
relative to the United States that was 30 percent or higher as “wealthy” and assign
them a value of 1 for the given year. All other states are coded as 0. Leeds and Davis
(1999), using an earlier version of PWT, sought to resolve the problem by adding data
missing for the communist states that they collected from various other sources. I
supplement the per capita GDP data from PWT 6.1 that I converted to categorical data
with the categorical data from the Leeds and Davis data set for those cases.
Control Variable: Alliance
An alliance variable is included in the dissertation to control for the similarity
of formal alliances between states. Walt (1987) explains alliance formation in terms
of: a response to threat; ideological, political and cultural solidarity; and a means of
garnering more foreign military and economic assistance. Each of these can be
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expected to reinforce policy stability. Since alliances reflect common perceived
threats, interests, goals or orientations, states with similar alliance patterns should be
less likely to undertake actions that would change the relationship they have with
important partners.
Control variables for alliance are constructed from EUGene based on S scores
for regional alliance similarity from the Correlates of War data set, updated by Dan
Reiter through 1992. Alliances are ranked as 1 (defense pact), 2 (neutrality pact), 3
(entente) and 4 (no alliance). All states in the international system are included, even
if they do not engage in any alliance behavior. Signorino and Ritter’s S correlation
(1999), evaluates the rank order correlation for two states’ alliance portfolios and takes
into account both the presence and absence of an alliance in the correlation
calculation, accounting for the fact that states may have identical alliances with some
states as well as no alliances with identical sets of other states. Possible S scores range
from -1 (totally opposite alliance agreements) to +1 (complete agreement in alliances)
(Bennett and Stam, 2001). For the model using important U.N. votes, I use a control
variable for alliance similarity with the U.S. For the other models I use the average
alliance S score for each state with all other states in its PRIE – the same sets of states
captured in the dependent variables. Like the national capabilities control, use of this
variable limits analysis up to the year 1992.
Control Variable: U.S. Economic Assistance
For the model using important U.N. votes, an alternate measure is necessary to
control for states that have closer relations with the United States. I include a U.S. aid
control variable as a surrogate for alliance, since alliance data are not available beyond
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1992, and data for the dependent variable, independent variable, and other control
variable are available up through 1997. This variable is the total annual economic
assistance loans and grants provided to each country in millions of current U.S.
dollars. These data come from the United States Agency for International
Development. One drawback of using this measure is that the industrialized countries
of Western Europe have close relations with the United States but do not receive U.S.
aid.
Control Variables: Polity and Polity Differences
Another set of variables control for polity-related effects that may exist
between states and may influence their foreign policies. First, I created a control
variable to capture the level of non-democracy/democracy of the states receiving the
change in foreign policy action. There are reasons to believe that the recipient state’s
level of democracy/non-democracy may influence the stability of foreign policy
directed toward it. Aside from findings in the vast democratic peace literature, stud ies
have shown that democracies and non-democracies are treated differently and that
democracies will more often be the recipients of conflictual behavior than cooperative
behavior from non-democracies (Leeds and Davis, 1999). I construct a control
variable Regime (target) by calculating the average Polity score for each state’s PRIE
in each year to control for the overall Polity of the states receiving the foreign policy
action.
Another polity-related variable controls for the difference in levels of nondemocracy/democracy between interacting states. States of a more similar regime
type may be expected to behave differently toward one another. States with similar
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regime types are likely to have more similar interests, less to disagree over, and
perhaps fewer occasions for foreign policy change. On the other hand, states of a
similar regime type may have less to fear from one another and in the context of a
cooperative relationship be willing to change policies. I constructed the control
variable Regime (dif) from the difference in the Polity score for each state and the
average Polity score for its PRIE.
A third control seeks to address changes that might be happening in the
environment receiving the foreign policy action. Cases will occur when a state may
change its foreign policy in response to significant changes occurring in its PRIE, not
necessarily any internal dynamic. Especially in the case of the Affinity model,
changes from one year to the next raise the issue of “who moved?” One type of
change that can occur in a PRIE that might induce foreign policy response is a change
in the regime makeup of the states. A state that has dealt primarily with nondemocracies could be expected to change its foreign policy if each of those states
suddenly became democracies. To control for this effect, I create a control variable
Regime Change (target), calculated as the absolute value of the difference in a state’s
PRIE’s average Polity score from the previous year.
Control Variable: Cold War
Using important U.N. votes as the dependent variable permits examination of a
more recent timeframe, and an analysis of the impact of the Cold War and post-Cold
War periods. A Cold War dummy variable will be used in an interaction model. The
Cold War period is coded 1 for the years 1986 to 1990, and 0 for 1991 to 1997.

141

Methodology
In this dissertation I employ a pooled, cross-sectional time series design to test
each of the hypotheses. These designs enable comparisons across a number of units
(in this case states) over a period of time (years) by combining time series for multiple
cross sections of data. Pooling data gathered across time and space presents a number
of advantages. It helps overcome the "small N" problem often associated with studies
involving too many explanatory variables and too few cases. These designs are also
beneficial when examining variables whose "variability" may appear at different times
and in different cases and for cases where variability may be negligible across time or
space but can be captured in time and space (Stimson, 1986). Ultimately, pooled,
cross-sectional time series designs permit the capture of variation not only through
time or space, but also variation of these dimensions simultaneously (Podesta, 2002).
Pooled, cross-sectional time series present a number of problems, however,
since “the disturbance term is likely to consist of time series related disturbances,
cross section disturbances, and a combination of both” (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991:
223-224). These designs often violate the standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
assumptions regarding the error term. The OLS method dictates that the "best fit" for
a regression line is the one where the sum of squared deviations of the points from the
line are a minimum. OLS regression estimates are the standard way social scientists
link causes and effects, but for OLS to be optimal “it is necessary that all the errors
have the same variance (homoskedasticity), and that all of the errors are independent
of each other” (Podesta, 2002: 9). Meeting these assumptions is a problem for pooled,
cross-sectional time series designs for a number of reasons.
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Error terms tend not to be independent from one time period to the next.
Autocorrelation may occur if errors for a country in a given year are correlated with
errors in subsequent years. National traits, such as population, largely carry over from
one time period the next and cannot be characterized as "independent." Errors may
also be correlated across cases. Interdependence increases the opportunity for
disturbances from one country to the next (Podesta, 2002). Events in Canada, for
example, will likely influence events in its largest trading partner, the United States.
Errors also tend to be heteroskedastistic. The variance on certain variables may differ
substantially from one country to the next. Military expenditures, for example, are
likely more volatile in large countries than in very small countries with limited public
expenditures. Heteroskedasticity may also impact the dependent variable if the scale
of activity (such as foreign policy initiatives or United Nations votes) differs between
countries (Hicks, 1994; Podesta, 2002).
Errors may also be generated reflecting cross sectional and temporal effects.
This stems from the assumption of homogeneity in the level of the dependent variable
across units. "If we assume the units are homogenous in level and they are not…then
the least squares estimator will be a compromise unlikely to be a good predictor of any
of the units, and the apparent levels of heteroskedasticty and autocorrelation will be
substantially inflated " (Stimson, 1986: 919).
The method used here is a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model
employed using the STATA data analysis program. GEE models control for
heteroskedasticity and the non- independence of observations through a populationaveraged approach to estimating correlated data. This procedure “fix(es) the average
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values of the independent variables across the panel to the average value of the
dependent variable for a given year – essentially turning panel data into crosssectional data” (Bennett and Stam, 2000b: 665). These models "in fact, model…the
average response over the sub-population that shares a common value of X" (Diggle,
Liang and Zeger, 1994: 131). Zorn (2001) states that this method is most valuable for
making comparisons across groups or sub-populations.
Hu, et. al. (1998) observe:
The GEE approach is more desirable when the objective
is to make inferences about group differences . . .If we
want to estimate the average treatment effect, regardless
of individual change over time, then the populationaveraged parameter is of more interest (ibid.: 701).
In the context of political science, Zorn observers that the GEE approach is ideal for
assessing such things as the propensity of democracies and non-democracies to engage
in interstate conflict.
Using this model, variables associated with greater degrees of foreign policy
change should yield coefficients that are positive. Variables associated with greater
foreign policy stability should produce coefficients that are negative. I will conduct
one-tailed tests of significance on the independent variables and two-tailed tests on the
control variables.
In calculating foreign policy change for the dependent variables, the first year
for each state in the study had to be dropped. With this, periods of analysis for models
using the COPDAB data cover 1954 to 1978. The models using U.N. Affinity scores
include the years 1951 to 1992; and the models using important U.N. votes cover 1986
to 1997, depending upon the years available for the control variables used.
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Hypothesis 1: Democracy and Non-Democracy
The reader will recall that the first hypothesis of this dissertation is that states
with democratic regimes demonstrate greater stability (less foreign policy change)
than do states with non-democratic regimes. Thus the null hypothesis is that estimates
for the coefficient for democracy will be zero or greater, and the alterna tive hypothesis
is that estimates will be less than zero. Likewise, for non-democratic systems, the null
hypothesis is that the estimate for non-democracy will be zero or less than zero. The
alternate hypothesis is that the estimate will be greater than zero.
I first test this hypothesis using the COPDAB measure of foreign policy
change as dependent variable, which covers the years 1954 to 1978. The first column
in Table 5.2 displays the results for the model including a non-democracy and
democracy independent variable. The estimated coefficient for the independent
variable for non-democracy reveals that non-democracy has a positive effect on
foreign policy change, significant at the .01 level. A one-unit change in the nondemocracy variable, in this case from the intermediate category of “mixed systems,” is
associated with a 17 percent increase in the annual mean change in the COPDAB
score (see summary statistics in Appendix C).
The lack of statistical significance in the estimate for democracy suggests that
there is no significant difference in the amount of foreign policy change occurring in
democracies and “mixed systems.” The mixed systems, however, are a relatively
small percentage of states, and the significant finding in the predicted direction for the
non-democracy variable confirms the hypotheses that there are differences in the
stability of foreign policy between non-democracies and other systems. This finding
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Table 5.2 Regime Effects on Foreign Policy Change:
Five Models Using COPDAB Dependent Variable, 1954-1978
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
Non-Dem/Dem

Non-Dem

Dem

Regime
(3-Point Scale)

Regime
(2-Point Scale)

Non-Dem (+)

.675***
(.301)

.637***
(.229)

-------

-------

-------

Dem (-)

.068
(.355)

-------

-.444***
(.268)

-------

-------

Regime (-)
(3-Point)

-------

-------

-------

-.340***
(.136)

-------

Regime (-)
(2-Point)

-------

-------

-------

-------

-.820***
(.298)

Capability (+/-) -17.712****
(3.980)

-17.729****
(3.978)

-18.297****
(3.928)

-17.945****
(3.962)

-17.493****
(4.083)

Wealth (-)

.520**
(.267)

.538**
(.250)

.550***
(.265)

.598***
(.259)

.687**
(.298)

Coup (+)

.673
(.430)

.668
(.429)

.714
(.430)

.665*
(.430)

.740
(.525)

Exec Change (+) .258
(.222)

.262
(.222)

.221
(.222)

.260
(.222)

.320
(.258)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.105**
(.048)

.105**
(.048)

.075*
(.046)

.096*
(.048)

.125***
(.053)

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

-.081**
(.040)

-.077**
(.035)

-.027
(.032)

-.050
(.032)

-.086*
(.046)

Regime (+)
.238*
Change (Target) (.145)

.237*
(.144)

.221
(.145)

.228
(.144)

.208
(.164)

Alliance (-)

-.538
(.410)

-.523
(.402)

-.420
(.404)

-.446
(.402)

-.330
(.483)

Constant (+/-)

3.250****
(.627)

3.256****
(.626)

3.711*****
(.588)

4.081****
(.577)

3.650****
(.657)

N

2,453

2,453

2,453

2,453

2,453

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
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is robust across all models of the independent variables, outlined in columns 2-5 of
Table 5.2.
The second column shows that non-democracies, compared with all other
systems, undertake more foreign policy change. The third column shows an opposite
relationship for democracies, which undertake less foreign policy change than other
states. Comparing this coefficient with that of democracy in column one shows that
while significant differences may not exist between democracies and mixed systems,
significant differences can be found when democracies are compared to mixed
systems and non-democracies together. The fourth and fifth columns show the
relationship between regime type and foreign policy change on two- and three-point
scales from non-democracy to democracy. The negative coefficients, both significant
at the .01 level, indicate that a change from a less democratic to a more democratic
system is associated with less foreign policy change.
Among the control variables, both capabilities and wealth produce significant
coefficients in the model. The estimate for national capabilities indicates that greater
national capabilities are associated with less change as measured by the dependent
variable. Greater wealth, however, is associated with more change. Also significant
are the estimates controlling for the levels of democracy in the states receiving the
foreign policy action. The estimated coefficient for the average Polity score of the
PRIE, Polity (target), is positive and significant, indicating that the more democratic
the state’s PRIE, the more foreign policy change a state would undertake toward it.
The estimate of the coefficient for the difference in regime type between a state and its
PRIE, measured as the absolute value of the difference in Polity scores, is negative
147

and significant, indicating that the more dissimilar the regime types of interacting
states, the less foreign policy change they will undertake.
The second model tests this hypothesis in a model using U.N. Affinity scores,
which capture voting similarity between a state and other states in its PRIE. As with
the model using COPDAB data, the findings in this model support the hypothesis of
this dissertation that democracies undertake less foreign policy change than nondemocracies. While the estimates for both variables in the first column of Table 5.3
indicate a statistically significant and negative direction, the coefficients show that
democracies undertake less change in U.N. voting patterns than do non-democracies,
which undertake less changes than mixed systems. A one-unit change in the
independent variable to democracy is associated with a 30 percent decrease in the
annual mean change in the Affinity score for all states. The remaining columns in
Table 5.3 show that this finding is robust across all measures of the independent
variable, whether as separate indicators of regime type or as a scale.
As in the COPDAB model, the control variable for national capabilities is
significant. However, unlike the model using the events data as the dependent
variable, the estimate here is positive, indicating that states with more national
capabilities undertake more changes in voting similarity with states in their relevant
environments. The estimate for the variable controlling alliance similarity is also
significant, and as expected, indicates that states with more similar alliance patterns
are less likely to change patterns of voting similarity. All three of the regime-related
controls were also significant. As was the case in the COPDAB model, estimate for
regime type of the recipient states is positive and negative, and the estimate for the
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Table 5.3 Regime Effects on Foreign Policy Change:
Five Models Using U.N. Affinity Dependent Variable, 1951-1992
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
Non-Dem/Dem

Non-Dem

Dem

Regime
(3-Point Scale)

Regime
(2-Point Scale)

Non-Dem (+)

-.005**
(.003)

.004*
(.003)

-------

-------

-------

Dem (-)

-.0170****
(.003)

-------

-.014****
(.003)

-------

-------

Regime (-)
(3-Point)

-------

-------

-------

-.006****
(.002)

-------

Regime (-)
(2-Point)

-------

-------

-------

--------

-.010****
(.003)

Capability (+/-)

.190****
(.047)

.184****
(.047)

.193****
(.048)

.191****
(.048)

.196****
(.046)

Wealth (-)

.002
(.003)

-.003
(.003)

.002
(.003)

-.000
(.002)

.001
(.003)

Coup (+)

-.006
(.005)

-.003
(.005)

-.006
(.005)

-.005
(.005)

-.004
(.006)

Exec Change (+) .003
(.003)

.002
(.003)

.003
(.003)

.003
(.003)

.003
(.003)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.004****
(.000)

.003****
(.000)

.004****
(.000)

.004****
(.000)

.003****
(.000)

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

-.000
(.000)

-.001*
(.000)

-.000
(.000)

-.001**
(.000)

-.000
(.000)

Regime (+)
.012****
Change (Target) (.001)

.012****
(.001)

.012****
(.001)

.012 ****
(.001)

.013****
(.001)

Alliance (-)

-.039****
(.005)

-.044****
(.004)

-.041****
(.005)

-.044****
(.005)

-.037****
(.005)

Constant (+/-)

.032****
(.007)

.031****
(.007)

.028****
(.006)

.039****
(.006)

.032****
(.007)

N

4,125

4,125

4,125

4,125

4,125

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables.
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“regime distance” between the states and their PRIEs is positive and significant.
Another significant estimate is for the variable controlling regime changes in a state’s
PRIE. The positive coefficient shows that greater changes in the average Polity score
of a PRIE is associated with more changes in a state’s United Nations voting patterns.
The third model of foreign policy change measures change in terms of voting
coincidence with the United States on important votes in the U.N. General Assembly
and covers the years 1986 to 1997. This model also produced an estimate for the
independent variable that supports the hypothesis. As the first column in Table 5.4
indicates, the coefficient for democracy is negative and significant, and the coefficient
for non-democracy is positive and significant. A one-unit change from a mixed
system to a democracy is associated with an 18 percent decrease in the annual mean
change in the voting coincidence of all states. A one- unit change to non-democracy is
associated with a 22 percent increase in the annual mean change in the voting
coincidence of all states. Statistically significant findings on the three-point regime
scale also support the hypothesis that democracy is associated with less foreign policy
change.
Statistically significant estimates were produced for the control variables for
wealth, executive changes and U.S. aid. Contrary to the findings in the COPDAB
model, the estimate for the wealth control variable in this model reveals that greater
wealth is associated with less foreign policy change. As expected, changes in
executive leadership are associated with more foreign policy change. The estimate for
the control variable for U.S. aid, used here as a surrogate for alliance, shows a small
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Table 5.4 Regime Effects on Foreign Policy Change:
Four Models Using Important Votes Dependent Variable, 1986-1992
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
Non-Dem/Dem

Regime
(3-Point Scale)

Regime
(2-Point Scale)

Regime (3-Point Scale)
With Cold War Interaction

Non-Dem (+)

.029**
(.016)

-------

-------

-------

Dem (-)

-.024*
(.018)

-------

-------

-------

Regime (-)
(3-Point)

-------

-.027**
(.014)

-------

-.025*
(.014)

Regime (-)
(2-Point)

-------

-------

.007
(.055)

-------

Cold War

-------

-------

--------

.005
(.019)

Cold War
X Regime

-------

-------

-------

.042****
(.008)

Wealth (-)

-.019***
(.009)

-.019**
(.008)

-.014
(.010)

-.029****
(.008)

Coup (+)

.019
(.030)

.019
(.030)

.019
(.035)

.020
(.029)

Exec Change (+) .017*
(.010)

.017*
(.010)

.015
(.011)

.017*
(.010)

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

-.001
(.002)

-.001
(.001)

.002
(.003)

-.000
(.002)

U.S Aid (-)

-.000*
(.000)

-.000*
(.000)

-.000*
(.000)

-.000***
(.000)

Constant (+/-)

.147****
(.020)

.203****
(.045)

.110*
(.061)

.160****
(.045)

N

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction
model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
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but negative association between aid and less foreign policy changes on U.N. votes
deemed important by the United States.
The fourth column displays the results of an interaction model testing the
difference in the effect of regime type on foreign policy change during the Cold War
and post-Cold War periods. The coefficient for the regime type variable (three-point
scale) represents the effect of regime type on changes in voting coincidence during the
post-Cold War period (i.e., when Cold War=0, 1991-1997). The negative coefficient
of -.025 indicates that during the post-Cold War period, greater democracy is
associated with less foreign policy change. The coefficient for the interaction variable
represents the difference in regime effects during the Cold War and post-Cold War
periods. This coefficient is positive (.042) and significant, indicating that during the
Cold War, democracies undertook more change than during the post-Cold War era.
During the Cold War, the total effect of regime type is .017 (i.e., -.025 + .042). This
suggests that the non-democracies and democracies behaved fundamentally differently
during each period, at least as measured here. Democracies undertook more changes
in voting coincide with the United States than non-democracies during the Cold War
period, and undertook fewer changes than non-democracies during the post-Cold War
period.
These findings support the primary hypothesis of this dissertation that
democracies engage in relatively more stable foreign policies than do nondemocracies. All three models produced statistically significant results in the
predicted direction across numerous measurement schemes. A further discussion of
these findings and the control variables is included in Chapter 6.
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Hypothesis 2: Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies
In Chapter 4 I posited that presidential democracies would demonstrate greater
stability (less change) in their foreign policies than would parliamentary democracies.
The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or greater, and the alternative
hypothesis is that estimates will be less than zero. Test for this hypothesis are
conducted only on those states identified as democracies (17 or higher on the Polity
scale).
Results are outlined in Table 5.5. Since each model employs a different
measure of foreign policy change, covers different periods of time, and includes
different cross sections, the reader is cautioned in making comparisons between
coefficients produced by these models. The model using the COPDAB dependent
variable does not produce a statistically significant estimate for the independent
variable or for any of the control variables. Results from the model using Affinity
data, however, support the hypothesis. A statistically significant estimate for the
presidential democracy variable indicates that a one-unit change from parliamentary to
presidential democracy leads to a decrease in foreign policy change of .02 on the
Affinity scale. This amounts to 35 percent of the annual mean change in Affinity
scores for all states. Statistically significant estimates for control variables in this
model include those for capabilities (positive; the more capabilities, the more change),
regime type difference (negative; the more dissimilar the regime type of the actor and
target, the less change), regime change in the PRIE (positive; the greater the
magnitude of regime change in a PRIE, the most change directed toward it), and
alliance (negative; the more similar the alliance patterns between states, the less
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Table 5.5 Presidential vs. Parliamentary Democracy:
Effects on Foreign Policy Change
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
COPDAB
(1954-1978)

U.N. Affinity
(1951-1992)

President (-)

-.191
(.630)

-.020****
(.006)

.019
(.012)

.002
(.013)

Cold War (+/-)

-------

-------

-------

.094****
(.012)

Cold War (+/-)
X President

-------

--------

-------

.059**
(.018)

Capability (+/-) -10.345
(7.169)

.253***
(.081)

--------

-------

Wealth (-)

.152
(.565)

.006
(.006)

-.026**
(.012)

-.022*
(.012)

Coup (+)

-1.277
(.565)

-.030
(.006)

-------

--------

Exec Change (+) .394
(.319)

.002
(.003)

.015
(.011)

.018*
(.010)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.327
(.221)

-.001
(.002)

-------

-------

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

.028
(.205)

-.006***
(.002)

-.006
(.004)

.001
(.004)

Regime (+)
.734
Change (Target) (.311)

.007***
(.002)

-------

-------

Alliance (-)

-1.601
(1.173)

-.047****
(.011)

-------

-------

U.S. Aid (-)

---------

-------

-.000*
(.000)

-.000***
(.000)

.125***
(.040)

.124****
(.012)

.081****
(.013)

Constant (+/-)

N

.134
(4.142)
718

U.N. Important
(1986-1997)

1,460

655

U.N. Import (CW Inter)
(1986-1997)

655

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction
model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
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foreign policy change between them). These estimates are consistent with those
produced in the model testing the first hypothesis.
The important votes model does not produce a statistically significant estimate
in the hypothesized direction. The model produces a statistically significant estimate
for the wealth control variable, which indicates that greater wealth results in less
change in voting coincidence with the United States. The U.S. aid estimate is also
significant and in the predicted direction, but the small size of the coefficient
demonstrates little substantive impact.
The positive and significant coefficient for the Cold War interaction variable in
the fourth column shows that presidential democracies undertook more changes in
voting coincidence with the United States during the Cold War than after the Cold
War. However, because the coefficient for the presidential variable is not significant,
no conclusions can be drawn regarding the effect of presidential democracy on foreign
policy change during the Cold War period. The Cold War variable is positive and
significant, indicating a positive relationship between Cold War and foreign policy
change.
These results indicate that differences exist in the stability of the foreign
policies of presidential democracies and parliamentary democracies, depending upon
the foreign policy behavior being measured. The different timeframes analyzed in
each model also may affect these differences, as will be discussed later in Chapter 6.
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Hypothesis 3: Presidentialism and Divided Government
The third hypothesis of this dissertation is that presidential systems under
divided government demonstrate greater foreign policy stability than in democracies
where the president and a majority of the legislature come from the same party.
Testing this hypothesis confines this part of the study only to presidential democracies.
Since divided government is expected to be associated with less foreign policy change,
the alternative hypothesis is that estimates for the divided government coefficient will
be negative. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or greater.
As Table 5.6 indicates, none of the three models produces a statistically
significant estimate in the direction hypothesized, indicating that presidents facing
opposition in the legislature undertake no less change than presidents with unified
government. Among the control variables, the COPDAB model produces statistically
significant and positive estimates for the regime type of the recipient states, indicating
that states undertake more foreign policy change when the recipient state is more
democratic; and regime changes in the PRIE, which indicates that when recipient
states change their regime type, foreign policy directed at them also changes. In the
Affinity model, significant control variables include those for wealth (positive),
difference in regime type between the actor and recipient states (negative) and alliance
(negative). The single statistically significant estimate in the important votes model,
controlling for alliance, indicated little substantive impact.
As was the case in the second hypothesis, a lack of statistical significance for
the divided go vernment variable prohibits an estimation of the effect of divided
government on foreign policy change during the Cold War. However, a statistically
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Table 5.6 Divided Government in a Presidential Democracy:
Effects on Foreign Policy Change
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
COPDAB
U.N. Affinity
U.N. Important U.N. Import (CW Inter)
(1954-1978)
(1951-1992)
(1986-1997)
(1986-1997)
Div. Govt. (-)

.226
(.447)

.016
(.005)

.005
(.014)

-.005
(.016)

Cold War (+/-)

-------

-------

-------

.123****
(.000)

Cold War (+/-)
X Div. Govt.

-------

-------

--------

.122****
(.033)

Capability (+/-)

-3.183
(2.73)

.068
(.106)

--------

-------

Wealth (-)

.072
(.474)

.024***
(.009)

.011
(.020)

.007
(.020)

Coup (+)

-2.36
(2.65)

-.029
(.033)

-------

-------

Exec Change (+) -.666
(.508)

.001
(.005)

.024
(.020)

.014
(.016)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.717****
(.221)

-.005
(.003)

-------

-------

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

.008
(.126)

-.009***
(.003)

-.004
(.005)

.004
(.004)

Regime (+/-)
1.867****
Change (Target) (.539)

.002
(.003)

-------

-------

Alliance (-)

1.866
(.539)

-.073****
(.022)

------

-------

U.S. Aid (-)

--------

-------

.000**
(.000)

-.000
(.000)

Constant (+/-)

-5.481
(3.732)

.175****
(.052)

.000****
(.000)

.074****
(.014)

N

146

416

294

294

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction
model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
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significant and positive coefficient for the interaction variable shows that divided
presidential systems undertook more foreign policy change during the Cold War
period than after the Cold War period. This is consistent with the fact that the Cold
War variable is positive and significant.
The lack of significant findings in any of the models merits a re-evaluation of
the contention that divided government constrains presidents in their foreign
policymaking. Further examination may reveal ways in which presidents may
overcome these constraints and the types of foreign policies that may be more
sensitive to legislative constraints.
Hypothesis 4: Presidentialism and Multipartism
I next test the hypothesis that multipartism in a presidential democracy is
associated with greater foreign policy stability and less foreign policy change. It is
expected that a greater number of parties will place greater constraints on a president’s
ability to undertake foreign policy change. The subpopulation in this model includes
all presidential democracies. Since multipartism is expected to be associated with less
foreign policy change, the null hypothesis is that estimates for the variable effective
number of parties will be zero or greater. The alternative hypothesis is that estimates
will be less than zero. As outlined in Table 5.7, the COPDAB and U.N. Affinity
models do not produce significant estimates for the independent variable for effective
number of parties.
The significant estimates for the control variables in the COPDAB model were
consistent with those produced in the earlier models. In the Affinity model, the
estimate for wealth showed that states with greater wealth undertake more foreign
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Table 5.7 Presidential Democracy and Multipartism:
Effects on Foreign Policy Change
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
COPDAB
U.N. Affinity
U.N. Important
U.N. Import (CW Inter)
(1954-1978)
(1951-1992)
(1986-1997)
(1986-1997)
Effective (-)
# of Parties

-.063
(.263)

.000
(.002)

-.004**
(.002)

-.002
(.002)

Cold War (+/-)

-------

-------

-------

.099****
(.030)

Cold War (+/-)
X ENP

-------

-------

-------

.018**
(.009)

Capability (+/-)

-2.41
(2.96)

.046
(.111)

-------

--------

Wealth (-)

.008
(.472)

.027***
(.009)

.009
(.019)

.006
(.021)

Coup (+)

-------

.009
(.033)

-------

--------

Exec Change (+) -.414
(.531)

.001
(.005)

.031
(.020)

.023
(.017)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.682****
(.205)

-.005*
(.003)

-------

-------

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

-.050
(.118)

-.009***
(.003)

-.003
(.004)

.004
(.006)

Regime (+)
1.816****
Change (Target) (.544)

.002
(.003)

-------

-------

Alliance (-)

1.09
(1.21)

-.090****
(.025)

-------

-------

U.S. Aid (-)

---------

--------

.000
.000

.000
(.000)

Constant (+/-)

-4.251
(3.688)

.176****
(.053)

.137****
(.137)

.073****
(.016)

N

140

339

273

273

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction
model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
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policy change. The control variable for regime type of states receiving the foreign
policy action, or in this case, those states with which U.N. voting patterns are
measured, is negative and significant. This indicates that states undertake fewer
changes in voting patterns with democratic states than non-democratic states. Another
statistically significant control in this model indicated that, consistent with the other
models, the further apart states are in terms of regime type, the less foreign policy
change occurs.
The important U.N. votes model did produce a statistically significant estimate
in the predicted direction. An increase of one party in a presidential system leads to a
.004 decrease in foreign policy change, which accounts for about three percent of the
annual mean change in voting coincidence of all states (see Appendix C). No other
significant estimates were produced in this model.
The fourth column of Table 5.7 displays results from the Cold War interaction
model. The interaction variable indicates that the multipartism in presidential systems
was associated with more foreign policy change than in the post-Cold War period.
However, since the coefficient for the effective number of parties is not statistically
significant, no conclusions can be drawn about the effect that presidentialism and
multipartism had on foreign policy change during the period of the Cold War. The
Cold War variable is positive and significant, indicating a positive relationship
between Cold War and foreign policy change.
Hypothesis 5: Coalition Government
For the fifth hypothesis I explore whether coalition governments in
parliamentary systems demonstrate greater stability in foreign policy than states
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governed by single-party governments. For this model estimates were obtained for the
subpopulation of states comprising parliamentary democracies. Since coalition
governments are expected to be more constrained in their decisionmaking and
undertake less foreign policy change, the alternative hypothesis is that estimates for
the coalition variable will be less than zero. The null hypothesis is that estimates will
be zero or greater.
As Table 5.8 indicates, the U.N. Affinity model is the only one of the three to
produce a statistically significant estimate for the independent variable. The
coefficient -.007, significant at the .10 level, indicates that a one-unit change in the
value assigned to coalition (0 or 1) is associated with a decrease in foreign policy
change, expressed in terms of U.N. voting similarities, accounting for about 12 percent
of the annual mean change in Affinity scores of all states.
The COPDAB model produced a significant and negative estimated coefficient
for the capabilities control variable. The executive change control was positively
associated with foreign policy change, as expected. The estimate for wealth was
negative and significant in the important votes model, which indicates that wealth is
associated with less foreign policy change.
The control variable for Cold War indicates a positive association between the
Cold War and greater changes in voting coincidence with the United States. This
indicates that a one-unit change in the Cold War dummy variable (from non-Cold War
to Cold War) is associated with an increase in the amount of foreign change equal to
about 65 percent of the annual mean change of all states.
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Table 5.8 Coalition Parliamentary Democracy:
Effects on Foreign Policy Change
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
COPDAB
U.N. Affinity
U.N. Important
U.N. Import (CW Inter)
(1954-1978)
(1951-1992)
(1986-1997)
(1986-1997)
Coalition (-)

.100
(.440)

-.007*
(.005)

-.009
(.014)

-.001
(.021)

Cold War (+/-)

-------

-------

-------

.085****
(.024)

Capability (+/-) -31.794*
(18.879)

.558
(.216)

-------

-------

Cold War (+/-)
X Coalition

-------

-------

-------

.014
(.030)

Wealth (-)

.516
(.844)

-.010
(.009)

-.054***
(.021)

-.053**
(.022)

Coup (+)

-------

-------

-------

-------

Exec Change (+) .868**
(.390)

.002
(.004)

.010
(.017)

.017
(.016)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.214
(.351)

-.005
(.004)

-------

-------

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

.039
(.339)

-.002
(.004)

-.013
(.014)

-.007
(.014)

Regime (+)
.504
Change (Target) (.380)

.009
(.003)

-------

-------

U.S. Aid (-)

--------

---------

-.000*
(.000)

-.000
(.000)

Alliance (-)

-1.50
(1.573)

-.052
(.015)

-------

-------

Constant (+/-)

1.253
(6.603)

.032
(.072)

.167****
(.023)

.114****
(.027)

N

524

1,007

293

293

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction
model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
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Hypothesis 6: Effective Number of Parties and Coalition Parliamentary
Government
I next test the hypothesis that the greater the effective number of parties in a
coalition government, the less foreign policy change occurs. These models look
exclusively at parliamentary democracies with coalition governments. Since a greater
number of parties are expected to generate more constraints on the decision- making
process and be associated with less foreign policy change, the alternative hypothesis is
that estimates will be less than zero. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero
or greater.
The COPDAB model produces a significant estimate for the independent
variable in the direction predicted in the hypothesis. As Table 5.9 indicates, a one-unit
change in the effective number of parties in a coalition parliamentary government is
associated with a .725 decrease in foreign policy change, approximately 20 percent of
the annual mean change of all states. Significant estimates for the control variables for
capabilities and alliance are both negative.
The important U.N. votes model also produces an estimate for the effective
number of parties in the predicted direction, significant at the .01 level. This indicates
that a one- unit change in the effective number of parties is associated with a seven
percent decrease in voting coincidence, about five percent of the annual mean change
of all states. Other significant estimates for variables in this model include wealth
(negative) and regime difference (negative). The Affinity model produces significant
estimates for the control va riable measuring regime changes in the PRIE (positive) and
alliance (negative).
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Table 5.9 Coalition Parliamentary Democracy and Number of Parties:
Effects on Foreign Policy Change
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
COPDAB
U.N. Affinity
U.N. Important U.N. Import (CW Inter)
(1954-1978)
(1951-1992)
(1986-1997)
(1986-1997)
Effective (-)
# of Parties

-.725****
(.285)

-.002
(.002)

-.007*
(.005)

-.002
(.006)

Cold War (+/-)

-------

-------

-------

.125***
(.045)

Cold War (+/-)
X ENP

-------

-------

-------

-.007
(.010)

Capability (+/-)

-59.377*
(34.794)

.357
(.268)

-------

-------

Wealth (-)

1.297
(1.470)

.008
(.014)

-.093***
(.033)

-.081**
(.032)

Coup (+)

--------

-------

--------

-------

Exec Change (+)

.671
(.498)

-.002
(.005)

.020
(.020)

.019
(.018)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.209
(.642)

-.005
(.006)

-------

-------

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

.045
(.661)

-.009
(.006)

-.042**
(.019)

-.024
(.018)

Regime (+/-)
.706
Change (Target) (.561)

.011***
(.004)

-------

-------

U.S. Aid (-)

--------

-.000
(.000)

-.000
(.000)

-.041**
(.020)

-------

-------

.206
(.126)

.227****
(.050)

.152***
(.052)

596

191

191

Alliance (-)

Constant (+/-)

N

--------

-6.251***
(2.630)
5.619
(12.510)
308

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction
model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
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As is the case with the hypothesis above, the Cold War control variable
indicates a positive relationship between the Cold War and foreign policy change.
However, no significant results are found in the coefficients of interaction variable.
Hypothesis 7: Military Government
The next set of models test the hypothesis that greater military involvement in
non-democratic governments is associated with less foreign policy change. Thus these
models look exclusively at the subpopulation of non-democratic states. The reader
will recall that I created two dummy variables – one indicating cases whe re civilians
and military rule together and one for cases where the military rules alone. Since
greater military involvement in government is expected to be associated with less
foreign policy change, the alternative hypothesis is that estimates for the coefficients
of both variables will be less than zero, but that the relationship will be stronger for
cases where there is complete military rule. The null hypothesis is that estimates will
be zero or greater.
Because too few cases are available for analysis in the important U.N. votes
model, the hypothesis is tested using the COPDAB and Affinity models. As Table
5.10 reveals, estimates for the independent variables in the Affinity model support the
hypothesis of this dissertation. While the estimates indicate that both types of
government are associated with less foreign policy change, when compared to civilian
non-democratic governments, the coefficient for complete military rule indicates that
there will be even less foreign policy change when there is greater military
involvement. Among the control variables, estimates for capabilities (positive),
wealth (negative), regime type of PRIE (positive), regime change in the PRIE
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Table 5.10 Military Role in Non-Democratic Government:
Effects on Foreign Policy Change
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
COPDAB
U.N. Affinity
U.N. Important U.N. Import (CW Inter)
(1954-1978)
(1951-1992)
(1986-1997)
(1986-1997)
Mil-Civilian (-) .613
(.291)

-.004*
(.003)

Military (-)

-.009**
(.005)

.887
(.494)

Capability (+/-) -21.800****
(4.700)

.202***
(.066)

Wealth (-)

.697*
(.362)

-.009**
(.004)

Coup (+)

.997
(.647)

-.003
(.007)

Exec Change (+) -.253
(.472)

.007
(.005)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

-.011
(.123)

.002*
(.001)

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

.030
(.106)

-.001
(.001)

Regime (+/-)
.0357
Change (Target) (.191)

.017****
(.002)

U.S. Aid (-)

--------

--------

Alliance (-)

-.503
(.483)

-.034****
(.006)

Constant (+/-)

4.216
(.811)

.038****
(.008)

N

1,281

1,941

Too few cases for analysis – Only 40 cases
of complete military rule since 1986.

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
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(positive) and alliance (negative) were all significant as well. The only significant
estimates produced by the COPDAB models were for capabilities (negative) and
wealth (positive).
Hypothesis 8: Development and Foreign Policy Change
In testing the hypothesis that more developed states engage in more stable
foreign policies than do less developed states, I include all states in the population, and
code them as either less developed or developed. The variable used to operationalize
less developed countries is Group of 77 membership. Because G-77 membership is
closely associated with a country’s wealth, the control variable for wealth was dropped
from this analysis. Since G-77 members are expected to undertake more foreign
policy change, estimates for the independent variable should be positive and
significant. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or less.
As Table 5.11 indicates, both models employing U.N. voting as the dependent
variable produce significant estimates for the independent variable in the predicted
direction. The one-unit change in the independent variable was associated with a .006
increase in the Affinity score and a .024 increase in the voting coincidence measure, or
11 percent, and 18 percent of the annual mean change of all states, respectively.
The control variable for capabilities produces coefficient estimates that are
negative for the COPDAB model and positive for the Affinity model. The estimate
for the control variable for regime change in the PRIE is also significant and positive
in both models. The estimate for alliance similarity is significant and negative for the
COPDAB model. The estimate for regime type of the PRIE is positive in the Affinity
model, indicating that more changes in voting similarity occur when the makeup of the
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Table 5.11 Less Developed Counties and Foreign Policy Change
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
COPDAB
U.N. Affinity
U.N. Important U.N. Import (CW Inter)
(1954-1978)
(1951-1992)
(1986-1997)
(1986-1997)
Less Dev. (+)

-.157
(.292)

.006***
(.003)

.024****
(.009)

.027***
(.010)

Cold War (+/-)

-------

-------

-------

.082****
(.014)

Cold War (+/-)
X Less Dev.

-------

-------

-------

-.008
(.016)

Capability (+/-) -17.056****
(4.319)

.197****
(.048)

--------

-------

Coup (+)

.520
(.401)

.002
(.005)

.001
(.028)

.004
(.027)

Exec Change (+) .181
(.213)

-.000
(.002)

.022**
(.010)

.019*
(.010)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.048
(.047)

.004****
(.000)

--------

-------

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

-.030
(.031)

-.000
(.000)

.001
(.000)

.000
(.001)

Regime (+)
.232*
Change (Target) (.137)

.011****
(.001)

--------

-------

U.S. Aid (-)

---------

--------

-.000
(.000)

-.000**
(.000)

Alliance (-)

-.868**
(.411)

-.043
(.004)

--------

-------

Constant (+/-)

4.252****
(.709)

.018****
(.007)

.099****
(.077)

.075****
(.009)

N

2,627

4,574

1,483

1,483

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction
model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.

168

PRIE is more democratic. The single significant estimate for control variables in the
important U.N. votes model is for executive change, which is positive, as expected.
The Cold War interaction model did not produce a statistically significant
estimate for the interaction variable. However, consistent with all other models in this
dissertation, the Cold War is positively associated with change s in voting coincidence
with the United States.
Hypothesis 9: Executive Change
The final set of models test the hypothesis that changes in executive leadership
are associated with greater foreign policy changes in non-democracies than in
democracies. Since the effects of changes in the executive are expected to be a
function of regime type, interaction models are run using each of the dependent
variables. For the variable Democracy, democracies are coded as 1 and nondemocracies are coded as zero. Mixed systems are coded as missing data.
As the data in Table 5.12 indicate, no significant coefficients are produced for
the interaction variable. Contrary to the hypothesis of the dissertation, this indicates
that there is no significant difference in the effect of changes in the executive
leadership in democracies and non-democracies.
This chapter specified how each of the variables were operationalized and
tested according to the hypotheses developed in this dissertation. Results indicate
significant support for a number of these hypotheses. The following chapter will
analyze and discuss these results, their relevance, and their contribution to the
literature. I will also suggest further directions this line of research may take.
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Table 5.12 Executive Change in Democracies and Non-Democracies:
Effects on Foreign Policy Change
Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis
COPDAB
(1954-1978)

U.N. Affinity
(1951-1992)

U.N. Important
(1986-1997)

Exec Change (+) -.043
(.464)

.006
(.006)

.010
(.033)

Democracy (-)

-.011****
(.003)

.006
(.055)

Exec Change (-) .519
X Democracy
(.550)

-.004
(.006)

.006
(.036)

Capability (+/-) -17.416****
4.062

.241****
(.066)

--------

Wealth (-)

.697**
(.297)

.003
(.003)

-.014
(.010)

Coup (+)

1.020*
(.603)

-.006
(.006)

.024
(.045)

Regime (+/-)
(Target)

.126**
(.053)

.003****
(.000)

---------

Regime (+/-)
(Dif)

-.085*
(.046)

-.001****
(.000)

.002
(.003)

Regime (+)
.206
Change (Target) (.164)

.012****
(.001)

--------

U.S. Aid (-)

--------

--------

-.000*
(.000)

Alliance (+/-)

-.328
(.482)

-.038****
(.005)

--------

Constant (+/-)

3.657****
(.655)

.030****
(.007)

.110*
(.061)

N

1,999

3,359

1,028

-.891***
(.308)

* p <. 10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the
independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine effects that regime settings,
institutional arrangements, party systems and other factors have on a state's foreign
policy stability. The study of foreign policy change is an important endeavor, but
lacking in this field have been studies that look at foreign policy change empirically
across time and space, permitting conclusions that can be generalized regarding causal
factors and their influence. In this dissertation I have sought to address this concern
and developed a number of testable hypotheses examining how regime settings and
institutional arrangements create constraints and incentives that influence a decisionmaker’s ability and willingness to undertake foreign policy change. Some factors,
such as regime type, have received significant treatment in the international relations
literature but scant treatment as an explanatory variable for foreign policy change – at
least in any broad empirical studies. Other factors such as democratic institutional
arrangements have received extensive treatment in the area of comparative politics
throughout the past decade, but until very recently they have been largely ignored by
those studying international relations and foreign policy. This dissertation sought to
fuse and synthesize perspectives from a number of areas of political science to explain
the conduct of foreign policy and significantly enhance our understanding of some of
the factors that encourage or inhibit foreign policy change.
Examining the effects of regime type on foreign policy change is important.
While regime effects receive extensive treatment in the literature as they relate to the
politics of war and peace, alliance behavior and conflict resolution, they have not
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received significant treatment in a more general sense, looking at the day-to-day
conduct of foreign policy. Discovering differences between the major regime types
and their propensity for foreign policy change is a significant contribution to a better
understanding of those factors that shape foreign policy-making. Some scholars
charge that the democracy/non-democracy dichotomy is cast at too high a level of
abstraction to produce any meaningful differences in the conduct of foreign policy.
Results to the contrary merit a re-examination of this contention.
Another significant aspect of this dissertation is that it delved "below the
regime surface," incorporating insights from the comparative politics literature and
applying them to the study of foreign policy. The third wave of democratization
(Huntington 1991) fostered a renewed interest in the "new institutionalism" (Lane and
Ersson, 2000) among scholars in comparative politics who recognized that
"institutions matter" and can have a profound effect on a state's ability to consolidate a
new regime, represent adequately and efficiently the interests of citizens, and to
effectively develop and implement public policies.
Another important contribution of this dissertation is that it provided empirical
and generalizable results across a broad area of space, covering different periods of
time and multiple aspects of foreign policy change. Broad-based empirical studies of
foreign policy change are seriously lacking in the field (t’Hart, 1998), and this
dissertation provided an important step in beginning to identify those causal factors
that can be generalized beyond specific countries or regions.
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Findings
Examining the effects of regime types on foreign policy change, I posit that
democracies demonstrate greater stability in foreign policy than do non-democracies.
Democracies face greater constraints, which come in the form of: (1) legal and
structural constraints on what a decision maker may do; (2) political constraints which
preclude executives from making decisions that could adversely affect their position or
the position of their party; (3) the interests of the public which a democratic leader
must consider; and (4) the procedural and juridical nature of the democratic regime’s
legitimacy. Non-democratic leaders on the other hand face fewer constraints, can
more effectively repress demands, and exercise a freer hand in the conduct of foreign
policy. Additionally, I identify ways non-democratic leaders may face unique
incentives to undertake foreign policy change.
The hypothesis was tested using three different measures of foreign policy
change. The empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that democracies are more
stable in their foreign policies than non-democracies, undertaking fewer foreign policy
changes. Results from each of the models demonstrate that more democratic states
undertake less foreign policy change. This proves true for the COPDAB events data
model, which measures the foreign policy actions of states toward all states in its
Politically Relevant International Environment on a weighted severity scale, as well as
both models using United Nations votes. Findings are robust not only across different
measure of the dependent variable but also across numerous models of the
independent variable as well.
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These findings demonstrate a significant difference between regime types when
it comes to foreign policy change. While constraints and incentives can function
equally in both democracies and non-democracies, the results of these tests show that
important differences can be found. These findings suggests that contentions that
regime differences are cast at too high level of abstraction to have any meaningful
impact on foreign policy change merit re-evaluation.
A significant regime effect found in the control variables throughout the
dissertation concerns the regime type of the recipient states and the polity distance
between them. The results in the COPDAB model indicate that states undertake more
foreign policy change as the average level of democracy of the state receiving the
foreign policy action increases; or, in the case of Affinity scores, as the average level
of democracy increases for those states with which U.N. voting similarity is measured.
This may be explained in the way democracies are viewed by other states. If
democracies face greater constraints at home, can more credibly commit to a course of
action, and tend to engage in more cooperative behavior and avoid conflict, other
states may feel more compelled to change their foreign policies toward them than
toward non-democracies – since changing policies toward non-democracies could
invite a more immediate and negative response.
Results across each of the models also indicates that the greater the difference
in regime type between a state and those states receiving the foreign policy action (or
those states with which voting similarity was measured), the less states undertake
foreign policy change. This finding suggests that the more dissimilar the regimes of
states, the less foreign policy change will occur between them. On the surface this
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finding is somewhat surprising, since dissimilar states would be expected to have
dissimilar interests. One explanation may be related to the fact that states of similar
regime type have been found to engage in more cooperative and less conflictual
behavior (Leeds, 1999). In the context of a cooperative relationship, a state may feel
free to change it foreign policy toward a state of a similar regime type without fear of
possible negative consequences.
The estimate for the control variable for regime changes in the PRIE was
significant and positive in the Affinity model. This indicates that more foreign policy
changes occur when there are greater changes in the regime type of those states
receiving the foreign policy action. Regime changes can fundamentally affect the
approaches states take in their foreign policies, as new leaders, with different goals,
incentives and constraints take new and different approaches to foreign policy. The
purpose of including this variable is to capture those effects where states must adjust
to new realities abroad as a consequence of domestic changes in other states.
Whenever significant, the estimate for this variable was consistently positive
throughout the models in this dissertation.
Two other sets of controls that are consistently in the same direction
throughout the models in the dissertation are those controlling alliance and executive
changes. The two measures used to control for alliances (alliance or U.S. aid,
depending upon the model) consistently demonstrate that states undertake fewer policy
changes with those states with which they share similar alliances. Similar interests
and goals create fewer issues for disagreement and fewer occasions for foreign policy
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change. Changes in executive leadership are also associated with foreign policy
change.
Two control variables that produce estimates in the opposite direction,
depending upon the model, are capabilities and wealth. Capabilities are negatively
associated with change in the COPDAB model, while wealth is positively associated.
In the Affinity model, estimates indicate a positive association between capabilities
and foreign policy change. In the important U.N. votes model, the coefficient for
wealth is consistently negative, indicating that wealthy states undertake fewer changes
in their voting coincidence with the United States. These findings are fairly consistent
throughout the models in the dissertation — greater capabilities mean less foreign
policy change, and wealth means more foreign policy change in the COPDAB events
data model, while the opposite is found in the model using U.N. votes. Reasons for
this are not readily apparent, though the two variables are fairly collinear (.215). East
(1973), however, demonstrates that “small states,” with fewer resources and
capabilities, nonetheless act forcefully in the international system. Also, states with
greater capabilities are likely to have larger foreign policy bureaucracies to process
information and implement policy. States lacking these filtering mechanisms may
change policies more abruptly.
Additionally, states with greater resources may be more satisfied with their
situation and position in the international system and may be less willing to undertake
policies that could alter that status – particularly if the change in policy requires major
commitments of those resources. In forums such as the United Nations, however,
states’ resource commitments are not tied to the decisions they make. Votes instead
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reflect preferences and positions. In this setting, states may see their votes as an
opportunity freely express their views on a range of issues that they otherwise would
not address in their foreign policies.
I expected wealth to be negatively associated with foreign policy change. This
is not the case in the COPDAB model. This may be explained by the fact that
although wealthy states may be more satisfied with their position, as a consequence of
greater wealth they have more interactions with their neighbors and the major powers
and thus more opportunities to change their foreign policies. The changing policies
and positions of the oil-producing states in the Middle East is one example that may
reflect this phenomenon.
The control variable for Cold War is incorporated into an interaction with the
regime variable for the important U.N. votes model. Results show that the Cold War
was positively associated with changes in this foreign policy measure, and that while
more democratic states undertake fewer foreign policy changes than non-democratic
states, that relationship was reversed during the Cold War. While regime type is the
only independent variable in this dissertation to show any statistical significance in the
interaction models, all of the interaction models for Cold War show that the Cold War
was associated with greater foreign policy change. This finding runs counter to all
conventional wisdom concerning the constraints imposed by the international system
during the Cold War.
Before drawing any conclusions, however, the reader is cautioned to recall that
this finding is generated in a model measuring foreign policy change specifically in
terms of percent-agreement with the United States on United Nations role call votes it
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deems important. The timeframes for the other data available does not permit
comparisons between a Cold War and post-Cold War period. The COPDAB ends in
the year 1978 and the Affinity data ends in 1992, which would permit changes during
the Cold War period to be observed for only one year out of the 41 years covered.
I suggest that this finding is not related to the nature of the Cold War system
but rather to other factors related specifically to the dependent variable. Were these
findings concerning the Cold War robust, regime effects in the COPDAB and Affinity
models, which for the most part cover the Cold War period exclusively, would have
generated coefficients in the opposite direction that they did. Other factors, including
U.S. activities during this same time period must also be considered as explanations.
The 1986 to 1990 time period identified as the Cold War coincided with reductions in
U.S. aid allocations in a direct attempt to tie aid to foreign policy behavior (Kegley and
Hook, 1991). States receiving reduced U.S. aid may have felt compelled to vote
against resolutions promoted by the United States in greater frequency in retaliation
for aid cuts; or, hoping to see aid restored, they may have begun to vote more in favor
of U.S. positions, which could account for the greater changes during this period.
Issues associated with democratization that continued throughout the early 1990s also
cannot be dismissed as a possible explanation. Further examination may discover that
the “new” democracies demonstrate greater consistency in their voting coincidence
with the United States than do the “old” democracies. If this is the case, the changing
makeup of democratic states in the world since 1990 may account for the difference.
The time period also roughly coincides with a change in U.S. administrations and a
greater willingness to work with international bodies. The United States and its allies
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waged the Gulf War under the auspices of the United Nations; and under the Clinton
administration, the United States took a much more active role in multilateral efforts
aimed at such activities as family planning and reductions in global greenhouse gas
emissions. This greater willingness to work within multilateral institutions could be
reflected in the fact that overall, less change occurred after 1990.
Testing the hypothesis that presidential systems have more foreign policies
than parliamentary systems, the Affinity model produces results in the predicted
direction, indicating that presidential systems undertake fewer changes in voting
patterns with other states in their PRIE than do parliamentary systems. In developing
the hypothesis, the case was made that presidents face greater constraints on their
decisionmaking than do parliamentary executives. This is related to the separation of
powers, separation of purpose and separation of survival present in presidential
systems that I predicted would inhibit the chief executive's ability to undertake foreign
policy change.
The fact that no other models provided significant results should discourage
any sweeping claims that can be made about the presidential-parliamentary dichotomy.
Further examination is required regarding how the constraints in these systems impact
the decision-making process. As mentioned earlier, Maoz and Russett (1993) posit
that a parliamentary government’s reliance on the support of the legislature would
make it more constrained than presidential systems. This, and other cross cutting
influences, may account for the mixed results here.
A question that should be addressed, however, is why significant results are
found in one type of foreign policy measure (United Nations votes) and not in the
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other (events data). One possible explanation is related to the fact that of the three
measures of foreign policy change, the U.N. Affinity scores, which include all annual
votes cast in the General Assembly, are arguably the least substantive of all the
measures. On the other hand, the COPDAB data, which measure aspects of
cooperation and conflict behavior, capture aspects of foreign policy that have more
significant consequences for states. In these cases where more important international
issues are at stake, presidential and parliamentary systems may behave more similarly,
regardless of the differences that may exist between them, as the realist paradigm
would predict.
Contrary to my expectations regarding presidentialism and divided
government, no significant findings show that when presidential systems experience
divided government they undertake less foreign policy change. There are a number of
possible explanations for this. First, the assumptions developed in the hypothesis may
have overlooked the significant bargaining power presidents have with members of the
legislature, and the ability of presidents to establish coalitions of support for policies
with members of the opposing party (in fact, the weak party systems often associated
with presidential systems should make this task easier). Other factors not included in
the model such as presidential popularity, which allow a president to overcome some
of these constraints, may also account for a lack of findings consistent with the
hypothesis.
While there no significant findings to suggest that divided government is
associated with less foreign policy change, the fact that the coefficients produced by
the other estimates are positive merit further investigation. This may reveal that
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presidents will, when confronted with a divided government, seek ways to circumvent
the legislative process by exercising other executive powers in foreign policy making,
something he may be reluctant to do with members of his own party – thereby creating
a situation where unified government encourages greater foreign policy stability and
divided government greater foreign policy change. If divided government places
legislative constraints on a president’s ability to exercise a free hand in the conduct of
foreign policy, he may look for other ways to express policy preferences that avoid
significant legislative meddling. Certain types of foreign policy behavior may be more
amenable to this.
Results from the model using important U.N. votes do support the
dissertation’s hypothesis that a greater number of legislative parties will inhibit foreign
policy change in presidential democracies. The model shows that the greater the
effective number of legislative parties in a presidential system the less foreign policy
change occurs. When there are fewer parties in the legislature it is easier for the
president to take the necessary steps to undertake foreign policy change.
Testing the hypothesis that coalition governments undertake less foreign policy
change than do single-party governments produces a significant result in the direction
predicted when using the model with important U.N. votes. Higher profile votes,
especially those with a possible consequence of lost economic assistance are more
likely than other U.N. votes to have the attention of domestic actors. This may
account for why differences could be found in the important vote model but not in the
Affinity model. Results from the COPDAB events data model, however, suggest that,
coalition governments are no more or no less likely to change foreign policy than are
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single party governments. This may be because single-party governments, in fact, face
greater constraints in foreign policy-making than was posited here, or because
coalition governments can as effectively undertake foreign policy change as singleparty governments. Another possible explanation for the lack of significant findings
may stem from the fact that single-party governments are more identifiable to the
voters. If policies go bad or could upset a significant portion of the population, singleparty governments may be reluctant to undertake foreign policy change even though
they have the means to do so. Thus coalition governments undertake a level of foreign
policy change reflected by their level of domestic constraints, and single-party
governments undertake no greater changes because they are more risk averse.
The dissertation also tests the impact that the number of legislative parties in a
parliamentary system with a coalition government has on foreign policy change. A
greater number of parties should make the agreement necessary for major foreign
policy change more difficult to achieve. Findings in the COPDAB and important U.N.
votes models confirm this hypothesis. A greater number of parties in parliament
makes it more difficult for the executive, who already must contend with different
interests within his or her own government, to exercise effectively and authoritatively
a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. Because the government must rely on the
support of the legislature, it must take care to avoid taking policy positions
objectionable to a majority of parliament. With more parties come more interests and
policy dimensions that must be accommodated, which will tend to inhibit foreign
policy change in coalition governments.
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Turning from democratic regimes, I propose that a military role in the
governance of non-democratic regimes has a stabilizing effect on foreign policy. This
notion is based on the ideology and interests of most military regimes, how they view
their role in government, as well as the absence of legitimizing strategies for military
leaders in non-democracies that might otherwise provide incentives for foreign policy
change. The hypothesis predicts that in non-democratic governments where the
military is a member, there will be less foreign policy change than in non-democratic
governments where military is not a member. A lack of cases where there is direct
military rule during the 1986-1997 time period precluded analysis using the important
U.N. votes model.
The U.N. Affinity produced significant estimates for each of the military
government variables. Greater military involvement is associated with less foreign
policy change. Both levels of military involvement are associated with greater foreign
policy stability than civilian rule. The lack of significant findings in the COPDAB
model suggests that in terms of cooperation and conflict during this time period,
military governments were no more stable in their foreign policies than are their
civilian counterparts.
This is another area that merits further investigation. Military governments, in
fact, should be quite able to undertake foreign policy change if they wish. They are by
nature highly cohesive actors, with an organized and clearly defined hierarchical
structure. Cohesive actors face far fewer internal constraints on the decision making
process that could inhibit foreign policy. Another factor is that the military itself
exercises control over a significant tool of foreign policy. Military governments
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wishing to employ the military for a foreign policy action do not face the same barriers
as their non-democratic civilian counterparts in needing to convince a reluctant
military establishment to cooperate with the government's foreign policy aims. Also,
in non-democratic states where the military in not a political player, the military is
nonetheless often seen as a potential player. Their presence as an actor outside the
political system may have a constraining effect on a civilian autocrat’s ability and
willingness to undertake foreign policy change that could conflict with the interests of
the military.
In examining cases of the Third World, I hypothesize that features associated
with lower levels of political and economic development make these states especially
prone to strategies that use foreign policy to promote state building, development, and
legitimacy. Significant results are found in the predicted direction in both of the
models using U.N. voting. The model using COPDAB data as the dependent variable
does not yield significant findings for the independent variable. Statistically
significant estimates for control variables in this model that do explain change indicate
that with increasing capabilities and more similar alliance patterns with recipient
states, there is less foreign policy change.
Because these states are in a relatively weak position within the international
system, they may be unwilling to take on the consequences or risks associated with
significantly altering the substantive aspects of their policies in their relevant
international environment, as would be captured in the model using COPDAB data.
The fact that significant results are found in both of the U.N. votes model, however,
reflects the fact that these states conduct foreign policy in the United Nations
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fundamentally differently than in their direct interactions with other states. The United
Nations presents these states with a relatively cost-free forum to use foreign policy,
expressed in terms of U.N. votes, in the manner hypothesized. The less developed
states may use United Nations votes to assert their interests and independence and
thwart the interests of the major powers. This may be done for purposes of domestic
consumption without regard to the consequences invited by becoming more or less
conflictual with states in their relevant environments.
A factor that merits consideration is the fact that, as a United Nations affiliated
organization, the G-77’s activities are focused toward activities in the United Nations,
which may account for some of this change. However, examinations of the model
using wealth as the independent variable instead of G-77 membership produce nearly
identical results, with wealth associated with less foreign policy change.
The final hypothesis examines how executive changes in non-democracies and
democracies might differently impact foreign policy change. I predict that the
mediating aspects of organized, regularized and institutionalized political competition
in democracies will lead to fewer significant changes in foreign policy when new
leaders come to power. In non-democracies, however, where political competition
cannot effectively be channeled or managed, the expectation is that when changes in
the executive do happen, they will coincide with much more significant changes in
foreign policy. Interaction models for executive change do not produce significant
estimates for the interaction in any of the models, suggesting, somewhat surprisingly,
that there is no significant difference in the level of foreign policy change between
executive changes in non-democracies and democracies.
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Among the control variables not already discussed above, the variable for
national capabilities is consistently significant across most of the models. In the
COPDAB and important U.N. votes models, the estimate is negative, indicating that
greater capabilities mean less foreign policy change. In the Affinity model, the
estimate for capabilities is consistently positive and is associated with greater changes
in the similarity of voting patterns. Here again, the different direction of the estimates
is reflected in the measurement used for the dependent variable. If capabilities reflect
a state’s position in the system, it may be unwilling or unable to undertake the more
significant foreign policy changes reflected in the COPDAB and important votes
models. The General Assembly votes not subject to heavy U.S. lobbying, however,
may more accurately display these state’s preferences, which they are more
constrained from doing in other foreign policy areas – accounting for the greater levels
of change. The control variable for wealth is also significant across a large number of
the models. As is the case with capabilities, the direction of estimates varies
depending upon the measure of foreign policy used. The COPDAB produces positive
coefficients for this variable, while the important U.N. votes models produces negative
estimates. The Affinity models produce both positive and negative estimates.
Significant findings for the alliance control show that with greater alliance similarity
between states there is less foreign policy change.
Somewhat surprisingly, the estimates for the control variables for leadership
change and coup produce few statistically significant estimates, with the coup variable
dropped from the model several times due to collinearity. In cases where the variables
were significant, however, they were in the direction as predicted, indicating that
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executive changes coincide with greater foreign policy change. The different controls
for regime effects – capturing the regime type of the target, the distance between
regime types, and regime changes in the PRIE were consistent in their direction across
all cases. Significant estimates showed that the more democratic the recipient states,
the more foreign policy change occurred, and the greater the regime distance between
states, the less foreign policy change occurred. Possible reasons for this are outlined
above.
The Dissertation in Perspective
The statistical analysis supports the general contentions of this dissertation –
that the regime setting and institutional arrangements have an impact on the amount of
foreign policy change a state will undertake. Of the tests on the 9 hypotheses, seven
yielded significant findings from which to draw conclusions. The hypotheses are
summarized below, indicating which of models produced statistically significant
findings to support them:
H1: Democratic states demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign
policies than do non-democratic states.
• COPDAB
• Affinity
• Important Votes
H2: States with presidential democracies demonstrate a greater degree of
stability in their foreign policies than do states with parliamentary democracies.
• Affinity
H3: Presidential democracies with divided government demonstrate a greater
degree of stability in their foreign policies than do presidential democracies with
unified government.
• None
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H4: Multi-party presidential democracies demonstrate a greater degree of
stability in their foreign policies than do two-party presidential democracies.
• Important Votes
H5: Parliamentary democracies with coalition governments demonstrate a
greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do parliamentary
democracies with single-party governments.
• Important Votes
H6: In parliamentary democracies with coalition governments, the greater the
effective number of parties seated in the parliament, the more stable a state’s
foreign policy.
• COPDAB
• Important Votes
H7: Non-democratic governments in which the military is a member will engage
in a more stable foreign policy than will non-democratic governments where the
military is not a member.
• Affinity
H8: The more developed states will engage in a more stable foreign policy than
will the less developed states.
• Affinity
• Important Votes

H9: Changes of leadership in democratic states will produce less dramatic
changes in foreign policy than will leadership changes in non-democratic states.
• None
As this indicates, the results are not entirely robust. Only the results for the
first hypothesis produce significant estimates using all of the models in this
dissertation. This is not altogether surprising, considering that these measures cover
different time periods and vastly different aspects of foreign policy behavior. The
COPDAB measurement covers the Cold War period and includes a wide array of
foreign policy actions, from the diplomatic to military. The important U.N. votes
model covers the decade straddling the end of the Cold War and measures foreign
policy in terms of votes cast on issues important to the United States in the United
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Nations. The Affinity model covers the longest period and includes all annual votes
cast in the United Nations, measuring foreign policy change in terms of changes in
voting similarities with a state’s relevant environment.
Of the three different models, those employing the COPDAB measure offer the
most compelling evidence for the hypotheses they support. Because this measure
captures substantive actions that have real consequences for a state’s foreign policy,
findings discerning differences in the amount of foreign policy change between states
with different regime types and institutional arrangements provide compelling
evidence in support of the hypotheses. In a number of the hypotheses, significant
results were found using the U.N. voting measurements only. This may be a function
of the fact that U.N. voting, particularly as measured in Affinity, is a relatively costfree expression of foreign policy. When foreign policy changes involve more
significant risks and consequences, external considerations may override domestic
constraints and incentives facing decision-makers. The forum of U.N. however,
provides a forum where those constraints and incentives may play a more active role.
On the other hand, as was suggested in the discussion of divided government, the U.N.
may also provide a forum for leaders to “play politics” and express foreign policy
preferences that would be constrained in other venues. Both of these dynamics may be
in place, which merit future investigation.
The measure using important U. N. votes produces significant findings for
almost all of the independent variables tested. These votes are subject to heavy
lobbying and arm-twisting on the part of the United States. However, even when
controlling for alliance similarity with the United States and economic aid, the models
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show significant estimates for the independent variables. This suggests that those
factors driving the hypothesized differences in levels of foreign policy change are
sufficient to overcome these barriers. It also may reflect the ineffectiveness of U.S.
lobbying and bargaining efforts in the United Nations.
This dissertation is a significant contribution to the study of foreign policy
change. It builds on a number of recent works in different parts of the political science
literature and develops and tests hypotheses on important causal factors of foreign
policy change. Explanations of the democratic peace by authors such as Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Morgan and Schwebach (1992) and Morgan and
Campbell (1991) have shown how institutional constraints on democratic executives
promote accountability and competition, reducing the likelihood that democracies will
go to war with one another. Gaubatz (1996) demonstrates how aspects of democracy
made them less resistant to change and their alliances more durable. Leeds (1999)
demonstrates how these characteristics make democracies’ commitments more
credible and cooperation more likely. Recent works in the democratic peace by
scholars such as Prins and Sprecher (1999) and Auerswald (1999) have expanded the
concept of regime to examine how different institutional constraints within
democracies affect a state’s likelihood to take military action or escalate disputes. In
the area of comparative politics, institutionalists such as Tsebelis (1995, 2002),
Cheibub and Limongi (2002), and Stephan Haggard, et. al. (2001) have looked at ways
domestic institutional arrangements facilitate or inhibit policy change. Aspects of each
of these approaches were incorporated into this dissertation to study how regimes and
institutions specifically affect foreign policy change.
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This dissertation applies these important concepts developed elsewhere in the
literature to a field of inquiry where they have thus far received little attention. For
scholars of the democratic peace, this dissertation offers insight into how regime
characteristics might impact foreign policy more generally, below the levels of war
and peace. These findings are also insightful for scholars of comparative politics.
Arguably, foreign policy should be much less sensitive to institutional and political
constraints and other types of public policy. The fact that institutional arrangements
were found to have an influence on foreign policy change further enhances the
argument of those comparativists who claim that "institutions matter" and can have a
profound influence on the policy process.
Implications for Future Research
This dissertation is an important step in applying the concepts of regimes
institutions to the study of foreign policy change, and the concepts developed here
provide directions for future study. Greater insight into role of institutions and foreign
policy change may be found by distinguishing between different types of foreign
policy change. Different types of policies demand the use of different foreign policy
instruments, each of which may generate different constraints and incentives for
foreign policy change. Differentiating between economic policies and security
policies may show that executives may be more or less sensitive to the constraints and
risks associated with foreign policy change, depending upon the nature of the policy.
Legislatures in presidential systems, for example, are likely more sensitive to changes
in economic policies that could impact their constituents. Differentiating policy types
may demonstrate that institutional constraints are greater concerning economic
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policies than, for example, security policies. This dynamic, if it exists, may account
for a lack of significant findings in a number of the models.

The COPDAB data

provides an outlet to explore these differences, where policy types are identified
according to security, economic, cultural, etc. The data also provides an opportunity to
capture directional change in foreign policy – toward more cooperation or conflict.
Future study, for example, may uncover a difference in the direction that nondemocracies and democracies change their foreign policies.
This dissertation determined that constraints and incentives for foreign policy
change are discernible by regime type, as well as institutional arrangement. Future
studies should refine those specific aspects that constrain and/or create incentives for
foreign policy change. This would require taking apart and analyzing the myriad of
characteristics inherent in each of the institutions to determine those specific aspects
that inhibit or encourage foreign policy change. For example, is it the leader’s risk
adversity or the institutional constraints that inhibit change in a given system?
Another direction for future study is to examine other institutional factors that might
have an influence on foreign policy change. These may include bicameralism versus
unicameralism, federalism, the division of cabinet portfolios in coalition governments,
as well as corporatist arrangements and other aspects of citizen representation.
Foreign policy change remains an important subject of inquiry, and recent
scholarship in this area suggests a renewed interest in studying those factors that may
impel states to depart from status quo foreign policies. By demonstrating the influence
of regimes and institutions on foreign policy change, this dissertation adds important
new elements to the study. Foreign policies will continue to change as long as states
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continue to conduct foreign policies. The quest to explain those changes will also
continue. As this dissertation shows, the centuries-old debate over regimes and
foreign policy behavior is as relevant today as ever before.
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APPENDIX A
COPDAB DATA DESCRIPTION
1. Voluntary unification into one nation: two states join into a single, legally binding
government.
2. Major strategic alliance (regional or international): fighting a war jointly; establishing
or joining a joint military command or alliance; conducting joint military maneuvers; or
establishing economic common market.
3. Military, economic or strategic support: selling nuclear power plants or materials;
providing air, naval, or land facilities for bases; providing military assistance; granting
military aid; joint programs and plans to initiate and pursue disarmament; or sharing
highly advanced technology.
4. Non-military, economic, technological or industrial agreement: making economic
loans or grants; agreeing to economic pacts or trade agreements; giving industrial,
cultural, or educational assistance; establishing common transportation or communication
networks; selling industrial-technological surplus supplies; providing technical expertise;
ceasing economic restrictions; repaying debts or providing disaster relief.
5. Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non-strategic): starting diplomatic
relations; recognizing a government; visit by a head of state; opening borders;
establishing technological or scientific communications; proposing or offering economic
or military aid; conducting or enacting friendship agreements; or conducting cultural and
academic agreements or exchanges.
6. Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime: official support of a policy; raising
legation to an embassy; reaffirming friendship; asking for help against third party;
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apologizing for unfavorable actions or statements; allowing entry of press
correspondents; thanking for aid; or resuming broken diplomatic or other relations.
7. Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions--mild verbal support: meeting of
high officials; visit by lower officials for talks; conferring on problems of mutual interest;
proposing talks; issuing joint communiqués; announcing cease-fires; exchanging
prisoners of war; appointing ambassadors; non-governmental exchanges; requesting
support for a policy.
8. Neutral or non-significant acts: rhetorical policy statements; non-consequential news
items; non-governmental visitors; indifference statements; compensating for
nationalized enterprises or private property; or “no comment” statements.
9. Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction: low-key objections to
policies or behavior; communicating dissatisfaction through a third party; failing to reach
an agreement; refusing a protest note; denying accusations; objecting to an explanation of
goals, position, etc.; or requesting change in policy.
10. Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction: warning retaliation for
acts; making threatening demands and accusations; condemning strongly specific actions
or policies; denouncing leaders, a system, or ideology; postponing heads of state visits;
refusing participation in meetings or summits; leveling strong propaganda attacks;
denying support; blocking or vetoing policy or proposals in the United Nations or other
international bodies.
11. Diplomatic-economic hostile actions: increasing troop mobilization; boycotts;
hindering movement on land, waterways, or in the air; closing borders and blocking free
communication; imposing economic sanctions; embargoing goods; refusing mutual trade
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rights; manipulating trade or currency to cause economic problems; halting aid; granting
sanctuary to opposition leaders; mobilizing hostile demonstrations against a target
country; refusing to support foreign military allies; recalling an ambassador for
emergency consultations regarding a target country; refusing visas to other nationals or
restricting movement in the country; expelling or arresting nationals or press; spying on
foreign government officials; terminating major agreements.
12. Political-military hostile actions: inciting or supporting riots, rebellions or guerilla
activities against the target country; limited and sporadic terrorist actions; kidnapping or
torturing foreign citizens or prisoners of war; providing sanctuary to terrorists; attacking
diplomats or embassies; breaking diplomatic relations; expelling military advisors; or
nationalizing companies without compensation.
13. Small scale military acts: limited air, sea, or border skirmishes; border police acts;
annexing territory already occupied; seizing material of a target country; imposing
blockades; assassinating leaders of a target country; or material support of subversive
activities against target country.
14. Limited war acts: intermittent shelling or clashes; sporadic bombing of military or
industrial areas; small-scale interception or sinking of ships; mining of territorial waters.
15. Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs: full-scale air,
naval, or land battles; invasion of territory; occupation of territory; massive bombing of
civilian areas; capturing of soldiers in battle; large scale bombing of military installations;
or the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
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APPENDIX B
POLITY DATA DESCRIPTION
Variable descriptions are adapted from Gurr (1997) and Marshall and Jaggers (2000b)
1. Competitiveness of Participation: Refers to the extent to which alternative preferences
for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.
a.) Suppressed Competition (coded 0 for Democracy, 2 for Autocracy): No
significant oppositional activity outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party,
and the regime's institutional structure is matched by its demonstrated ability to
suppress oppositional competition.
b.) Restricted (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): Some organized
political competition occurs outside government, but the regime systematically
and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups
(20% or more of the male adult population) from participation.
c.) Factional Competition (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Polities with
“factional” or “factional/restricted” patterns of competition. This differs from
"Restricted" in that the restrictions are not "persisting in nature," and do not
include large categories of people, groups, or types of peaceful political
competition.
d.) Transitional Competition (coded 2 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Any
transitional elements from Restricted, or Factional patterns to fully Competitive
patterns, or vice versa.
e.) Competitive Competition (coded 3 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy):
Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political
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influence at the national level. Competition rarely causes widespread violence or
disruption. Very small parties or political groups may be restricted.
2. Regulation of Participation: The extent to which there are binding rules on when,
whether, and how political preferences are expressed.
a.) Restricted (coded 0 for Democracy, 2 for Autocracy): Some organized
political participation is permitted, but significant groups, issues and/or types of
conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.
b.) Factional/Restricted (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): Polities which
oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and restriction -when one group secures power it restricts its opponents' political activities until it
is in turn displaced.
3. Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: "The extent that prevailing modes of
advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr,
1974:1483)."
a.) Selection (coded 0 for Democracy, 2 for Autocracy): Chief executives are
determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both.
Examples include rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of
presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian
executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent
selection of successors; and cases where there are repeated election boycotts by
the major opposition parties.
b.) Dual/Transitional (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 to Autocracy): Dual executives in
which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election.
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Also used to describe transitional arrangements between Selection and competitive
Election.
c.) Election (coded 2 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Chief executives are chosen
in or through competitive elections (may be popular or by an elected assembly)
matching two or more major parties or candidates.
4. Openness of Executive Recruitment: Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to
the extent that all the politically-active population has an opportunity, in principle, to
attain the position through a regularized process.
a.) Closed (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): Chief executives are
determined by hereditary succession, which have executive powers by right of
decent.
b.) Dual Executive--Designation (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy):
Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief
minister.
c.) Dual Executive--Election (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy):
Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.
d.) Open (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Chief executives are chosen
by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between
designation and election.
5. Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): Eckstein and Gurr (1975) define decision
rules in the following manner:
Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the
direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers
and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been
concluded, especially “properly” concluded. An indispensable
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ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision
Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered
to have been taken (ibid.: 121).
This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making
powers of chief executives (whether individuals or collectives), which may be imposed
by any number of different "accountability groups."
a.) Unlimited Authority of Chief Executive (coded 0 for Democracy, 3 for
Autocracy): There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions. Examples
include: cases where constitutional restrictions are ignored, or the constitution is
frequently revised or suspended; there is no legislative assembly, or it is called
and dismissed at the executive's will; the executive appoints a majority of
members of any accountability group and can remove them at will; the legislature
cannot initiate legislation, veto or suspend acts of the executive; rule by decree is
repeatedly used.
b.) Intermediate Category (code 0 for Democracy, 2 for Autocracy): A transition
period between Unlimited Authority and Slight to Moderate Limitations, where
power within an autocratic regime is either contracting or expanding.
c.) Slight to Moderate Limitations on Executive Authority (coded 0 for
Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): There are real, but limited constraints on the
executive. Examples include: cases where the legislature can initiate some
categories of legislation and delays or blocks implementation of executive acts
and decrees; the ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some
administrative action independently of the executive; the legislature or party
approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive; the
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executive fails to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on
succeeding himself, or extending his term; there is an independent judiciary;
situations in which there is civilian leadership, but policy decisions reflect the
demands of the military.
d.) Intermediate Category (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): A transition
period between the concepts Slight to Moderate Limitations and Substantial
Limitations, where limited constraints on an autocratic regime emerge, or there is
a weakening of horizontal accountability in a democratic system.
e.) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority (coded 2 for Democracy, 0 for
Autocracy): The executive has more effective authority than any accountability
group but is subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples include: a
legislature, ruling party or council that often modifies or defeats executive
proposals for action; a council or legislature that sometimes refuses funds to the
executive; the accountability group makes important appointments to
administrative posts; the legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the
country.
f.) Intermediate Category (coded 3 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): A transition
period between Substantial Limitations and Executive Parity or Subordination,
where there is a weakening of executive authority vis-à-vis the legislature and/or
the judiciary, or a strengthening of executive authority vis-à-vis these branches of
government. This category includes cases where the legislature grants the
executive temporary emergency powers in times of a national crisis.
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g.) Executive Parity or Subordination (coded 4 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy):
Accountability groups have effective authority equal to, or greater than the
executive in most areas of activity.
Examples include: a legislature, ruling party, or council that initiates most
important legislation; and cases where the executive is chosen by the
accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office
(as in most parliamentary systems). Most consolidated democracies are coded
here (Marshall and Jaggers 2000b).
The Polity dataset constructs separate democracy and autocracy scores for every
state, as of Dec. 31 of each year
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APPENDIX C
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT
AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Table C.1 Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
COPDAB (1954-1978)
2,815
4.043
3.669
0
Affinity (1951-1992)
4,762
0.056
0.056
0
Important Votes (1986-1997)
1,608
0.130
0.135
0

Max.
29.944
0.489*
1.000

* For a more accurate representation of this data, a single outlier of 0.839 is eliminated from this
summary.

Table C.2 Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
Variable
Obs.*
Mean
Std. Dev. Min.
Democracy (1954-1978)**
2,346
0.366
0.482
0.000
Democracy (1951-1992)
4,168
0.389
0.488
0.000
Democracy (1986-1997)
1,390
0.564
0.496
0.000
Presidential Dem. (1954-1978)
858
0.202
0.401
0.000
Presidential Dem. (1951-1992)
1,612
0.271
0.445
0.000
Presidential Dem. (1986-1997)
772
0.475
0.500
0.000
Pres. Dem. Divided (1954-1978)
147
0.592
0.493
0.000
Pres. Dem. Divided (1951-1992)
265
0.664
0.473
0.000
Pres. Dem. Divided (1986-1997)
146
0.801
0.400
0.000
ENP in Pres. Dem. (1954-1978)
167
2.525
0.9631
1.212
ENP in Pres. Dem. (1951-1992)
415
2.825
1.623
1.000
ENP in Pres. Dem. (1986-1997) *** 337
3.751
3.581
1.000
Coalition Parl. Dem. (1954-1978)
629
0.590
0.492
0.000
Coalition Parl. Dem. (1951-1992) 1,083
0.594
0.491
0.000
Coalition Parl. Dem. (1986-1997)
301
0.664
0.473
0.000
ENP in Coal. Parl Dem. (1954-1978) 366
3.576
1.097
1.829
ENP in Coal. Parl Dem. (1951-1992) 638
3.811
1.298
1.829
ENP in Coal. Parl Dem. (1986-1997) 198
4.477
1.762
2.227
Military-Civilian Rule (1954-1978) 1,488 0.173
0.379
0.000
Military-Civilian Rule (1951-1992) 2,546
0.178
0.382
0.000
Military-Civilian Rule (1986-1997)
604
0.192
0.394
0.000
Military Rule (1954-1978)
1,488
0.055
0.228
0.000
Military Rule (1951-1992)
2,546
0.062
0.242
0.000
Military Rule (1986-1997)
604
0.065
0.246
0.000
Less Developed (1954-1978)
4,090
0.700
0.458
0.000
Less Developed (1951-1992)
6,858
0.700
0.458
0.000
Less Developed (1986-1997)
1,954
0.700
0.459
0.000
Exec. Change (1954-1978)
2,963
0.177
0.382
0.000
Exec. Change (1951-1992)
5,208
0.173
0.378
0.000
Exec. Change (1986-1997)
1,818
0.166
0.372
0.000
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Max.
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
5.893
12.300
34.014
1.000
1.000
1.000
8.058
10.905
10.905
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

* The number of observations does not precisely meet the N in each of the models due to some missing
control variables.
** Democracy variable is coded 1 for democracy (17-21 on Polity scale) and 0 for non-democracy (1-5 on
Polity scale). Interim cases (6 –16) are coded as missing data here.
***The CNTS data set codes all self-identified parties as separate parties. Several conglomerate parties in
countries of the former Soviet Union Eastern Europe won seats in the early to mid 1990s, which accounts
for few cases of unusually high multipartism.
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APPENDIX D
HISTOGRAMS FOR DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
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Figure D.1 Relative Frequency Distribution
COPDAB Dependent Variable, 1954-1978
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Figure D.2 Relative Frequency Distribution
U.N. Affinity Dependent Variable, 1951-1992
Single outlier of 0.839 is eliminated from this histogram for more accurate representation.
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Figure D.3 Relative Frequency Distribution
Important U.N. Votes Dependent Variable, 1986-1997
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Figure D.4 Relative Frequency Distribution
Regime Type Independent Variable (21-Point Scale), 1954-1978
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Figure D.5 Relative Frequency Distribution
Regime Type Independent Variable (21-Point Scale), 1951-1992
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Figure D.6 Relative Frequency Distribution
Regime Type Independent Variable (21-Point Scale), 1986-1997
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Figure D.7 Relative Frequency Distribution
Effective Number of Parties in Presidential Democracy Indep. Var., 1954-1978
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Figure D.8 Relative Frequency Distribution
Effective Number of Parties in Presidential Democracy Indep. Var., 1951-1992
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Figure D.9 Relative Frequency Distribution
Effective Number of Parties in Presidential Democracy Indep. Var., 1985-1997
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Figure D.10 Relative Frequency Distribution
Effective Number of Parties in Coalition Parl. Dem. Indep. Var., 1954-1978
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Effective Number of Parties in Coalition Parl. Dem. Indep. Var., 1951-1992
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Effective Number of Parties in Coalition Parl. Dem. Indep. Var., 1986-1997
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APPENDIX E
CORRELATION MATRICES FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Table E.1
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Democratic Systems (Democracies Only), 1954-1978
Pres.
Div. Govt.
ENP
Coalition
Less Dev.
Exec Change

Pres.
1.000
.468
-.187
N/A
.438
-.067

Div.
Govt.
1.000
.029
-.053
.194
-.074

ENP

Coalition

Less Dev.

1.000
.666
-.279
.149

1.000
-.290
.130

1.000
-.033

Exec.
Change

1.000

Table E.2
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Democratic Systems (Democracies Only), 1951-1992
Pres.
Div. Govt.
ENP
Coalition
Less Dev.
Exec Change

Pres.
1.000
.401
-.122
N/A
.500
-.045

Div.
Govt.

ENP

1.000
.097
.017
.164
-.018

1.000
.626
-.186
.103

Coalition

Less Dev.

1.000
-.252
.100

1.000
-.010

Exec.
Change

1.000

Table E.3
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Democratic Systems (Democracies Only), 1986-1997
Pres.
Div. Govt.
ENP
Coalition
Less Dev.
Exec Change

Pres.
1.000
.331
-.060
N/A
.510
-.053

Div.
Govt.

ENP

Coalition

Less Dev.

1.000
.272
.192
.093
.050

1.000
.558
-.101
.072

1.000
-.140
.081

1.000
.012
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Exec.
Change

1.000

Table E.4
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Non-Democratic Systems
(Non-Democracies Only), 1954-1978
Military-Civ.
Military
Less Dev.
Exec. Change

MilitaryCivilian
1.000
-.111
.165
.100

Military

Less Dev.

Exec.
Change

1.000
.109
.210

1.000
.024

1.000

Table E.5
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Non-Democratic Systems
(Non-Democracies Only), 1951-1992
Military-Civ.
Military
Less Dev.
Exec. Change

MilitaryCivilian
1.000
-.120
.164
.073

Military

Less Dev.

Exec.
Change

1.000
.106
.219

1.000
-.016

1.000

Table E.6
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Non-Democratic Systems
(Non-Democracies Only), 1986-1997
Military-Civ.
Military
Less Dev.
Exec. Change

MilitaryCivilian
1.000
-.128
.135
.050

Military

Less Dev.

Exec.
Change

1.000
.073
.128

1.000
-.066

1.000

Table E.7
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Democratic and Non-Democratic Systems
(Both Systems Included), 1954-1978
Non-Dem.
Democracy
Less Dev.
Exec. Change

Non-Dem.
1.000
-.674
.243
-.229

Democracy

Less Dev.

Exec.
Change

1.000
-.444
.183

1.000
-.059

1.000

237

Table E.8
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Democratic and Non-Democratic Systems
(Both Systems Included), 1951-1992
Non-Dem.
Democracy
Less Dev.
Exec. Change

Non-Dem.
1.000
-.696
.288
-.219

Democracy

Less Dev.

Exec.
Change

1.000
-.454
.176

1.000
-.078

1.000

Table E.9
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Democratic and Non-Democratic Systems
(Both Systems Included), 1986-1997
Non-Dem.
Democracy
Less Dev.
Exec. Change

Non-Dem.
1.000
-.659
.346
-.167

Democracy

Less Dev.

Exec.
Change

1.000
-.416
.179

1.000
-.092

1.000
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